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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates two relationships between governance and portfolio
restructuring. First, post-restructuring governance is addressed. Prior research
suggests that firms restructure because of less than desirable performance, which
results from managerial inefficiencies. Such inefficiencies are predominantly believed to
be the result of inadequate governance. Research has never proven that governance is
weak in the pre-restructuring period, yet this philosophy has become institutionalized.
Thus, if governance is weak or a complete failure in the pre-restructuring period, then
what changes do firms make in the post-restructuring period? Drawing on institutional
and resource dependence theories, this dissertation addresses this issue by suggesting
that modifications to governance structures in the post-restructuring period are greatest
for those firms with poor performance in the pre-restructuring period. Specifically, these
firms will adjust their governance structures to reflect socially valid indicators of sound
governance. By changing governance structures that adhere to the prescriptions of
rationalizing myths in the institutional environment, an organization might enhance its
legitimacy and demonstrate that it is behaving on collectively valued purposes in a
proper manner. The results revealed that the relationship between restructuring and
governance is best characterized as direct, irrespective of firm performance.
Restructuring was positively related to the proportion of outsiders on the board, and
CEO, top management team, and board of director equity ownership in the postrestructuring period. The results also revealed an interaction effect between
restructuring and CEO equity ownership, as well as a curvilinear relationship between
restructuring and CEO duality.

ix

Second, this dissertation focuses on the impact of governance on the
restructuring-performance relationship. Due to institutionalized beliefs about what
constitutes sound governance, it is argued that firms will be positively rewarded if their
firms possess socially valid indicators of governance because there is evidence that
market valuations can be impacted by non-financial factors, such as governance
structures. The results revealed that CEO duality negatively influences shareholder
returns. Additionally, shareholders of restructuring firms were positively rewarded by
holding ownership positions in firms with independent boards and boards with large ties
to the environment. Discussions for both studies are offered, in addition to
contributions, limitations, and areas for future research.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Corporate restructuring has been a significant area of interest to strategy and
finance scholars in helping to understand the limits of firm growth, the implications of
changes in the firm’s business portfolio, as well as the effectiveness of changes in
organizational and capital structures (Bergh, 2001; Bowman & Singh, 1993; Johnson,
1996). Although a considerable amount of restructuring research has been carried out
resulting in much insight for scholars and practitioners alike, significant contributions
can still be made (Bergh & Lawless, 1998; Bowman & Singh, 1993; Bowman, Singh,
Useem & Bhadury, 1999; Chatterjee, Harrison & Bergh, 2003; Johnson, 1996; Markides
& Singh, 1997).
Even though the literature has clearly established and empirically verified the
existence of three different types of corporate restructurings (Bowman & Singh, 1993),
this dissertation focuses strictly on the phenomena of portfolio restructuring (also known
as asset restructuring, refocusing, or downscoping – Johnson, 1996). Specifically,
portfolio restructuring involves the process of divesting and acquiring businesses that
entails a refocusing on the organization’s core business(es), resulting in a change of the
diversity of a firm’s portfolio of businesses (Bergh, 1998; Bowman, & Singh, 1990; 1993;
Bowman et al., 1999; Gibbs, 1993). The other two types of restructuring are financial
restructurings, which involve significant changes in the capital structure of a firm,
including leveraged buyouts and debt for equity swaps, and organizational
restructurings, which involve significant changes in the organizational structure of the
firm, including a realignment of structure with strategy, flattening of hierarchic levels,
and employment downsizing (Bowman et al., 1999; Bowman & Singh, 1993).
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Portfolio restructuring is an important organizational phenomenon worthy of study
since it is, and has been, a much undertaken practice by top executives (Bergh, 2001;
Bowman et al., 1999; Chatterjee et al., 2003; Filatotchev, Buck & Zhukov, 2000;
Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994; Johnson, 1996). During the 1990s and into the 21st century,
mergers and acquisitions, as well as restructuring activities were quite prevalent. For
instance, Frank and Sidel (2002) and Frank (2002) noted that the biggest wave of
mergers and acquisitions was during the 1990s, which totaled $8.7 trillion.
Furthermore, the authors noted that spin-offs and sales of subsidiaries accounted for
35% of the total market of mergers and acquisitions in 2001, which compared to 21% in
2000 and 22% in 1999. In January 2002 alone, there were 75% more announced spinoffs compared to the same month a year prior (Frank, 2002). Additionally, the U.S.
Bureau of Census reported that in the years 2000 and 2001, a total of 3,497 and 2,776
divestitures were undertaken in the United States, with a total market value of $891.8
billion and $654.7 billion, respectively.1 Recent announcements of portfolio
restructurings have come from large firms such as Merck, AT&T, Citigroup, Fleet
Boston Financial, JC Penney, Diageo, Motorola, Emerson Electric, and Philips
Electronics.
The decade of the 1980s also produced a considerable amount of refocusing
activity (Johnson, 1996). For example, there were 1,200 divestitures worth $59.9 billion
in 1986 alone; 2,450 leveraged buyouts worth $297 billion between 1981 and 1989; and
an overwhelming 55,000 mergers and acquisitions worth just under $2 trillion between
1981 and 1989 (Jensen, 1993; Mergers & Acquisitions, 1990). Markides (1993)
1

These Bureau of Census figures cover transactions valued at $5 million or more. Additionally,
divestiture activity reported by the Bureau of Census requires a divesting firm to have at least a 40%
stake or a $100 million investment in the divested firm prior to divestiture.
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reported that at least twenty percent and as many as fifty percent of the Fortune 500
firms refocused in the period of 1981 through 1987. These numbers are in contrast to
the approximately one percent of the Fortune 500 organizations that refocused in the
1960s.
Portfolio restructuring is not only a valuable area of study since it has been,
frequently employed by managers, but is theoretically important because it represents a
shift in an organization’s domain in response to endogenous and exogenous factors
(Smart & Hitt, 1994). These changes in the firm’s level and type of diversification
represent critical decisions that affect not only the boundaries of the organization, but
also the allocation of resources within them (Goodstein & Boeker, 1991). Furthermore,
such changes in the organization’s domain redefine the expectations of both the
members of the firm and for others with whom they interact, and alter the “image of the
organization’s role in the larger system, which in turn serves as a guide for the ordering
of action in certain directions and not in others” (Thompson, 1967: 29).
A multitude of empirical and theoretical investigations into the antecedents of
portfolio restructuring have revealed that various factors precipitate the shedding and/or
expansion of corporate assets. A synthesis of this research reveals that there are four
main drivers of portfolio restructuring. First, the premier explanation (also known as the
agency explanation) is that firms engage in portfolio restructuring as a direct response
to less than desirable organizational performance (Duhaime & Grant, 1984; Hoskisson
& Hitt, 1994; Hoskisson, Johnson & Moesel, 1994; Johnson, 1996; Johnson, Hoskisson
& Hitt, 1993; Markides, 1995; Montgomery, Thomas & Kamath, 1984; Smart & Hitt,
1994), which is claimed to have resulted from past managerial inefficiencies. Such
managerial inefficiencies occurred largely as a result of weak governance mechanisms,
3

and, as a result of its overwhelming acceptance by restructuring researchers, the
agency explanation has made portfolio restructuring synonymous with weak or poor
governance (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; Chatterjee et al., 2003; Hoskisson & Turk,
1990; Markides & Singh, 1997). Second, researchers have argued that firms
restructure as a result of mimicking the behavior of other organizations that are
engaged in the divestiture of assets (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Markides & Singh, 1997;
Oliver, 1991). Third, it is suggested that environmental conditions serve as antecedents
to portfolio restructuring (Bergh & Lawless, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1991). Lastly,
researchers suggest that firm strategy is a driver of portfolio restructuring (Baysinger &
Hoskisson, 1989; Johnson, 1996; Markides, 1992, 1995). These four antecedents are
elaborated upon in the following chapter.
Although poor performance driven by weak governance is the most widely
investigated antecedent of portfolio restructuring, it is also the most widely contested
area since the governance structures of restructuring firms are automatically labeled as
inappropriate. As will be revealed later in this dissertation, research has not really
proven that governance is weak in the pre-restructuring period, yet this school of
thought has become institutionalized in the literature. Markides and Singh (1997)
attempted to address this issue in their research and revealed that the governance
structures of firms that did restructure are not statistically different from the governance
structures of firms that did not restructure. As such, much work remains in this area in
order to assess the relationship between governance and restructuring. It is important
to note that unlike the other three drivers of restructuring mentioned above (i.e.,
mimicry, environmental conditions, and firm strategy), which are well-accepted and
undisputed, governance still presents a gray area for restructuring researchers.
4

One area that has received little or no attention is that of post-restructuring
governance. In calls for future portfolio restructuring research, Johnson (1996) asked
that if governance is truly weak or a complete failure in the pre-restructuring period, then
what changes does a firm make in the post-restructuring period? The basic implications
of this question is that if firms do not correct such inefficiencies or shortcomings, then
the process of portfolio restructuring may be followed by renewed expansion or
continued inefficiencies in various governance mechanisms.
Within the first part of this dissertation, it is argued that not all firms will change
their governance structures in the post-restructuring period. Specifically, it is suggested
that firms that suffer from poor performance in the pre-restructuring period will initiate
governance changes in the post-restructuring period. The rationale behind these
arguments is that for these firms it is common for their governance structures to be
labeled as weak or inadequate (i.e., the agency explanation of restructuring). As such,
boards of directors and the CEO are pressured by institutional investors and
substandard performance assessments by the financial markets to not only address the
performance issues but also address the governance issues that are frequently linked
with the firm’s poor performance. Such arguments are reasonable since it is suggested
that in times of organizational crises, such as poor performance, CEOs and boards of
directors are spurred to action (Chatterjee & Harrison, 2001; Daily, 1996; Daily &
Dalton, 1994, 1995; Smart & Hitt, 1994: Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001).
Thus, the first part of this dissertation argues that governance changes are most
prevalent in firms that restructured their portfolio of assets and experienced sub-optimal
performance in the pre-restructuring period. In other words, low performance leads to
changes in governance, and the magnitude or probability of these changes is amplified
5

for those firms that have restructured their portfolio of assets.

A graphical

representation of the impacts of performance and restructuring on governance
structures in the post asset restructuring period is offered in Figure 1.
By drawing on the basic tenets of institutional (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer
& Rowan, 1977) and resource dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) theories this
dissertation suggests that firms experiencing poor performance redesign their
governance structures in post-restructuring periods to enhance, or even maintain,
organizational legitimacy (Oliver, 1991), whether or not such changes are instituted for
substantive or symbolic reasons. By changing governance structures that adhere to the
prescriptions of rationalizing myths in the institutional environment, an organization may
demonstrate that it is behaving on collectively valued purposes in a proper and
adequate manner (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Thus, by not making significant changes in
post-restructuring governance structures, the firm becomes more vulnerable to claims
that they are negligent or irrational. Additionally, as posited by the resource
dependence perspective, conformity of organizations to normative pressures increases
the flow of societal resources and enhances the chances of survival (Meyer & Rowan,
1977; Parsons, 1960: Tolbert & Zucker, 1996; Zucker, 1987).
Based on these arguments, the first set of research questions are “Do
organizations experiencing substandard performance in pre-restructuring periods
modify their governance structures in post-restructuring periods?” and “If governance
structures do change in post-restructuring periods, what types of changes are made?”
As prior research suggests, the ultimate goal of restructuring firms is to adjust an
organization’s portfolio of businesses with the intent, either directly or indirectly, of

6
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! CEO equity ownership
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TMT’s Personal Wealth
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•

Board’s Personal Wealth
! Board equity ownership

(t-2 to t -1)

Figure 1
Governance in the Post-Restructuring Period – Study 1

improving firm performance. Thus, this dissertation addresses a second, yet related,
topic – the impact of post-restructuring governance and governance changes on firm
performance. Utilizing institutional theory to address this topic is valuable since the
financial markets’ reactions may reflect social benefits resulting from symbolic actions
that reduce uncertainty about managerial motives (Westphal & Zajac, 1998).
Institutional theorists have argued that symbolic actions are most effective under
conditions of uncertainty or ambiguity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan,
1977; Scott, 1995; Westphal & Zajac, 1998). The restructuring literature suggests that
assets restructuring events are significant enough to surround the organization with
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uncertainty and ambiguity as a result of considerable changes to the firm’s routines and
organizational domain.
Thus, one could argue that potentially symbolic actions such as socially valid
governance structures might play a role in the social construction of market value when
firms are engaging in portfolio restructuring activities. As such, it is suggested that the
returns to shareholders are greater for those organizations exhibiting socially
legitimated governance structures. As such, the second research question of this
dissertation is “What is the moderating impact of governance on the relationship
between portfolio restructuring and performance?” A graphical representation of these
relationships is offered in Figure 2.
The outline for the remainder of this dissertation is as follows. In chapter 2 the
existing literature on portfolio restructuring and governance is reviewed with the intent of
synthesizing existing empirical findings and discussing the gaps in the literature.
Chapter 3 develops the theoretical foundation of this research project along with
propositions. The specific hypotheses, the variables of interest, and methods used to
test the hypotheses are offered in chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses the findings of the
analyses. Lastly, chapter 6 contains a discussion and offers implications and
contributions of this dissertation, as well as its limitations.
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Figure 2
The Moderating Impact of Governance on Post-Restructuring
Firm Performance – Study 2
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Within this chapter a variety of issues will be discussed in relation to governance
and restructuring. First, there is a discussion about the concept of portfolio restructuring
and its antecedents. Even though the literature has settled on four primary drivers,
research has overwhelmingly focused on the relationship between governance and
restructuring since agency arguments have become institutionalized in the restructuring
literature. In essence, portfolio restructuring as a result of poor performance has
automatically been attributable to weak governance.
Following such a discussion, the chapter discusses how agency arguments have
also been taken for granted in not only the restructuring literature, but also the literature
on corporate governance. As such, an explanation of this phenomenon and the
literature’s interpretation of what constitutes good governance are discussed. The third
section draws upon this discussion of what the literature deems to be sound
governance practices by discussing the impact these structures have on organizational
performance. One would assume that overwhelming consensus concerning best
governance practices would be reached due to their positive impact on performance,
yet there are no real systematic relationships between governance characteristics and
organizational performance.
In the fourth and fifth sections I build upon the prior discussion by elaborating on
boards of directors and their roles within organizations. Such a discussion is important
because the primary focus of governance research, as evidenced earlier, revolves
around the board of directors. I elaborate on the value boards have in conferring
legitimacy upon their organizations. Furthermore, I discuss the pressures boards face
in periods of poor performance from external constituencies, and the types of reforms
10

they seek with the intent of improving the governance of the organization and ultimately
the performance of the organization.
Following the above discussions, I review the governance-restructuring
relationship in general and specific relationships in the literature that address the
impacts of governance structures on restructuring activity. Specifically, I review in detail
twelve governance-restructuring relationships found in the literature. It is evident at the
conclusion of this review that, for the most part, there are no systematic relationships
between governance and restructuring activity. As such, the eighth section of this
chapter attempts to shed light on five issues that might contribute to contradictory
findings. Lastly, I discuss the next logical step in the governance-restructuring
literature, which serves as the focus of this dissertation. This discussion also points out
the specific contributions of this research project.
2.A.

Portfolio Restructuring and Its Antecedents
During the 1960s and 1970s, many firms diversified their organizations

predominantly via the acquisition of businesses unrelated to their core business(es),
thus frequently achieving ‘conglomerate’ status (Bergh, 2001; Davis et al., 1994;
Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994; Johnson, 1996; Servaes, 1996; Shleifer & Vishny, 1991). Such
undertakings resulted in firms very large in size and, in some instances, producing firms
that owned over 500 different business lines. However, during the 1980s and 1990s,
many of these highly diversified businesses were reorganized as a result of refocusing
initiatives intended to reduce both the breath of corporate portfolios (i.e., lower levels of
diversification) and overall company size, thus ultimately translating into firms holding
more related diversified portfolios (Berger & Ofek, 1995; Comment & Jarrell, 1995;
Davis et al., 1994; Kose & Ofek, 1995; Johnson, 1996; Markides, 1992; Williams, Paez
11

& Sanders, 1988). A related diversified portfolio is one in which the organization
controls businesses that share similarities in products, markets, and/or technologies
with the intent of allowing management to exploit the interrelationships between the
businesses (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990, 1994; Palepu, 1985; Rumelt, 1974).
As previously mentioned, a multitude of empirical and theoretical investigations
into the antecedents of portfolio restructuring have revealed that various factors
precipitate the shedding of corporate assets. A synthesis of this research reveals that
there are four main drivers of portfolio restructuring.
2.A.1. The Agency Explanation
The premier explanation as to why organizations engage in portfolio restructuring
is in response to less than desirable organizational performance (Duhaime & Grant,
1984; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994; Hoskisson, Johnson & Moesel, 1994; Johnson, 1996;
Markides, 1995; Markides & Singh, 1997; Montgomery, Thomas & Kamath, 1984; Smart
& Hitt, 1994). In other words, an organization divests assets with the intent of improving
performance, whether it is their performance in relation to competitors, the overall
industry, or a predetermined aspiration level (Greve, 1998). In fact, research has clearly
demonstrated that firms engaged in restructuring often are performing poorly prior to the
initiation of restructuring activities (Bergh, 2001; Bowman et al., 1999; Duhaime & Baird,
1987; Duhaime & Grant, 1984; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994; Hoskisson & Johnson, 1992;
Hoskisson et al., 1994; Johnson, 1996; Lang, Poulson & Stulz, 1995; Markides, 1992,
1995; Markides & Singh, 1997; Montgomery & Thomas, 1988; Montgomery et al., 1984;
Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987; Sicherman & Pettway, 1987; Smart & Hitt, 1994). For
example, Jain (1985) found that firm performance began to suffer approximately a year
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prior to divestiture and resulted in negative excess stock return of 10.8% within the one
year prior to the actual restructuring event.
Such assessments of one’s own performance are valuable since sound
performance is needed to ensure the maintenance and survival of the organization
(Child, 1972), in addition to offering feedback to the firm as to the viability of its plans
(Cyert & March, 1963). Thompson notes that publicly traded firms closely monitor
fluctuations in the price of their stock since “the market represents a visible social
judgment about the firm’s fitness for the future” (1967: 90).
More commonly known as the agency explanation of portfolio restructuring
(Filatotchev et al., 2000; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994; Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Markides &
Singh, 1997; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987), poor performance as an antecedent of
portfolio restructuring has become the leading explanation in the academic literature to
account for the restructuring wave of the 1980s. Essentially, this rationale suggests that
performance needs to be improved as a direct result of past managerial inefficiencies.
Such inefficiencies include excessive levels of diversification, improper diversification,
sub-optimal investments in research and development, unprofitable capital investments,
and over-leveraging.
For example, it is argued that CEOs and their top managers frequently increased
firm size and levels of diversification without comparable increases in firm value
(Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Jensen, 1986, 1993; Johnson, 1996). Within the literature it
is argued that CEOs have the opportunity to diversify their organizations even when
doing so does not increase the market value of the firm because their personal wealth is
linked more to firm size than to firm performance (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Bethel &
Liebeskind, 1993; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Empirical evidence does support the
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argument that managers in public firms have been inclined to increase diversification
without ensuring increasing firm value. Grant, Jammine and Thomas (1988) suggested
that increased levels of diversification led to decreased accounting returns, thus
implying that, over time, top executives sacrificed performance for growth and
diversification. Additional studies (e.g., Bergh, 2001; Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1991;
Mayer & Whittington, 2003; Palich, Cardinal & Miller, 2000; Rumelt, 1974; Wernerfelt &
Montgomery, 1988) have substantiated such a finding by arguing that firms pursuing a
strategy of unrelated diversification possess lower accounting and market returns than
firms pursuing related diversification strategies.
Proponents of the agency explanation suggest that such managerial
inefficiencies occur largely as a result of agency costs (i.e., increased managerial
consumption of corporate resources resulting from weak, poor, or inefficient governance
mechanisms). Basically, this view argues that the board of directors, ownership
concentration (equity held by blockholders and institutional investors), and managerial
incentives were ineffective and resulted in the failure of internal governance as a system
(Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; Chatterjee & Harrison, 2001; Gibbs, 1993; Hoskisson et al.,
1994; Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Jensen, 1993; Johnson, 1996; Johnson et al., 1996).
Although never truly defined in the literature, weak governance is believed to be
characterized by diffusion of shareholdings among outside owners, certain
characteristics of managers and boards (e.g., minimal equity ownership by top
managers and board members or an insufficient amount of outsiders sitting on the
board), and board passivity (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; Dalton, Daily, Certo &
Roengpitya, 2003; Gibbs, 1993; Johnson et al., 1993; Johnson, 1996; Westphal &
Fredrickson, 2001).
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Due to its overwhelming acceptance by restructuring researchers and simplistic
and intuitive appeal, the agency explanation has made portfolio restructuring
synonymous with weak governance (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; Hoskisson & Turk,
1990; Markides & Singh, 1997). Smart and Hitt echoed this sentiment by suggesting
that “many of the arguments and concepts embedded in the agency literature seem so
compelling that agency and governance related arguments have become a virtual de
facto explanation for many types of corporate restructuring” (1996: 1). As a result, the
academic and practitioner literatures on portfolio restructuring have devoted much effort
to pointing out such governance alleged failures and highlighting ways of improving the
corporate governance system of the modern corporation (Jensen, 1993).
Shareholder scrutiny as a result of a firm’s failure to meet expectations places
considerable pressure on executives to take action designed to close the gap between
expected and actual performance (Sanders & Carpenter, 2003). Failure to manage
shareholder impressions and narrow the gap between expectations and actual
performance increases the chance that an executive will actually be removed from
office (Puffer & Weintrop, 1991). As such, it might be reasonable to assume that
establishing the caliber of the board and senior management and the soundness of the
strategic direction of the organization is crucial to impressing investors and
commentators (Stiles & Taylor, 2001), which is consistent with arguments from
institutional, signaling, and impression management perspectives.
2.A.2. The Mimicry Explanation
Outside of the agency explanation of restructuring, some have argued that firms
restructure as a result of mimicking the behavior of other organizations that are
engaged in the divestitures (Markides & Singh, 1997). Consistent with mimetic
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isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991), this viewpoint suggests that
firms, either consciously or unconsciously, engage in mimicry of institutional models of
other actors in their networks who are perceived as more legitimate or successful.
Executives of organizations engaged in such imitation believe that their actions will be
seen as appropriate and rational (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
Such arguments were utilized by Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley (1994) in their
explanation of the decline of the conglomerate firm (i.e., the deconglomeration
movement) in the United States during the 1980s.
2.A.3. The Environmental Explanation
Other scholars have suggested that environmental conditions serve as
antecedents to portfolio restructuring (e.g., Bergh & Lawless, 1998; Chatterjee, 1992;
Grinyer & McKiernan, 1990; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Johnson, 1996; Kose, Lang &
Netter, 1992; Meyer, Brooks & Goes, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1991). Researchers
have argued that tax rationales, antitrust policy changes, junk bond financing, global
competition, deregulation, technology shifts, and takeover activity through the market for
corporate control are reasons for the increase in restructuring activity in the early 1980s
(Johnson, 1996). A synthesis of studies investigating these relationships suggests that
changes in the environment, which increase turbulence or uncertainty, result in an
increased likelihood of restructuring.
For example, Grinyer & McKiernan (1990) suggested that restructuring might
result from changes in the industry that create an “aspiration-induced crisis” based on
the current performance or market share and where top management believes the
organization ought to be. Additional support of the environment argument was offered
by Meyer et al. (1990) who examined organizational responses to discontinuous change
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at the industry level. Their study investigated the hospital industry in San Francisco,
which was experiencing great turbulence, which resulted in excess capacity, resource
scarcity, and regulatory changes. To cope with these changes the hospitals engaged in
spin-offs of non-core areas, underwent divestitures of peripheral services, and formed
networks among themselves to respond to the need for managed care in the San
Francisco area. A third study to substantiate the environment argument was conducted
by Bergh and Lawless (1998), who examined environmental uncertainty and its impact
on the strategic decisions the firm makes. Their findings suggested that organizations
confronted with highly uncertain conditions engage in divestitures to reduce the costs of
managing a diverse portfolio.
2.A.4 The Strategy Explanation
Lastly, researchers suggest that firm strategy is a driver of portfolio restructuring
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989; Duhaime & Grant, 1984; Johnson, 1996; Markides,
1992, 1995; Montgomery et al., 1984). In other words, divestiture activity may be
related to a firm’s corporate or business level strategy. These divestitures often include
decisions to exit an industry sometimes attributable to a lack of fit between the firm’s
portfolio of businesses, move toward core businesses (i.e., a conscious choice to
emphasize core operations), realign a firm’s product mix within a given industry, focus
on synergistic economies (i.e., reestablish strategic controls), reduce debt levels, and
place a renewed emphasis on research and development.
Although the four aforementioned drivers of restructuring were discussed, the
agency explanation (i.e., weak governance rationales) is the most pervasive one in the
literature. As such, it is important to discuss corporate governance and governance
issues in relation to portfolio restructuring. Before doing so, it is paramount to provide a
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clear definition of the concept of corporate governance and its predominant focus and
institutionalization in the management literature. As such, these issues are discussed in
the following section.
2.B.

Corporate Governance
Drawing on Berle and Means (1932), Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) and

Williamson (1984), Baysinger and Hoskisson defined corporate governance as the
“integrated set of internal and external controls that harmonize manager-shareholder
(agency) conflicts of interest resulting from the separation of ownership and control”
(1990: 72). Furthermore, these authors and others (e.g., Amihud & Lev, 1981;
Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Chatterjee & Harrison, 2001; Chatterjee et al., 2003;
Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Fama & Jensen, 1983a, 1983b; Finkelstein & Hambrick,
1996; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994; Hoskisson et al., 1994; Johnson,
Daily & Ellstrand, 1996) argued that in the absence of proper governance mechanisms,
managers are more likely to deviate from the interests of shareholders.
2.B.1. The Institutionalization of Agency Arguments
There is unequivocal consensus that the dominant theoretical perspective
employed to investigate governance and governance issues in a host of disciplines
(e.g., law, finance, and strategic management) is agency theory (Daily et al., 2003a;
Daily, Dalton & Rajagopolan, 2003; Dalton et al., 1998, 1999, 2003; Hillman & Dalziel,
2003; Jensen, 1998; Lynall et al., 2003; Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2003; Shen, 2003;
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Young, Stedham & Beekun, 2000). The central premise of this
theory is that managers, as agents, can engage in decision making and behaviors that
may be inconsistent with maximizing shareholder wealth (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama &
Jensen, 1983a; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Mizruchi, 1983).
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Agency theorists see the primary functioning of the board of directors as
monitoring the actions of agents (i.e., managers) to protect the interests of principals
(i.e., owners). Similarly, legal and financial scholars emphasize the fiduciary
responsibilities of directors to ensure that managers are acting in the interests of
shareholders (Bainbridge, 1993; Berle & Means, 1932; Mace, 1986). Thus, even
though the monitoring function of the board of directors includes a number of specific
activities (e.g., monitoring the CEO, monitoring strategy implementation, planning CEO
succession, and evaluating and rewarding the CEO/top managers of the firm), the
primary driver of each of these activities is the obligation to ensure that management
operates in the interests of shareholders.
According to various researchers (e.g., Daily et al., 2003a; Markides & Singh,
1997), the popularity of agency theory in governance research is likely due to two
factors. First, agency theory is a simple theory, in which large corporations are reduced
to two participants – managers and shareholders – and the interest of each are
assumed to be both clear and consistent. Second, according to Daily et al., “the notion
of humans as self-interested and generally unwilling to sacrifice personal interests for
the interests of others is both age old and widespread” (2003a: 372).
It is important to note that agency explanations have become so ingrained in
governance research that alternative paradigms are too often ignored. Daily et al.
referred to this barrier as empirical dogmatism, which they suggested has negatively
impacted researchers’ willingness to “embrace research that contradicts dominant
governance models and theories (e.g., a preference for independent governance
structures) or research that is critical of past research methodologies or findings”
(2003a: 379).
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In essence, agency arguments have been institutionalized in reference to
corporate governance. These have become the norms for viewing governance, and, as
such, impact the organization of firms (e.g., the structure of the board) (D’Aunno et al.,
2000). The agency arguments are embedded in how practitioners, institutional
investors, and for the most part, academicians define what is good or sound corporate
governance. In other words, there is remarkable consensus as to the best practices
that need to reside in all firms if they are to maximize performance. Support for this
idea was offered by Westphal and Zajac (1998) and Zajac and Westphal, who noted
that “large investors appear to have co-opted normative agency theory to help legitimate
their political agenda, thus contributing to and benefiting from the growth of agency
theory as a dominant perspective on corporate control” (1995: 287-288).
2.B.2. Defining Good Governance
A major area of academic study within the governance literature is the
investigation as to what constitutes good governance. As a result of the
institutionalization of agency arguments, the literature has reached considerable
agreement that the proper internal mechanisms of a firm include effectively structured
boards, executive and board compensation contracts that encourage a shareholder
orientation, and concentrated ownership holdings that lead to active monitoring of
executives (Chatterjee & Harrison, 2001; Daily et al., 2003a, 2003b). In essence, the
social validity of these pressures and desired outcomes are largely unquestioned
because they have been taken for granted. In other words, within the academic
literature, popular press, and corporate practice, there is an extremely clear
understanding as to what constitutes good governance. In fact, these conceptions are
so ingrained in the minds of academicians, shareholder activists, large shareholders,
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and institutional shareholders that the validity of these conceptions goes unquestioned
even in spite of contradictory evidence.
It is obvious that agency theory principles, as elaborated in the academic
literature, have also dominated corporate practice (Daily et al., 2003; Shleifer & Vishny,
1997). Evidence of this can be found by considering the reforms sought by shareholder
activists, thus lending insight into those governance practices that are perceived as both
legitimate and effective in protecting shareholders’ interests (Ryan & Schneider, 2002).
According to Daily et al., shareholder activism is “designed to encourage executives and
directors to adopt practices that insulate shareholders from managerial self-interest by
providing incentives for executives to manage firms in shareholders’ long-term interests”
(2003: 373). It is argued in the literature that such activism acts as a trigger to
destabilize managerial power and makes managers more responsive to the needs of
institutional investors through increased monitoring by owners and boards of directors
(David et al., 2001). As noted by David et al., “through activism, managers are
pressured to take actions to signal their commitment to owners” (2001: 146).
Specifically, corporate governance reforms have included configuring boards
largely, if not exclusively, of independent, outside directors; separating the positions of
board chair and CEO; imposing age and term limits for directors; and providing
executive compensation packages that include contingent forms of pay (e.g., Brown,
2003; Business Roundtable, 1997; Byrne, 2000; Clark, 2003; Craig, 2003; Daily et al.,
2003a; Dalton et al., 1999; Felton & Hudnut, 1995; Hymowitz, 2003; Johnson et al.,
1996; Langley, 2003; Lublin, 1998; Minard, 1998; National Association of Corporate
Directors, 1996; Pratt, 1993; Rich, 2003; Schultz, 1996; Silverman, 2002; Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund, 1997). Some of
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the more notable shareholder activists are private and public pension funds, such as the
College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF) and the California Public Employees
Retirement System (CalPERS) (Daily et al., 2003; Davis & Thompson, 1994; Ryan &
Schneider, 2002).
Over the years there has been a large push for firms to have their governance
structures evaluated by outside associations, councils, groups, and companies such as
The Corporate Library, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., the Council of
Institutional Investors, the United Shareholders Association, and Governance Metrics
International, Inc., with the intent of bringing governance structures more in-line with the
interests of shareholders (i.e., addressing agency issues with the intent of reducing
agency costs). This intense focus on corporate accountability has heated up again as a
result of recent corporate scandals, such as Enron, HealthSouth, Global Crossing, and
WorldCom. In essence, these and other corporate scandals have spawned a cottage
industry of firms that rate corporate governance as an investment risk (Langley, 2003),
yet the vast majority of these calls for better governance are not proven to positively
impact performance (Dalton et al., 1998, 1999, 2003; Tosi, Werner, Katz & GomezMejia, 2000).
In the next section I will delve into this issue in greater detail by discussing the
research that investigates the impact of certain governance structures on firm
performance.
2.C.

Governance and Its Impact on Performance
A recent meta-analysis by Dalton et al. (1998) focused on research that

assessed the impact of board composition and board leadership structure
configurations on firm financial performance. The authors focused on these two
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governance characteristics since they noted that these two issues have received much
attention by governance reform activists, who have strongly argued for boards
comprised predominantly, if not exclusively, of independent directors and the formal
separation of the CEO and board chairperson positions.
The authors identified 54 and 31 empirical studies that investigated the board
composition-financial performance relationship and board leadership-financial
performance relationship, respectively. The studies included in the meta-analysis were
published from 1972-1996 for board composition and from 1978-1996 for board
leadership structure. Their conclusion was that there is no relationship between either
of the two governance structures and firm performance. Additionally, the authors
investigated the type of performance measure (i.e., accounting-based versus marketbased) and found no evidence of a moderating effect based on the nature of the
performance indicator.
Another recent meta-analysis by Dalton et al. (2003) sought to investigate the
impact of equity holdings by various groups (i.e., CEO, top managers, and directors) on
financial performance (i.e., Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, ROI, EPS, shareholder returns,
Jensen’s Alpha, and P/E ratio). The authors identified 229 empirical studies (published
from 1968-2001) that investigated the equity-performance relationship; however, not all
studies investigated all equity holdings by different actors and the subsequent impact on
multiple measures of firm performance. The results of the meta-analysis revealed that,
with the exception of officer and director equity and EPS, none of the correlations
between measures of insider equity and financial performance exceed .02.
The two meta-analyses above reveal that the linkage between governance and
firm performance is basically non-existent. However, it is important to note that within
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these meta-analyses, causality could not be tested or imputed. It is important that these
issues be studied in a longitudinal context (Dalton et al., 2003). Additionally, there is the
assumption in the literature that these governance variables have a direct impact on the
performance of the firm. As will be discussed later, I propose that these governance
variables are important, as moderators to the restructuring-performance relationship.
As such, it is premature for the literature to reach the conclusion that governance does
not matter in relation to the performance of the organization.
In the following section I build upon the prior discussion by elaborating on the
issue of boards of directors and their roles within organizations. Such a discussion is
important because the primary focus of governance research, as evidenced earlier,
revolves around the board of directors. This section elaborates on the value boards
have in conferring legitimacy upon their organizations. The section concludes with a
discussion of the pressures boards face, particularly in periods of poor performance, by
external constituencies.
2.D.

The Board of Directors
When discussing the control of the firm, or even corporate governance in

general, the predominant focus has been on the boards of directors as a control
mechanism since, theoretically, the board is the ultimate source of power in an
organization (Bazerman & Schoorman, 1983), and is ultimately responsible for effective
organizational functioning (Blair & Stout, 2001; Jensen, 1993, Johnson et al., 1996).
Additionally, Stiles and Taylor (2001) noted that it is the board that has formal control of
the organization, and its statements and behaviors have the power to confer legitimacy
and authority upon the firm. Gilson and Kraakman suggest, “in the corporate
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governance debate, all arguments ultimately converge on the role of the board of
directors” (1991: 873).
A vast amount of research has demonstrated that a variety of alternatives to
board monitoring exist. Some of those mechanisms include the market for corporate
control (i.e., the transferring of managerial control to new capital providers, such as
shareholders, through acquisitions, divestitures, and other control-transfer mechanisms
– Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson & Moesel, 1996; Manne, 1965), competitive forces in capital
and product markets, corporate law, and managerial labor markets. Even with such
mechanisms in place, the board of directors is considered central to ensuring that
management acts in the best interest of shareholders (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Fama
& Jensen, 1983a; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Chatterjee & Harrison, 2001).
Boards of directors are viewed as a crucial element in the governance structure
of large corporations (Fama & Jensen, 1983), especially since corporate law in the
United States requires that the business of publicly traded corporations be conducted
under the direction of a board of directors (Eisenberg, 1976). Their value is driven by
the importance of their many responsibilities, which include: exercising oversight and
control of CEOs and their top management teams in an effort to reduce the potential for
agency problems (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Chatterjee & Harrison, 2001; Gibbs,
1993; Johnson et al., 1996; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Walsh & Seward, 1990;
Williamson, 1975), and offering strategic and administrative advice and insight to
executives (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Chatterjee & Harrison, 2001; Dalton, Daily,
Ellstrand & Johnson, 1998; Johnson et al., 1996; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Mintzberg,
1983; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001).
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Additionally, the literature suggests that board members serve as a connection to
the external environment by providing valuable information that may lead to the
acquisition of critical resources, including prestige and legitimacy (Chatterjee &
Harrison, 2001; Daily & Dalton, 1994; Johnson et al., 1996; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer,
1972, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Selznick, 1949). Proponents of resource
dependence theory suggest that external board members act as boundary spanners
between the organization and its environment (Dalton, Daily, Johnson & Ellstrand, 1999;
Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold, 2000; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Johnson et al., 1996;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In this role, outside directors provide access to resources
needed by the firm. For example, outside directors who are also executives of financial
institutions may assist in securing favorable lines of credit; outside directors who are
partners in a law firm may provide legal advice, either in board meetings or in private
communication with executives that may otherwise be more costly for the firm to secure
(Daily et al., 2003b).
As a result of boards often being composed of lawyers, financial representatives,
top management of other firms, public affairs or marketing specialists, and former
governmental officials and community leaders, firms have access to important
expertise, experience, and skills that facilitate advice and counsel. The provision of,
and access to, resources reduces uncertainty that is associated with the firm’s
environment, as well as enhances organizational functioning, firm performance, and
survival (Gales & Kesner, 1994; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978;
Provan, 1980; Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993; Thompson, 1967; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).
In addition to providing resources to top executives, board members have the
ability to provide the firm with legitimacy and a positive reputation (Certo, 2003; Daily &
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Schwenk, 1996; Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1992; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Lynall, Golden &
Hillman, 2003). It is suggested that the prestige of directors can enhance the credibility
and performance of the firm they serve (Certo, 2003; Certo Daily & Dalton, 2001;
Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Pfeffer and Salancik noted that “prestigious or legitimate
persons or organizations represented on the focal organization’s board provide
confirmation to the rest of the world of the value and worth of the organization” (1978:
145). A similar argument was offered by Bazerman and Schoorman who suggested,
“An organization’s reputation can be affected by who serves on the board of directors
and to whom the organization is seen to be linked” (1983: 211).
Research has suggested that legitimacy bestowed upon an organization by
board members can translate into a decreased probability of organizational failure
(Baum & Oliver, 1991; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This might
result in further benefits for legitimate firms such as suppliers of capital accepting lower
risk premiums (e.g., lower interest rates) in loan repayment schedules (Cornell &
Shapiro, 1987; Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Mizruchi, 1996), less hesitation by investors to
invest in the organization (Mizruchi, 1996), and greater stock performance for firms
undertaking initial public offerings (Certo, 2003), to name a few. Given the need to
satisfy the organization’s shareholders, firms may adopt organizational structures (e.g.,
certain board of directors configurations and characteristics) to signal legitimacy (Certo,
2003; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Luoma & Goodstein, 1999; Suchman, 1995), because
“organizations that incorporate societally legitimated rationalized elements in their
formal structures maximize their legitimacy and increase their resources and survival
capabilities” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 352). As such, it is evident that boards have a
symbolic role/value that is independent of the board’s tangible activities (Certo, 2003).
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Within the next section, I discuss the impact of pressures that are exerted on
boards of directors as a result of ownership concentration. These pressures are
continually growing due to investors consistently assuming larger ownership positions in
corporations, but these pressures are especially prevalent in times of declining
performance. It is important to discuss these pressures because it is argued (in the
next chapter) that these actors will press for changes in the governance structures of
firms suffering from poor performance in the pre-restructuring period.
2.E.

The Impact of Ownership Concentration
The literature suggests that large firms are under considerable pressure from

institutional investors and other external constituencies to increase the board’s role in
strategy formulation, as well as to properly configure the board – all with the intention of
improving performance (Barnard, 1991; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Westphal &
Zajac, 1997; Useem, 1993, 1996; Useem, Bowman, Myatt & Irvine, 1993; Westphal &
Fredrickson, 2001). Additionally, there is significant evidence that shareholder
ownership (i.e., institutional investors and blockholders) can and does impact corporate
issues such as corporate strategy (Hill & Snell, 1988; Rajagopalan, 1997), restructuring
activity (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; Hoskisson et al., 1994; Ryan & Schneider, 2002),
capital structure (Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Short, 1994), board of director
composition (Carleton et al., 1998; Ryan & Schneider, 2002; Smith, 1996), executive
compensation (Brown, 1998, David et al., 1998; Kroll, Wright, Toombs & Leavall, 1997;
Ryan & Schneider, 2002), corporate social responsibility (Johnson & Greening, 1999),
management turnover (Holderness & Sheehan, 1985; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986),
adoption of poison pills (Mallette & Fowler, 1992), risk taking (Wright, Ferris, Sarin &
Awasthi, 1996), research and development (David et al., 2001; Hill & Snell, 1988; Ryan
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& Schneider, 2002), international diversification (Tihanyi et al., 2003), organizational
performance (Brown, 1998; Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998;
Gibbs, 1993; Ryan & Schneider, 2002; Short, 1994; Thomsen & Pederson, 2000;
Wahal, 1996), and firm value (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988; Prevost & Rao, 2000;
Ryan & Schneider, 2002; Smith, 1996; Teoh & Welch, 1999; Wright & Ferris, 1997).
Additionally, support has been offered for individuals in managerial positions to respond
to these pressures if they wish to remain employed (James & Soref, 1981).
Pressures from institutional investors are continually increasing since they are
actively taking large ownership positions in corporations (e.g., ownership stakes by
institutional investors have greatly increased over the years to nearly 60% of U.S.
corporate equity - Daily et al., 2003a; Davis & Thompson, 1994; Gompers & Metrick,
2001; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Ryan & Schneider, 2002; Securities Industry
Association, 2000; Smith, 1996; Tihanyi et al., 2003) and thus becoming more vocal in
influencing top managers both through boards and directly (Barnard, 1991; Chatterjee &
Harrison, 2001; Conference Board, 2000; Dalton et al., 2003; Davis & Thompson, 1994;
Ryan & Schneider, 2002; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson & Hitt,
2003). Salancik and Pfeffer discuss the value and power of equity ownership and note
that ownership “represents a source of power that can be used to either support or
oppose management depending on how it is concentrated and used” (1980: 655).
Specifically, institutional investors are a heterogeneous group of organizations,
including banks, public and private pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance
companies that hold equity ownership positions in corporations (David, Hitt & Gimeno,
2001; David, Kochhar & Levitas, 1998). The largest types of institutional investors are
private and public pension funds, such as the College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF)
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and the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) (Davis &
Thompson, 1994; Ryan & Schneider, 2002).
Due to their sizeable holdings (approximately $10.8 trillion in 1999), institutional
investors are increasingly limited in their ability to divest from firms with which they are
dissatisfied. Previously, institutional investors that were dissatisfied with management
would typically sell their stake rather than confront management. Now that ownership
stakes by institutional investors are greatly increasing, selling out depresses the share
price and harms the seller. In addition, for the largest funds, the number of alternative
investments is limited. As Davis and Thompson suggested, “faced with such a high
cost of exit, voice – shareholder activism – became more appealing” (1994: 154).
These authors and others (e.g., Daily et al., 2003a; Useem, 1996) additionally
state that activism has increased by pension funds as a result of increases in
investments and federal regulations, which placed greater demands on these funds to
fulfill their fiduciary duty to the plans’ participants and beneficiaries. Thus, as a result of
institutional investors increasingly assuming larger ownership positions in firms, they not
only have an economic incentive to monitor/pressure boards and top managers, but
they also have the ability to do so (Dalton et al., 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
Evidence exists that suggests fund managers have demonstrated a propensity to
actively monitor executives in the firms in which their funds invest (Black, 1992; Dalton
et al., 2003; Useem et al., 1993). Furthermore, institutional fund managers have been
particularly effective in achieving governance changes in the firms they target (Dalton et
al., 2003; Ryan & Schneider, 2002; Wahal, 1996).
It is argued in the literature that ownership concentration has a dominant focus
on improving the financial performance of the firms in which they invest (Ryan &
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Schneider, 2002). These financial improvements include both corporate financial
measures, such as operating and net income, and return on assets, as well as by stock
valuation, which is a measure of the market’s perception of firm value (Chaganti &
Damanpour, 1991; Prevost & Rao, 2000; Ryan & Schneider, 2002; Smith, 1996; Wahal,
1996). Additionally, these activist investors may extend their desired performance
improvements to non-financial indicators of performance, such as enhancements in the
composition of the board of directors and changes in the level and composition of
executive compensation (Carleton et al., 1998; David et al., 1998; Del Guercio &
Hawkins, 1999; Gillan & Starks, 2000; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Rehfeld, 1998; Ryan &
Schneider, 2002).
In fact, there is evidence that pension funds have pressed target organizations to
initiate governance reform (i.e., board changes) in response to poor organizational
performance (Barnard, 1991; Black, 1990; Daily & Dalton; 1995; Davis & Thompson,
1994; Fligstein, 1990; Fromson, 1990; O’Barr & Conley, 1992; Salwen & Lublin, 1992;
Useem, 1996). Among more commonly sought actions are increasing the proportion of
outside directors and separating the positions of CEO and board chairperson. Thus, it
is evident that ownership concentration can and does impact governance changes
within firms suffering from sub-optimal performance. Additionally, the reforms sought by
these constituencies are quite uniform in nature, since they seek the implementation of
good governance structures in the firms in which they invest. In other words, there is
considerable consensus as to what is good or correct governance – it is namely that
which supposedly minimizes agency costs (Brown, 2003; Byrne, 2000; Colvin, 2002,
2003; Felton & Hudnut, 1995; Langley, 2003; Ozanian & Decarlo, 2003; Pratt, 1993).
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It is important to note that such pressures to reform the governance structure of
the firm may not be driven by solid evidence that the governance structure was actually
inappropriate, since precise causes of poor performance are often difficult to identify
(Cyert & March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 1982). However, it is widely suggested that
poor performance does stimulate such changes within organizations (Davis et al., 1994)
even when performance deficits cannot be attributed unambiguously to efficiency
problems that the proposed changes seek to rectify (Palmer et al., 1993).
Within the next section I review the general findings of research investigating
governance issues in relation to portfolio/asset restructuring. The intent of this section
is to discuss the key relationships between governance structures and portfolio
restructuring. As they are presented in the literature, the governance characteristics
discussed below have been studied as antecedents to portfolio restructuring. As will
become, the overwhelming conclusion of this research stream is that there are no clear
and systematic relationships between certain governance structures and portfolio
restructuring. However, in the literature, researchers appear to assert that sound
governance will lead to firms holding the correct portfolio of businesses. Additionally,
the consensus is that poor governance leads to performance problems and, ultimately,
the need to restructure the firm.
2.F.

Governance and Portfolio Restructuring
Researchers have devoted attention to investigating the conditions under which

organizations are likely to make fundamental changes in strategies, structures, and
internal processes (Boeker, 1989; Carroll, 1984; Ginsberg & Buchholz, 1990; Hannan &
Freeman, 1984; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). Theorists have
long argued that organizations can and do respond to important changes in their
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environments by initiating strategic changes (Child, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978;
Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). Shifts in regulatory (Smith & Grimm, 1987) or
technological environments (Tushman & Anderson, 1986) motivate important strategic
changes in organizations. In addition to environmental changes, declines in
performance (Child, 1972; Harrigan, 1981; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994; Markides, 1992;
Miller & Friesen, 1982; Robbins & Pearce, 1992), as well as executive succession
(Meyer, 1975; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) might also
motivate changes in strategy. Other studies (e.g., D’Aunno, Succi & Alexander, 2000;
Davis et al., 1994; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Leblebici,
Salancik, Copay & King, 1991) have emphasized the importance of both market
competition and institutional factors in causing organizational change. For example,
Kraatz and Zajac (1996) found that local market forces (e.g., consumer demand)
prompted divergent changes in curricula among U.S. liberal arts colleges (e.g., offering
business degrees). In contrast, results from Davis et al. (1994) suggested that
institutional factors caused decreased use of the conglomerate form of organization in
the 1980s.
It is not uncommon for these aforementioned strategic changes to be defined in
the literature as changes in product and service domains (Ginsberg, 1988; Goodstein &
Boeker, 1991; Goodstein et al., 1994; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). As mentioned in
chapter one, by adding and divesting products and services, organizations alter their
domains. These product/service changes represent critical decisions that not only
affect the boundaries of the organization, but also the allocation of resources within
them. For these reasons, it is believed that changes in governance structures are likely
to have an important effect on the magnitude of major changes in product and service
33

offerings, thus overcoming the organization’s resistance to change (Goodstein &
Boeker, 1991). This is substantiated by the findings in the literature, which noted that
executive and director changes make the firm less committed to how the organization
previously operated (Helmich & Brown, 1972; Johnson et al., 1996; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978; Ocasio, 1999; Scott, 1995).
It has been argued that new top managers, particularly managers recruited from
the outside of the organization, typically initiate change and determine the new strategic
direction for their firm (Golden & Zajac, 2001; Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Grimm &
Smith, 1991; Miles, Snow, Meyer & Coleman, 1978; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Tushman
& Romanelli, 1985; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). The process of executive
succession – especially one in which an outsider becomes the new CEO – provides an
opportunity for existing power relationships to be altered and for new strategic
perspectives to be introduced. However, it is unlikely that top management team
changes are the only factor that might create conditions for strategic reassessment and
change. Interestingly, it was not until the 1990s (with the notable exceptions by Carroll,
1984 and Boeker, 1989) that researchers began to look beyond the CEO to consider
how changes in the broader governance structure of a firm, specifically its ownership
and board of directors, affect strategic change.
2.G.

Key Findings in the Governance-Restructuring Literature
The following discussion concerns the key findings of studies that investigated

the relationships between governance and restructuring. Each governance
characteristic and its impact on restructuring are discussed separately. Following this
discussion of the key findings, I present various reasons (i.e., sources of confound) that
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might be responsible for the generally mixed results in the literature. These findings are
summarized in Table 1 below.
2.G.1. Blockholder Ownership
As demonstrated in Table 1, four studies have investigated the relationship
between blockholder ownership and restructuring, and, in general, there is not a clear
and systematic relationship between the two. The majority of the studies (i.e., Bethel &
Liebeskind, 1993; Hoskisson et al., 1994; Bergh, 1995) demonstrated a positive impact
in relation to blockholder ownership.
For example, Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) investigated the relationship between
ownership structure and corporate restructuring in a sample of 93 surviving Fortune 500
firms from 1981-1987. The authors’ results revealed that as blockholder ownership in
1981 rose, total diversification decreased (i.e., firms became more focused).
Furthermore, the authors found that diversification decreased when blockholders
bought into the firm. They interpreted this finding to mean that new blockholders
pressured managers to reduced diversification. Lastly, the results of Bethel and
Liebeskind (1993) suggested that the only determinant of divestiture activity was
blockholder ownership in 1981. An interesting extension of this research is to
investigate blockholder holdings in the post-restructuring period. Drawing on the
research of Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler (1998), which suggested that blockholders
tend to purchase shares in firms with poor profitability, one could argue that new
blockholders might purchase shares and existing blockholders might purchase
additional shares in post-restructuring firms. One could reason that this would only be
the case in firms that suffered poor performance prior to engaging in restructuring
activity.
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Equity held by
outside board
members

Blockholder
ownership

Governance
Variable

Chatterjee et al. (2003)

Bergh (1995)

Hoskisson et al. (1994)

Johnson et al. (1993)

Markides & Singh (1997)

Bergh (1995)

Hoskisson et al. (1994)

Bethel & Liebeskind (1993)

Key Studies
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Ownership by blockholders was
positively related to divestiture of
assets
The presence of non-board
blockholders had an indirect, positive
effect on corporate divestiture
intensity as mediated by relative
product diversification
The percentage of total outstanding
common voting shares held by
blockholders is negatively related to
the sale of related units and the size
of the units sold.
Blockholder ownership was unrelated
to the divestiture of assets
Equity ownership by outside board
members was positively related to
divestiture of assets
Equity ownership by outside board
members did not have an indirect
effect on corporate divestiture
intensity as mediated by relative
product diversification
Equity ownership by outside board
members strengthened the negative
relationship between blockholders and
the relatedness and size of the units
sold
Equity ownership by outside board
members was negatively related to
restructuring

Findings

Mixed results – no evidence
of a systematic relationship
between equity held by
outside board members and
restructuring

Mixed results – more
evidence exists that
ownership by blockholders
is positively related to
restructuring

Summary of Findings

Table 1
Governance-Restructuring Relationship – Summary of Findings

Board size

Proportion of
outsiders on the
board

Equity held by inside
board members

(Table 1 continued)

Markides & Singh (1997)

Goodstein et al. (1994)

Chatterjee et al. (2003)

Markides & Singh (1997)

Hoskisson et al. (1994)

Johnson et al. (1993)

Goodstein & Boeker (1991)

Chatterjee et al. (2003)

Hoskisson et al. (1994)

Bethel & Liebeskind (1993)
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Equity ownership by insider board
members was unrelated to
divestitures
Equity ownership by inside board
members did not have an indirect
effect on corporate divestiture
intensity as mediated by relative
product diversification
Equity ownership by insider board
members was positively related to
restructuring
Proportion of outsiders on the board
was positively related to service
additions in hospitals, but not to
service deletions
Proportion of outsiders on the board
was positively related to board
involvement in restructuring
The proportion of outsiders on the
board did not have an indirect effect
on corporate divestiture intensity as
mediated by relative product
diversification
The proportion of outsiders on the
board was unrelated to the divestiture
of assets
The proportion of outside directors
was unrelated to restructuring
Board size was negatively related to
service reorganizations in hospitals,
but unrelated to service additions or
deletions
Number of board members was
unrelated to the divestiture of assets
Although only two studies
investigated this
relationship, both suggest
that board size is unrelated
to restructuring

Mixed results – the majority
of the results from these
studies suggest that there is
the proportion of outsiders
on the board in unrelated to
restructuring, however
consensus is lacking

Mixed results – although
two of the three studies
suggest no relationship
between equity held by
inside board members and
restructuring, consensus is
lacking

Goodstein & Boeker (1991)

Gibbs (1993)

Goodstein et al. (1994)

Outside directors’
power

Board diversity

Johnson et al. (1993)

Gibbs (1993)

Turnover on the
board

Equity held by the
top management
team

(Table 1 continued)
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Only one study – board
diversity is negatively
related to restructuring

Only one study –board
power is positively related
to restructuring

Only one study – turnover
on the board is unrelated to
restructuring since it has no
impact on divestitures

Turnover on the board was positively
related to service additions in
hospitals, but not to service deletions
Board power [(ratio of outside to
inside directors) x (ratio of average
tenure of outside directors to inside
directors)] was positively related to the
sale of property, plant, and equipment
Hospitals with more occupationally
diverse boards tended to initiate fewer
service additions, divestitures, and
reorganizations

Mixed results – no
systematic relationship
between equity held by the
top management team and
restructuring

Top management team ownership
was positively related to portfolio
restructuring
Top management team equity stakes
were negatively related to board
involvement in restructuring

Hoskisson et al. (1994) supported the conclusion reached by Bethel and
Liebeskind (1993), who suggested that blockholders play a significant role in influencing
restructuring. Hoskisson et al. (1994) investigated the impact of firm governance on
strategic change. Drawing on agency arguments, the authors proposed that certain
governance structures (e.g., the presence of non-board blockholders) would have
indirect effects on divestment activity as mediated by relative product diversification.
They tested their hypotheses on a sample of 203 firms that initiated programs of
divestitures between 1985 and 1990 and found that the presence of non-board member
blockholders appeared to significantly decrease relative product diversification and total
product diversification, which, in turn, was positively related to corporate divestiture
intensity. Thus, the authors concluded that the presence of non-board blockholders had
an indirect effect on corporate divestiture intensity as mediated by relative product
diversification. Unlike the finding of Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) and Hoskisson et al.
(1994), the positive relationship between blockholder ownership and restructuring was
not found by Markides & Singh (1997), who posited and found no relationship between
blockholder ownership and restructuring.
Although Bergh (1995) found value in the research investigating the relationship
between governance and restructuring, he felt that the major shortcoming of the
restructuring research at the time was that there was insufficient knowledge of the
antecedents and consequences of the characteristics of units sold. As such, Bergh
(1995) investigated the effects of ownership concentration (i.e., the percentage of total
outstanding common voting shares held by blockholders) and outside director
ownership on the size and relatedness characteristics of units sold by parent firms. He
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hypothesized that ownership concentration is negatively associated to the relatedness
and size of the unit sold.
Bergh’s (1995) argument for the negative relationship between ownership
concentration and the relatedness of the unit sold was that the owners’ interests are
best served by selling unrelated businesses since the disposal of such units may
refocus a company back toward its basic businesses and improve the selling firm’s
market performance. Additionally, he suggested that the sale of related units reduces
synergies that owners cannot duplicate in their own portfolio holdings.
Bergh’s (1995) argument for the negative relationship between ownership
concentration and the size of the unit sold was that owners favor selling small
businesses since the sale does not immediately threaten the company’s overall stream
of revenues and incomes as much as the sale of large units, in addition to the fact that
the overall risk of the owners’ investments in the company does not substantively
change. Bergh (1995) furthermore argued that these relationships are magnified by
outsider equity holdings. When outsider equity is high, boards become more committed
to the owners, and thus would favor actions protecting profit maximization and
cooperative synergies of the firm.
Bergh (1995) tested these hypotheses on a sample of 112 firms that divested
units during the 1986 – 1990 time period. The results supported Bergh’s (1995)
arguments that ownership concentration is negatively related to the sale of related units
and the size of unit sold. Additionally, the results revealed that the relation of
blockholdings to the size and relatedness of the unit sold was greater when outside
director equity (i.e., the percentage of total outstanding common voting shares held by
outsiders on the board) was correspondingly higher.
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The aforementioned findings generally support the expectation that owners and
managers favor different types of sell-offs. Bergh’s (1995) results support the argument
that when managers have power, restructurings are used to build core competencies
through unrelated diversification and competitive internal resource allocation. By selling
related and larger units, the managers are able to reposition the organization toward
competitive and financial synergies. In other words, these managers attempt to achieve
competitive and financial benefits (i.e., financial economies) by allocating resources
more efficiently internally than through investments in external markets (Dundas &
Richardson, 1982; Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; Hoskisson, 1987; Williamson, 1975, 1985).
Conversely, when owners have power, sell-offs appear to be used to develop core
competencies through cooperation and related diversification. By selling unrelated and
smaller units, the owners are able to reposition their organizations toward cooperative
and strategic synergies. As Bergh suggests, “owners and managers favor different
types of sell-offs because they are motivated by different types of economic benefits”
(1995: 234).
2.G.2. Equity Held by Outside Board Members
Four studies investigated the relationship between equity held by outside board
members and restructuring, and their findings suggest that there is no evidence of a
systematic relationship between these two constructs. Support has been found for a
positive relationship (Johnson et al., 1993; Bergh, 1995), a negative relationship
(Chatterjee et al., 2003), and no relationship (Hoskisson et al., 1994) between the two.
A positive relationship was suggested by Johnson et al. (1993), whose basic
premise was that, due to their oversight role, board members (especially outsiders)
become more involved in restructuring only when managerial strategy implementation
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appears to be deficient. Their sample consisted of 92 firms that had voluntarily divested
at least 10% of their total assets within the 1985-1990 timeframe and with some
operations in the industrial manufacturing segment (SIC 2000-4000). The authors
found that outside board member equity was positively related to the involvement of the
board on restructuring decisions (i.e., the decision to divest or acquire business units).
This relationship was based on agency arguments that equity ownership creates greater
incentive alignment and vigilance by outside board members since their personal wealth
is directly tied to the performance of the organization.
Similarly, Hoskisson et al. (1994) suggested that equity ownership by outside
directors encourages greater vigilance. Drawing on the basic tenets of agency theory,
they posited that substantial ownership positions in the firm results in increased
willingness on behalf of directors to press for continuous strategic corrections.
Specifically, they suggested that outside board membership results in active monitoring
of strategy formulation, thus preventing excessive diversification that may lead to
restructuring. The authors did not find statistical support for this argument.
Recent research by Chatterjee et al. (2003) sought to test the impact of
governance on restructuring activity. Specifically, the authors sought to investigate
whether firms that effectively repelled a hostile takeover attempt would subsequently
engage in restructuring activities. They argued that a hostile takeover attempt might be
viewed as a ‘wake-up call’ that the target firm has been managed inefficiently and thus
changes in strategies could produce value. The authors hypothesized that such a
‘wake-up call’ would occur in firms in which management has too much discretion.
Chatterjee et al. (2003) defined these firms as organizations with non-independent
boards, which could ultimately translate into entrenched management and give rise to
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agency costs. Such agency costs are likely to manifest themselves as a level of
diversification that is sub-optimal from the shareholder’s point of view. Under such
circumstances, most firms would benefit from refocusing or reducing their levels of
diversification. Thus, the takeover offer serves to reduce agency costs by exposing
sub-optimal diversification, which motivates management to reverse the process to
prevent further takeover offers and/or a loss of their jobs.
Conversely, Chatterjee et al. (2003) argued that even after a major event such as
a takeover attempt, boards that have taken their monitoring duties seriously might still
assume that their organization’s strategies are appropriate. In other words, the
existence of a vigilant board (i.e., independent board) should mean that the firm’s
diversification strategy was under constant scrutiny and that it was appropriate for the
firm, or, at least, board members believed that it was appropriate. As such, the authors
hypothesized that board independence was negatively related to refocusing activity.
Drawing upon a sample of 76 firms that successfully repelled takeover bids
between 1981 and 1991, Chatterjee et al. (2003) found support for two of the four
governance variables used to operationalized board independence – equity held by
outside board members and equity held by inside board members were two of these
variables. Specifically, refocusing (operationalized as spin-offs or sales of plants or
divisions) was more likely in firms with low levels of outside director stock ownership
and relatively high levels of inside director stock ownership (which is discussed in the
next section). These are both characteristics associated with a lack of board
independence. Thus, the authors concluded that ownership by outside board members
increases board vigilance, which suggests that such a board is more likely to be vigilant
on an ongoing basis with regard to evaluating firm strategies.
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Chatterjee et al. (2003) suggest that their findings contribute to the stream of
research that supports the idea that governance characteristics are more likely to be
relevant during times of organizational stress by demonstrating that governance can
make a difference with regard to how firms respond to failed takeover attempts. They
explained their results in terms of board vigilance by stating that an independent board
(e.g., one with significant equity holdings by outside board members) is more likely to be
vigilant on an ongoing basis with regard to evaluating strategies. Consequently, a
shock such as a takeover attempt is less likely to cause the board to believe that the
firm’s diversification strategy is inappropriate.
2.G.3. Equity Held by Inside Board Members
Three studies have investigated the relationship between equity held by inside
board members and restructuring. An analysis of this research reveals that there is no
consensus concerning the relationship between insider equity holdings and
restructuring. Although Chatterjee et al. (2003) demonstrated a positive relationship
between the two, research by Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) and Hoskisson et al. (1994)
suggested that insider equity holdings were unrelated to restructuring activity.
Both Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) and Chatterjee et al. (2003) argued that
equity ownership by insiders at the beginning of their time periods of study would be
negatively related to restructuring activity. Their rationales for suggesting such a
relationship were quite similar, in that they argued that the economic and fiduciary
incentives and the power of inside board members with equity were sufficient to ensure
that the firms from the outset of their study time frames should have already been
efficiently configured. As such, the authors expected that these firms were less likely to
restructure.
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Hoskisson et al.’s (1994) argument concerning insider board member ownership
was identical to the one they posited for outsider board member ownership, which
suggests that substantial ownership positions in the firm results in increased willingness
on behalf of inside directors to press for continuous strategic corrections. The authors
did not find support for their belief that equity ownership by inside board members would
be negatively related to levels of diversification. This finding agrees with that of Bethel
and Liebeskind (1993), yet contradicts Chatterjee et al.’s (2003) findings. It is important
to note that the primary difference might be attributable to the fact that Chatterjee et al.
(2003), unlike the other two, studied firms that successfully repelled a takeover attempt.
2.G.4. Proportion of Outsiders on the Board
As evidenced in Table 1, the relationship between the proportion of outsiders on
the board and restructuring is the most researched governance-restructuring
relationship. Out of a total of five studies, four studies (i.e., Goodstein & Boeker, 1991;
Hoskisson et al., 1994; Markides & Singh, 1997; Chatterjee et al., 2003) concluded that
the proportion of outsiders on the board was unrelated to restructuring or the divestiture
of assets or services. Johnson et al. (1993) was the only study that contradicted the
results of the four aforementioned studies. However, Hoskisson et al. (1994) hinted that
the statistical power of their study complicated their ability to find significant results
concerning the impact of board outsiders on relative product diversification. They
suggested that an increase in their sample size from 203 to 250 firms would lead to
marginal significance of this relationship.
Much like Johnson et al. (1993) and Hoskisson et al. (1994), Goodstein and
Boeker (1991) argued that greater proportions of outsiders on the board would lead to
greater restructuring activity in their sample of 327 hospitals in California that underwent
45

significant changes during the early 1980s. The authors claimed that increases in the
proportion of outsiders on the board would increase the number of service additions and
divestitures a hospital initiates. They drew upon the literature that suggests that
outsider-dominated boards will initiate substantial changes, even if they are in conflict
with the interests of incumbent CEOs (Chatterjee & Harrison, 2001; Johnson et al.,
1996; Kimberly & Zajac, 1988; Mizruchi, 1983). The results revealed that increases in
outsider representation on a board have a significant, positive effect on service
additions but not on divestitures. In other words, increases in outsiders on the board
appear to be unrelated to restructuring activity. The main contribution of their study was
that board changes could directly influence strategic change independent of CEO
succession.
Chatterjee et al. (2003) speculated that the lack of significance in the board
demography variable (proportion of outside directors) may be an indication that it is
stock ownership by outside directors (as discussed earlier) and not simply their board
seats that results in influence on executive decisions. Although this is a plausible
explanation for their non-significant finding, the authors failed to mention that nonsignificance of findings might be attributable to a low level of statistical power
(approximately .50) in their tests.
2.G.5. Board Size
The impact of board of director size and restructuring was investigated by two
studies – Goodstein et al. (1994) and Markides and Singh (1997) – and the results of
both studies suggest that board size is unrelated to restructuring activity. Unlike
Goodstein et al. (1994), Markides and Singh (1997) hypothesized governance (e.g.,
board size) does not impact restructuring. They cast much doubt on the well-received
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notion that governance impacts restructuring by arguing that sub-optimal performance
might not have resulted from governance weaknesses but from honest managerial
weaknesses (i.e., a mis-alignment of strategy and structure). In other words, there may
be instances when top managers are acting in good faith, yet their actions are actually
creating inefficiencies. Thus, restructuring is undertaken to improve the sub-optimal
performance that is created by managerial inefficiencies. As such, the authors claimed
that the governance characteristics of restructuring firms in the pre-restructuring period
would not be different from the governance characteristics of non-restructuring firms.
Markides and Singh (1997) tested their assertion on a sample of 132 firms in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. Of the 132 firms in the sample, 91 firms restructured
(operationalized as a 10% divestiture of the company’s asset base) and 41 did not
restructure. Their results revealed that not just board size, but none of the governance
variables were significantly different for those firms that did restructure versus those
firms that did not restructure. This finding is significant since it casts doubt on the heavy
emphasis placed on corporate governance structures in the agency explanation of
restructuring. Additionally, it challenges the accepted wisdom that the governance
structure of the public corporation is in need of a major overhaul.
2.G.6. Equity Held by the Top Management Team
As seen in Table 1, Gibbs (1993) and Johnson et al. (1993) investigated the
relationship between equity held by the top management team and restructuring. These
two studies reached completely opposite conclusions.
Johnson et al. (1993) argued that boards with a higher proportion of outside
members and outside members with equity ownership are more likely to become
involved in major strategic decisions. Conversely, when the members of the top
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management team have equity ownership in their organization, they have the power to
forestall board involvement, but they also have the incentive for greater monitoring and
making decisions in the best interest of the stockholders. That is, because they have an
ownership interest in the organization, when top management team members have
longer tenure on the team as well as longer tenure in the organization, they are likely to
have more power that allows them to forestall board involvement. Furthermore, the
authors suggest that there is less need for board involvement in strategic decisions
when top managers have equity ownership because top management’s decisions are
more likely to be in the best interest of the shareholders.
In spite of this, top management team equity ownership was not significantly
correlated with either relative firm performance (i.e., performance relative to average
industry performance) or market performance. The authors noted that the implication of
this finding is that top management equity ownership might translate into greater
perceived legitimacy by outside board members in reference to strategic decisions by
top managers. In other words, boards might not get involved in strategic decisions
(e.g., divestiture and/or acquisition decisions) because equity ownership on behalf of
top managers signals to the board that the top managers will make prudent decisions.
Additionally, the authors were clear to point out that top managers might assume equity
ownership in their organizations because they are pressured to do so by key
constituencies (i.e., outside board members, blockholders, and institutional investors).
Contradicting the findings of Johnson et al. (1993), Gibbs (1993) found support
for a positive relationship between management equity interests and portfolio
restructuring. In fact, outside directors and management equity interests, accounted for
approximately one-third of the variance explained in their model.
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2.G.7. Turnover on the Board of Directors
Goodstein and Boeker (1991) is the only study that has investigated the
relationship between board turnover and restructuring activity. Specifically, the authors
hypothesized that turnover on the board would increase the number of service additions
and divestitures in their sample of 327 hospitals in California that underwent significant
changes during the 1980-1986 time period due to the fact that membership changes
would increase the likelihood that new perspectives would enter the strategic decisionmaking process. The results revealed that change in board composition due to turnover
on a board has a significant, positive effect on service additions but not on divestitures.
As such, board turnover in unrelated to restructuring.
2.G.8. Outside Directors’ Power
Gibbs (1993) studied the impact of outside directors’ power on restructuring
activity. He attempted to directly measure board power by using a multiplicative
indicator of power. Gibbs (1993) operationalized board power as the ratio of outside
directors to inside directors times the ratio of the average tenure of outside directors to
inside directors. He investigated this impact by studying 86 firms during the 1982-1987
timeframe. Based on the results, Gibbs (1993) concluded that firms with strong boards
were less likely to restructure, or at least, restructured less.
2.G.9. Board Diversity
Goodstein et al. (1994) investigated how board diversity, which has traditionally
been associated with optimal institutional and governance performance of boards,
affects its ability to initiate strategic changes during periods of environmental turbulence.
Specifically, they studied a panel of 334 hospitals in California during the 1980-1985
timeframe. They examined three distinct types of strategic change in hospitals –
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service additions, service divestitures, and service reorganizations. Consistent support
was found for the hypothesized negative relationship between board diversity and
strategic change. Hospitals with more occupationally diverse boards tended to initiate
fewer service additions, divestitures, and reorganizations. The basic conclusion of the
authors is that board diversity limits its ability to take timely strategic actions.
2.G.10.Board Tenure
The only study investigating the impact of board tenure on restructuring activity
was undertaken by Johnson et al. (1993). The authors suggested that a board
composed of senior directors is more resistant to change. As such, long tenure among
board members may compromise governance of top management regardless of
efficiency. Additionally, the authors suggested that the longer a group works together,
the higher the social pressures within the group for conformity to group norms. Thus,
Johnson et al. (1993) posited that board tenure was likely to be negatively related to
board involvement in restructuring activity.
Their analysis revealed that mean board tenure was not a statistically significant
predictor of board involvement in restructuring. Johnson et al. suggested that one
explanation of their finding is that “it may be inappropriate to extend upper-echelon
theory and arguments to board members. The board of directors functions quite
differently than top management teams. While a top management team meets and
interacts on a regular basis, boards of directors meet only a few times a year.
Therefore, power and political processes may have less effect on board operations than
in top management teams” (1993: 46). The authors failed to point out that lack of a
significant finding might be due to less than desirable statistical power of their test
(approximately .71).
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2.G.11.Institutional Ownership
Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) was the only study to investigate the relationship
between institutional ownership and restructuring. The authors hypothesized that
institutional ownership at the outset of the 1980s would be negatively correlated with
corporate restructuring during the 1980s. They argued that if institutional investors are
efficient monitors of managers, then firms with high levels of institutional ownership at
the outset of the 1980s should have already been efficiently configured, and so are
expected to be less likely to restructure subsequently. Additionally, the authors argued
that if institutional investors promote efficiency, then firms in which the level of
institutional ownership increased during the 1980s should have undertaken more
restructuring than other firms. The results of their study demonstrated that no
significant relationship existed between institutional ownership/increases in institutional
ownership and restructuring activity. A potential explanation of non-significant findings
of these relationships is the low statistical power of their tests (approximately .61).
2.G.12.CEO Duality
As previously mentioned, Chatterjee et al. (2003) argued that even after a major
event such as a takeover attempt, boards that have taken their monitoring duties
seriously might still assume that their organizations’ strategies are appropriate. In other
words, the existence of a vigilant board (i.e., independent board) implies that the firm’s
diversification strategy was under constant scrutiny and that it was, at least believed to
be, appropriate. The authors believed that the lack of CEO duality creates greater
board independence, and, as such, they hypothesized that CEO non-duality was
negatively related to refocusing activity. Contrary to their arguments, Chatterjee et al.
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(2003) did not find support for their hypothesized negative relationship between CEO
non-duality and restructuring activity.
2.G.13.Summary of the Literature
From the above discussion and the synthesis of findings in Table 1 it is apparent
that, for the most part, there are no systematic relationships between governance
structures and restructuring activity, and for those relationships that have been
investigated by multiple studies, the results often have led to contradictory findings.
The debate regarding the role of the board of directors typically has been framed
by alternative characterizations of boards. On one end of the spectrum, boards have
been characterized as ‘rubber stamps’ (Herman, 1981) or as ‘tools’ of management
(Pfeffer, 1972) that rely heavily on top management for leadership, direction, and
information. This line of research, inspired by scholars emphasizing power in
organizations (Zajac & Westphal, 1996) and agency relationships (Jensen, 1989), has
tended to emphasize how powerful CEOs ensure that boards have essentially no effect
on a firm’s strategy or changes in strategy.
On the other end of the spectrum, researchers are increasingly viewing boards
as comprised of independent thinkers who take an active role in shaping the strategic
direction of their organization (Walsh & Seward, 1990; Davis & Thompson, 1994;
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Even if vigilant boards do not restructure because they
view organizational strategies as adequate, any changes in post-restructuring periods
might be due to pressures from key constituencies that attempt to align managements’
interests with those of the shareholders, or at least to attenuate managerial
opportunism. Such extremely divided conceptualizations of boards as passive versus
active have led to very different conclusions regarding descriptions of board
52

characteristics and behaviors and their impact on restructuring. In order to interpret the
results of the governance-restructuring literature, an understanding of potential sources
of the conflicting findings is needed.
2.H.

Potential Sources of Conflicting Findings
An assessment of the studies reviewed reveals contradictory findings. A variety

of reasons for such conflicting findings may be identified in the studies investigating the
relationship between governance and restructuring: 1) survivor bias; 2) inadequate
statistical power; 3) different operationalizations of restructuring; 4) failure to
differentiate why firms restructure; and, 5) failure to include control groups (i.e., firms
that did not restructure). Each of these explanations is discussed below. Table 2
shows which studies were affected by each potential problem.
2.H.1. Different Operationalizations of Restructuring
There is no consensus in the literature on how to properly operationalize
restructuring, which may contribute to the contradictory findings concern the
governance-restructuring relationship. For example, Johnson et al. (1993) argued that
companies engaged in restructuring when they divested multiple businesses (more than
two), involving a minimum of 10% of their total assets. Gibbs (1993) argued that single
measures of portfolio restructuring, such as asset divestment and decreased diversity
might not differentiate restructuring from clean-up activities associated with large
acquisitions and from normal growth differentials among business segments. As such,
Gibbs (1993) used a more restrictive measure of portfolio restructuring – the joint
product of asset divestiture (i.e., total sales of property, plant, and equipment during the
study period divided by net property, plant, and equipment at the beginning of the study
period) and decreased diversity (i.e., the change in diversity from the beginning to the
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end of the study period). Yet another measure of portfolio restructuring was provided by
Bethel and Liebeskind (1993), who used a variety of different measures of portfolio
restructuring – downsizing, change in total diversification, change in total diversification,
and divestitures. Investigating strategic change in a hospital setting, Goodstein and
Boeker (1991) and Goodstein et al. (1994) used three hospital specific measures of
strategic change – service additions, service divestitures, and service reorganizations.
As is evident from these examples, there are multiple operationalizations of
restructuring. Furthermore, the samples (hospitals versus Fortune 500) might lead to
contradictory findings regarding the board-restructuring relationship. As Goodstein and
Boeker noted, “there are some important differences in the structures and functions of
corporate and hospital boards. A major difference is the locus of responsibility for
initiating strategic change. Hospitals rely on their managements, physicians, and
directors to provide direction regarding strategic changes. But for most corporate
entities, the CEO and the top management team assume responsibility for strategic
changes” (1991: 325).
2.H.2. Survivor Bias
All of the studies in Table 2 that have assessed the governance-strategic change
relationship suffer methodologically by using data exclusively from organizations that
have survived a strategic change. These studies have only focused on the survivors of
change and their governance structures. As shown in Table 2, studies that suffer from
this problem are Bergh (1995), Bethel & Liebeskind (1993), Chatterjee et al. (2003),
Gibbs (1993), Goodstein & Boeker (1991), Goodstein et al. (1994), Hoskisson et al.
(1994), Johnson et al. (1993), Markides and Singh (1997). Since this issue is a form of
selection bias it poses a threat to internal validity (Cook & Campbell, 1979: 53;
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Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991: 227), and, thus, calls into question the validity of
assertions regarding the effects of the independent variable(s) (i.e., governance) on the
dependent variable(s) (i.e., restructuring) since these studies neglected to include those
organizations that failed at the process of strategic change.
2.H.3. Statistical Power
Conflicting and non-significant findings might also partially be attributable to a
lack of statistical power. Studies that suffer from substandard power levels leave
conclusions open to great interpretation. Non-significant findings could be due to
insufficient statistical power or the true absence of the phenomenon (Cohen, 1977;
Cortina & Folger, 1998; Greenwald, 1993). For example, Chatterjee et al. (2003) failed
to find significance for their arguments that CEO non-duality and the proportion of
outsiders on the board were negatively related to incidences of restructuring. In
discussing these findings, the authors failed to mention that non-significance might have
resulted from a substandard power levels (approximately .50). Other studies that
suffered from below-optimal power levels were Bethel and Liebeskind (1993), Gibbs
(1993), Johnson et al. (1993), Hoskisson et al. (1994), and Bergh (1995). In fact,
Hoskisson et al. (1994) even noted that with a slight increase in the sample size of their
study, one of the hypothesized relationships reached significance.
2.H.4. Failure to Differentiate Why Firms Restructure
A multitude of empirical and theoretical investigations into the antecedents of
portfolio restructuring have revealed that various factors precipitate the shedding of
corporate assets. However, the vast majority of the studies reviewed here (with a
notable exception by Gibbs, 1993) did not take this fact into consideration. They
proceeded as if governance issues and governance concerns were pervasive in all
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Chatterjee et al. (2003)

Markides & Singh (1997)

Bergh (1995)

Hoskisson et al. (1994)

Goodstein et al. (1994)

Johnson et al. (1993)

Gibbs (1993)

Bethel & Liebeskind (1993)

Goodstein & Boeker (1991)

Study
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Two different measures – the number of
service additions and divestitures in
hospitals
Three different measures – change in
total diversification, change in related
diversification, and divestitures
A multiplicative item defined as asset
divestment (percentage of property, plant,
and equipment sold during the study
period) times decreased diversification
(difference in diversification from the
beginning to the end of the study period)
Voluntary divestment of at least 10% of a
firm’s total assets
Three different measures – service
additions, divestitures, and
reorganizations in hospitals
Divestment intensity was measured with
three variables measuring different
aspects of the construct – the number of
business units divested, percentage of
sales divested, and time required to
restructure.
Selling or disposition of some previously
owned corporate asset, product line, or
ongoing entity to another company
10% divestiture of the company’s asset
base
Any spin-offs or sale of plants or divisions
(no minimum percentage)

Operationalization of
Restructuring

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Survivor
Bias

Table 2
Potential Sources of Conflicting Findings

X

X

X

X

X

X

Low
Power

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

No Reasons
Why Firms
Restructure

X

X

X

No Control
Group

organizations that implement restructuring programs, thus resulting in less robust
results. By combining all these firms into one sample, or at least not controlling for
alternate explanations, may have diluted the effects. As Kosnik suggested,
“observations need to be restricted to situations involving acute conflict of interest
between top management and shareholders” (1990: 145).
2.H.5. Failure to Investigate Non-Restructuring Firms
As shown in Table 2, three studies – Johnson et al. (1993), Hoskisson et al.
(1994), and Bergh (1995) – only analyzed firms that restructured their operations. As
such, internal validity of the findings is compromised. Internal validity refers to the
“validity of assertions regarding the effects of the independent variable(s) on the
dependent variable(s)” (Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991: 224). In other words, is the
phenomenon observed (i. e., restructuring activity) due to the variables the researcher
claims to be operating (i.e., certain governance characteristics), or can it be attributable
to other variables? (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991). For
example, Johnson et al. (1993) concluded that outside director ownership and outsider
representation on the board were positively related to board of director involvement in
restructuring. Without comparing these results against a group of firms that did not
restructure (or at least have a sample of firms that did and did not restructure), Johnson
and colleagues’ findings, as well as those of Bergh (1995) and Hoskisson et al. (1994),
lack internal validity.
Markides and Singh (1997) addressed this issue by comparing their results to a
control group. More specifically, their sample of 132 firms was divided between 91 firms
that initiated restructuring and 41 firms that did not implement a restructuring program.
They concluded that the governance characteristics of firms that did and did not
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restructure were not significantly different from each other. If Johnson et al. (1993) had
structured their study in a similar manner, they might have concluded that outside
director ownership and outsider representation on the board might also be prevalent in
firms that did not undertake restructuring programs.
2.I.

The Next Step
The portfolio restructuring literature is clear that restructuring corrects the

immediate problems of firms experiencing poor performance that are attributable to
substandard governance. Interestingly enough, these same researchers have yet to
empirically or conceptually examine the real source of the problem – poor governance.
A few have mentioned that more radical action besides restructuring is needed. They
have predicted the ‘eclipse of the modern corporation’ (Jensen, 1989) and have called
for a radical reexamination of the governance systems of the firm (Jensen, 1993).
Hoskisson and Turk (1990) suggested that such a reexamination is possible in postrestructuring periods by providing the firm with the opportunity to reconfigure the
governance structure in ways that restrict the management discretion that originally
resulted in excess diversification.
According to Golden and Zajac (2001) there has been an increased scrutiny on
board activities over the years, which is not only driven by academic researchers, but
also government regulators and the business press. The authors furthermore state that
most of the recommendations emerging from the corporate governance debate tend to
revolve around changes in board structure, such as increasing the proportion of outside
directors, which are aimed at increasing the independence of board decision-making.
Thus, if restructuring is, in part, directed at repairing corporate governance breakdowns,
it is not unreasonable to assume that new ownership and governance patterns would
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emerge in post-restructuring periods. As Johnson suggests, “If corporate governance is
weak or a failure in the pre-restructuring period, what changes does a firm make in the
post-restructuring period? If a firm does not correct governance inefficiencies or
shortcomings, then the process of refocusing may be followed by renewed expansion or
continued inefficiencies” (1996: 477). Addressing this issue is crucial and the next
logical step in making a contribution to the restructuring and governance literatures.
Specifically, I argue that during a crisis (i.e., periods of poor performance), firms
face significant pressures from independent boards, large individual shareholders, and
institutional investors to improve performance and ensure corporate accountability
(Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; Chatterjee & Harrison, 2001; Davis & Thompson, 1994;
Gilson & Kraakman, 1991; Hoskisson et al., 1994; Ryan & Schneider, 2002; Useem et
al., 1996; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001; Westphal & Zajac, 1997). Responses to such
pressures will manifest themselves in restructuring activity, as well as voluntary and
involuntary modifications to firms’ governance structures so as to demonstrate to these
powerful constituencies that the managerial strategies are sufficiently adequate to
safeguard shareholder interests. It is important to note that such changes occur for
substantive reasons or as symbolic gestures (Daily & Dalton, 1995; Meyer & Rowan,
1977; Westphal & Zajac, 1994; 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1995).
Based upon the literature on board of directors and governance in general, it
would not be unreasonable to assume that restructuring programs are coupled with
governance changes in firms that experience poor performance in the pre-restructuring
period. For example, as uncertainty arises in an organization (e.g., changing
diversification levels along with poor performance) the board will focus more on its
external role by increasing the board’s diversity to maintain links with the external
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environment (Pfeffer, 1972; 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Provan, 1980; Stiles &
Taylor, 2001). This idea is substantiated by Chatterjee and Harrison (2001) and Sutton
and Callahan (1987), who mention that during any type of crisis, maintaining exchange
relationships with key constituencies is important, which, on occasion, calls for
adjustments to the governance structure. Other evidence that substantiates
governance reform after periods of poor performance was offered by Pearce and Zahra
(1992) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), who noted that outside directors are added
to boards following periods of poor performance. Stearns and Mizruchi (1993) found
that declining profits were related to the appointment of representatives from financial
institutions. Some have suggested that any board reforms must first be preceded by
improvements in board composition (Schellenger, Wood & Tashakori, 1989). Board
leadership structure has also been targeted as a means for improving board of directors
(e.g., Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Rechner & Dalton, 1991).
To date, there has been no empirical examination that specifically addresses
governance as an outcome of the restructuring process. As previously mentioned,
governance (coupled with poor performance) is the most discussed antecedent of
portfolio restructuring, yet it is completely ignored in the post-restructuring period. The
literature has focused on strategy (e.g., Hitt et al., 1996; Hoskisson & Johnson, 1992),
employee effects (e.g., Brockner, Grove, O’Malley, Reed & Glynn, 1993; Brown, James
& Mooradian, 1994; Kose et al., 1992; Reilly, Brett & Stroh, 1993), and firm performance
(e.g., Bergh, 1995; Bowman et al., 1999; Comment & Jarrell, 1995; Kose & Ofek, 1995;
Markides, 1992, 1995; Montgomery et al., 1984) in the post-restructuring period.
Research has demonstrated that, on average, portfolio restructuring has a positive
impact on performance in the post-restructuring period. However, if the agency
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explanation of restructuring is correct, firms are still saddled with the same weak
governance structures in the post-restructuring period. As such, the idea of governance
reforms in the post-restructuring period has merit, yet lacks conceptual and empirical
examination, leaving a large gap in the literature.
It would seem reasonable to assume that such changes in governance would
occur predominantly for firms that suffered poor performance prior to restructuring. It is
predicted that such changes would occur in post-restructuring periods for the following
reasons:
•

The time between declines in performance and the initiation of a restructuring
is narrow – e.g., less than a year (Bergh, 1995; Jain, 1985). However,
changes to governance structures, such as board size, proportion of outsiders
on the board, outside and inside board equity, CEO duality, the presence of
prestigious board members, and the representation of key constituencies (e.g.,
financial institutions) on the board are time intensive processes, thus, not able
to be fully carried out until after the restructuring.

•

As previously mentioned, Markides and Singh (1997) investigated the
governance characteristics of firms that did and did not restructure, concluding
that there were no significant differences between the two sets of firms. As
such, an empirical investigation is needed to determine if calls for governance
reform are implemented in the post-restructuring period since governance has
been labeled as problematic and needs to be addressed, yet has not been
done so in the pre-restructuring period.

•

When firms are faced with the threat of significant declines in performance,
they may suffer from ‘threat-rigidity’ responses (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton,
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1981), characterized by increasing conservatism and resistance to change. As
such, to overcome such resistance a firm must engage in restructuring and
only in the post-restructuring period can changes be brought about in the
governance structure of the firm.
Additionally, it is argued in this dissertation that governance structures moderate
the portfolio restructuring-performance relationship. The idea here is that due to the
taken for granted nature of what constitutes sound governance, the financial markets
will positively reward those firms whose governance structures possess socially valid
indicators of sound governance. This is an area in the restructuring-market
performance relationship that requires investigation since there is significant evidence
that market evaluations can be impacted by non-financial factors, such as alterations of
governance structures. This investigation examines whether the positive impact of
restructuring on performance is impacted by the governance structures of the firm.
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY DEVELOPMENT
This chapter contains the theoretical background and propositions concerning
governance in the post-restructuring period, as well as the impact of governance on the
restructuring-performance relationship. The chapter draws upon arguments set forth in
the prior chapter concerning how investors, governance activists, and experts view
governance and ultimately define what is good or sound governance.
Utilizing institutional, signaling, impression management, and resource
dependence arguments, I offer propositions concerning how restructuring organizations
will conform to these expectations of good governance and modify their governance
structures in the post-restructuring period. Additionally, arguments are offered that
predict the impact of governance structures on the market evaluation of organizations in
the post-restructuring period. The main idea behind this latter set of relationships is that
the market evaluations of firms will be more positive for those organizations exhibiting
good governance.
3.A.

Pressures for Change
Institutional theory suggests that organizational legitimacy is paramount for firm

performance and survival (Certo, 2003; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995;
Suchman, 1995). To gain legitimacy, organizations respond to institutional pressures
stemming from such sources as suppliers of capital, consumers, owners, boards of
directors, and regulatory agencies by adopting similar organizational forms (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Luoma & Goodstein, 1999; Townley, 2002).
Better known as isomorphism (Deephouse, 1996; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer &
Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2001), this process forces an organization to resemble other
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organizations that are confronted with the same set of environmental issues (DiMaggio
& Powell, 1983).
Additionally, the literature suggests that isomorphism does impact organizational
characteristics, such as structures and practices (Deephouse, 1996; Meyer & Rowan,
1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). The adoption of these prevailing practices and
procedures results in increases in organizational legitimacy, which helps organizations
acquire more resources and lessen the probability of failure (Baum & Oliver, 1991;
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Suchman, 1995; Westphal, Gulati & Shortell, 1997).
This argument is consistent with the tenets of signaling theory (Bhattacharya,
1979; Certo, 2003; Riley, 1989; Ross, 1977; Spence, 1973; Turban & Greening, 1997;
Williams & Gauer, 1994), which suggests that compliance with institutional norms will be
seen as signaling to the population at large the firm’s reputation and legitimacy. The
theory suggests that information asymmetry exists between owners and executives
since executives are more informed about the firm’s prospects for firm growth and
profitability. As such, executives must effectively demonstrate that they are working in
the best interests of shareholders (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Leland & Pyle, 1977).
Based on the aforementioned arguments it is suggested that governance
structures face these same pressures from their external environment. The pressures
are greatest when performance is sub-optimal since the literature has linked suboptimal governance to deteriorations in firm performance. As such, the following
section argues that firms suffering from poor performance will not only face these
pressures, but will have to make changes to their governance structures, either
voluntarily or involuntarily, in order to conform to these pressures.
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3.A.1. Pressures for Governance Changes
It is argued in this dissertation that following a crisis, such as declining financial
performance followed by portfolio restructuring, boards/firms will institute changes in
their governance structures as a result of increased pressures by large shareholders
(i.e., institutional investors and blockholders) and vigilant boards of directors, since
power shifts away from management to boards in times of poor performance (Mizruchi,
1983; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). As a response to declining performance, a
variety of firms opt to restructure their portfolio of assets with the intent of placing the
firm on a track for improved performance, or at least demonstrate to their constituencies
that they are attempting to do so.
In addition to the attempt to correct the declining performance situation, it is
argued that significant pressures are placed upon firms (i.e., boards of directors and
managers) to address the causes of the poor performance – namely, inadequate
governance and inefficient governance structures, as advocated by the overwhelmingly
accepted arguments in the portfolio restructuring literature as set forth by agency
theory. However, to date, no research has either conceptually or empirically addressed
this issue.
Given the need to positively influence these sources of power (namely
institutional investors and the markets, in general), firms may adopt organizational
structures to signal legitimacy, because “organizations that incorporate societally
legitimated rationalized elements in their formal structures maximize their legitimacy and
increase their resources and survival capabilities” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 352). The
anticipated result is an improved perception of the organizational image and renewed
confidence in the organization’s future (Daily & Dalton, 1995; Schwartz & Menon, 1985).
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Conceptual research indicates that such organizational structures include
characteristics of boards of directors and top managers (Certo, 2003; Mizruchi, 1996;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Westphal & Zajac, 1994; 1998).
The literature on institutional theory would suggest that firms would incorporate
or institute governance changes that reflect the myths of their institutional environments.
These changes will become part of the organization’s rationalized formal structure (e.g.,
board of director and top management team), whose elements reflect rules that are
socially constructed, deeply ingrained, taken for granted, may be supported by public
opinion, and/or enforced by the views of important constituents (Berger & Luckmann,
1967; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Starbuck, 1976). In other words, rather than incorporate
elements in terms of efficient coordination and control of productive activities, firms
incorporate elements that are legitimated externally. Thus, making alterations to one’s
governance structures by adhering to the prescriptions of myths in the institutional
environment (i.e., effective and high performing firms are those with sound governance
structures), an organization demonstrates that it is acting on collectively valued
purposes in a proper and adequate manner (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Kamens, 1977;
Meyer & Rowan, 1977, 1978; Scott, 1991; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). This is crucial to an
organization because they require more than material resources and technical
information if they are to survive and thrive in the social environment. They also need
social acceptability and credibility (Scott, Ruef, Mendel & Coronna, 2000).
As previously argued, significant pressures are exerted by shareholders upon
boards of directors to effectively respond in times of organizational crisis (e.g., period of
declining performance). Additionally, top managers face similar pressures for
performance enhancements by boards of directors. It is important for top managers and
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boards to manage these multiple contingencies in order to preserve their positions.
Failures to keep shareholders satisfied may result in removal from the board and the
potential for a negative impact to the board members’ reputation/prestige, thus
decreasing the probability of an attractive board assignment with another firm.
Additionally, corporate boards not active in their pursuit of performance improvements
might be regarded as negligent in their protection of stockholder interests (Westphal &
Zajac, 1994).
Executives also face immediate demands to show that they are maximizing
shareholder wealth. Failure to keep shareholders satisfied presents significant hazards,
including hostile takeovers (Chatterjee et al., 2003; Davis & Stout, 1992; Kabir, Cantrijn
& Jeunink, 1997; Sundaramurthy, 1996); intervention by vigilant, professional money
managers (Daily, 1996; David et al., 2001; Useem, 1996); board interference in
corporate strategy (Boeker & Goodstein, 1991; Westphal & Zajac, 1998); involuntary
executive replacement (Boeker, 1992; Chatterjee et al., 2003; Daily et al., 2003a; Dalton
& Kesner, 1985; James & Soref, 1981; Johnson et al., 1996; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978;
Puffer & Weintrop, 1991; Schwartz & Menon, 1985; Wright et al., 1996); downgrading of
the company’s stock (Sanders & Carpenter, 2003); and the loss of potential gains from
stock options (Rajagopalan & Finkelstein, 1992; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). As
such, it is extremely important in times of substandard performance and organizational
change for organizations to conform to these pressures since firms are dependent on
these sources for stability, legitimacy, and the appearance of rationality (Oliver, 1991;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Suchman, 1995).
It is important to offer examples where organizations institute changes as a
response to the demands of constituencies. The belief is that the instituted changes will
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be ones that are favorably received by these constituencies. The following section
specifically addresses this issue by offering the reader examples of institutionally
legitimated change. Such a discussion is important since this dissertation posits that
firms experiencing poor performance will not only restructure their portfolio of assets,
but also will be pressured to institute governance changes that are institutionally
legitimated.
3.A.2. Examples of Institutionally Legitimated Change
The literature contains examples where executives are likely to respond to
pressures by instituting shareholder and board of director mollification strategies to
manage pressures in their environment. Specifically, it is suggested that executives
deal with shareholder and board demands by adopting structures or implementing
programs that are generally favorably received by the shareholders, boards, and the
markets (Elsbach, 1994; Harrison, 1987; Sanders & Carpenter, 2003; Wade, Porac &
Pollock, 1997; Westphal & Milton, 2000; Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 1998; Zajac &
Westphal, 1995).
For example, Sanders and Carpenter (2003) suggested that a CEO might
announce a stock repurchase to send a strong signal that he or she is bullish about the
firm. The authors noted that this perception is shared by financial market analysts, who
view repurchase programs as a tactic to reassure nervous investors. From an
institutional perspective, announcing a stock repurchase program has achieved takenfor-granted status in U.S. capital markets as a shareholder-friendly initiative (Jensen,
1986; Sanders & Carpenter, 2003; Westphal & Zajac, 2001). However, while a stock
repurchase program redistributes wealth and ownership, it does nothing in and of itself
to create long-term value or better a firm’s competitive position relative to its
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competitors. Thus, according to Sanders and Carpenter (2003) it is reasonable to
assume that if CEOs and their top managers fail to maximize shareholder returns, the
announcement of stock repurchase programs may look like an intendedly rational
method of managing shareholder impressions and expectations. Such actions should
not be unexpected since “executives resort to all sorts of actions to allay shareholders’
near-term concerns” (Sanders & Carpenter, 2003: 175). From an impression
management perspective, the adoption of a repurchase plan may enhance a firm’s
image with its shareholders (cf. Bolino, 1999).
The results obtained by Sanders and Carpenter (2003) suggested that strategic
initiatives that tend to garner favorable stock market responses, such as stock
repurchase programs, become tempting choices for executives, even when they may be
sub-optimal firm strategies. The authors labeled such tactics as strategic satisficing.
Sanders and Carpenter argued that “by adopting such programs, executives mitigate
perceived threats to their tenure and personal wealth, but potentially supplant other
strategic contingencies that require significant funding” (2003: 173).
Another example of an adopted reform is the use of long-term incentive plans
(LTIPs – plans that focus on profitability over a multiyear period as well as on stock
price) as part of executives’ pay packages (Westphal & Zajac, 1998). The use of these
plans is seen as a mechanism to minimize the extent to which the interests of agents
(top management) diverge from those of principals (shareholders) (Jensen & Meckling,
1976). Furthermore, LTIPs are expected to lengthen executives’ time horizons and
focus their attention on creating shareholder value. The use of these plans receives
positive praise by governance reform advocates and positive ratings by Business
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Week’s (2002) “The Best & Worst Boards,” which, among other things, evaluates
boards on the degree to which they link the CEO’s pay to specific performance targets.
Given the presumed advantages of LTIPs, most research investigating the
consequences of LTIP adoption have found a positive market reaction to the announced
adoption of LTIPs (Larcker, 1983; Brickley, Bhagat & Lease, 1985; Tehranian, et al.,
1987; Kumar & Sopariwala, 1992). According to Kumar and Sopariwala, “this positive
reaction is consistent with the view that there will be a lower degree of agency problems
and lower agency costs subsequent to the adoption of these plans” (1992: 562). Thus,
the notion of protecting shareholders’ interests through incentive alignment may have
acquired institutional or symbolic value over time as an explanation for the introduction
of LTIPs (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zajac & Westphal, 1995; Zucker, 1983, 1987).
Westphal and Zajac (1998) studied the adoption of LTIP by executives and
concluded that the adoption of these programs is an important form of symbolic action,
regardless of whether or not the plans are actually implemented. Additionally, the
authors found that the use of agency language in the proxy statements (i.e., language
that explicitly discusses how LTIPs promote shareholder interests by tying CEO
compensation more closely to shareholder wealth) results in more favorable stock
market reaction to LTIP adoption, again, irrespective of whether the plans were
implemented. Thus, the authors argued that their study illustrated how structural or
policy changes (whether decoupled or not) might provide a vehicle or opportunity for
firms to manage impressions.
Westphal and Zajac (1994) suggested that boards use impression management
in response to poor performance. Independent of CEO influence over the board,
declining prior performance is positively related to the likelihood of LTIP adoption but
70

not to the likelihood or magnitude of subsequent grants in actual compensation
packages. Drawing on their results, the authors concluded that it appeared that LTIP
adoption frequently represented a symbolic rather than a purely substantive adaptation
to poor performance. In effect, boards facing the pressures associated with a firm’s
poor performance may seek to restore their credibility with stakeholders by ceremonially
increasing control over management (Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Elsbach & Sutton,
1992). As such, LTIP adoption can provide an opportunity for the firm to manage
stakeholders’ impressions about CEO compensation and the role of compensation in
organizational affairs (Westphal & Zajac, 1994).
3.A.3. Governance in the Post-Restructuring Period
Based on the fact that a common research proxy for a board’s governing
effectiveness is firm financial performance (Kosnik, 1987; Mallette & Fowler, 1992), and
revolutionary, yet not universally accepted, statements in the portfolio restructuring
literature such as “If perfect governance is achieved, no performance problems should
exist” (Johnson et al., 1993: 34), pressures for, and adoptions of, governance reforms
should be greatest when shareholders’ interests are viewed as having been neglected
(Westphal & Zajac, 1994). As such, it is believed that this has direct implications for
firms engaged in portfolio restructuring, specifically those organizations that are
experiencing substandard performance.
It has been argued from an institutional and signaling perspective that directors
and executives must respond to these pressures in order to, among other things,
maintain legitimacy, credibility, employment security, and reputation. These arguments
are reinforced from an impression management perspective (Bolino, 1999; Pfeffer,
1981; Schlenker, 1980; Schlenker & Weigold, 1992; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981), which
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suggests that poor performance threatens the credibility of board members as
guardians of shareholder interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983a). In order to alleviate this
negative attribution, boards must at least “give the appearance of efficacy” (Salancik &
Meindl, 1984: 238) by symbolically affirming and tightening their control over
management (Pfeffer, 1981; Westphal & Zajac, 1994).
Thus, it is suggested that restructuring firms who experience poor performance in
the pre-restructuring period will face significant pressures from ownership groups and
vigilant boards to address the commonly agreed upon cause of poor performance –
substandard governance. Thus, boards will respond to these pressures, either
voluntarily or involuntarily, by modifying their current governance structures, which will
reflect common conceptions of what good governance ought to be. Formally stated,
Proposition 1: Firms experiencing poor performance in the pre-restructuring
period will institute governance changes in the post-restructuring period
3.B. Specific Changes in Governance Structures
In this section I will specifically discuss what types of changes I expect owners,
the markets, and, potentially, outside board members will demand, and thus eventually
be instituted in firms. It is important to note that the changes in governance (those that
possess social validity and are institutionally legitimated) discussed pertain specifically
to the post-asset restructuring organizations that experienced poor performance in the
pre-restructuring period.
3.B.1. Board Composition
One of the most widely studied governance structure is the composition of the
board since many believe that its composition is a critical determinant of the board’s
ability to effectively carry out its governance responsibilities (Daily & Schwenk, 1996;
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Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992;
Williamson, 1975, 1985). There is a commonly held belief in the academic literature
(e.g., Bathala & Rao, 1995; Daily, 1995; Daily et al., 2003a; Daily & Johnson, 1997;
Daily, Johnson & Dalton, 1999; Hoskisson et al., 1994; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Mizruchi,
1983; Monks & Minnow, 1991; Rock, 1991; Weisbach, 1988; Young et al., 2000; Zahra
& Pearce, 1989) and the popular press (Brown, 2003; Langley, 2003; Nussbaum &
Dobrzynski, 1987; Ozanian & Decarlo, 2003; Pozen, 1994) that the interests of
shareholders are better protected when there is greater board independence (i.e., a
higher proportion of independent directors sitting on the board).
Dalton et al. noted the prevalence of this belief by stating, “There is near
consensus in the conceptual literature that effective boards will be comprised of greater
proportions of outside directors. The corporate community is even more outspoken on
this issue. Among practitioners, especially institutional investors and shareholder
activists, it is not unusual to find advocates for boards which are comprised exclusively
of outside directors” (1998: 270). These arguments echoed prior arguments by
Hoskisson et al., who stated that “outside directors have often been viewed in the
governance literature as having few costs in terms of strategic formulation and unbound
benefits for governance and monitoring” (1994: 1237). Lastly, Baysinger and Butler
argued that “proposals for corporate board reform devote special attention to the issues
of board composition and director independence. According to many reformers, the
boards of all major U.S. corporations should have at least a majority of outside
directors. Moreover, the ideal board would have no director, except for the chief
executive officer, who is also an employee of the firm, past or present” (1985: 102).
Based on this evidence, there is a taken for granted notion that boards characterized by
73

a predominance of outsiders, those individuals not currently employed by the
organization, are ones that lead to the greatest reduction of uncertainty about
managerial motives.
There is evidence in the popular press that firms respond to increases in
pressures from ownership groups or social expectations by replacing insiders with
outsiders with the intent of achieving greater, or even maintaining, legitimacy and
social acceptability. For instance, Tenet Healthcare Corporation recently
announced that it’s CEO and three directors would step down from the board and
replaced by four individuals not working for the organization (Rundle, 2003). The
move was part of a broad plan by the organization to quell shareholder discontent
about its governance practices. When asked about the change, the CEO, Jeffrey
Barbekow, mentioned, “It is an indication of the level of seriousness we have about
this…when we talk about independence, we really mean it” (2003: A8).
In the academic literature, it is theorized that the greater representation of
management on the board, the greater the degree of managerial discretion and the
increased likelihood that executives will act opportunistically. Such opportunistic action
may manifest itself in decisions, among other things, to pursue diversification that is
either inappropriate or too great in scope (Amihud & Lev, 1981), pay greenmail (Kosnik,
1987), or persist in existing courses of action and strategic directions that are
detrimental to the functioning of the organization (Harrigan, 1983). In other words, an
insider-dominated board is expected to allow managers to “indulge their preference for
non value-maximizing behavior” (Morck et al., 1988: 294).
Signaling theory suggests that a board composed predominantly of outside
directors may signal that effective controls are in place (Certo et al., 2001). As such,
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board independence may provide investors greater confidence in the firm’s potential.
Evidence of this belief was offered by Seward and Walsh (1996), who hypothesized and
found evidence of their assertion that spun-off firms would create outsider-dominated
boards as a means of communicating that management wanted to “do right” by
shareholders and have effective monitoring in place. Here, again, there is an
assumption that effective monitoring and proper governance manifests itself in the form
of a majority of outsiders on the board of directors. Westphal and Zajac (1994)
suggested that such changes in board composition, although substantive in
appearance, might be largely symbolic since the CEO may have the opportunity to
recruit sympathetic outsiders to the board (Wade et al., 1990). While such changes
may enhance the formal structural bases of board power, they may nevertheless
decrease the board’s informal power over management if CEOs effectively control the
selection process. As such, changes in the formal structure of the board are highly
visible to stakeholders, especially institutional investors, yet the inability of stakeholders
to discern what outcomes they are obtaining or the value of such outcomes makes it
easier for boards to take such symbolic action (Pfeffer, 1981; Westphal & Zajac, 1994).
The resource dependence perspective (e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Selznick,
1949) views outside directors as a critical link to the external environment. Such board
members may provide access to valued resources and information (Bazerman &
Schoorman, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Provan, 1980; Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993).
It has also been noted that this resource dependence role of directors may be
particularly useful in shielding the organization from diversity (e.g., Daily & Dalton,
1994a, 1994b; Sutton & Callahan, 1987; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Pfeffer & Salancik
noted that “one would expect that as the potential environmental pressures confronting
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the organization increased, the need for outside support would increase as well (1978:
168). Thus, the resource dependence perspective suggests that performance
advantages accrue to organizations with effective board-environment linkages (Dalton
et al., 1998).
Conversely, it is argued that insiders on the board or insider-dominated boards
may be less likely to meet the resource dependence role (Daily & Dalton, 1994a; Dalton
et al., 1998; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Sutton & Callahan, 1987). As noted by Dalton et
al., “Given their operational responsibilities, inside directors generally may not have the
same access to external information and resources that would be enjoyed by the firm’s
outside directors (e.g., CEOs of other firms, investment bankers, former governmental
officials, major suppliers)” (1998: 275). It is argued that these outside members bring
with them important expertise, experience, and skills to facilitate advice and counsel
(Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Gales & Kesner, 1994; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).
In summary, based on the above arguments, it is believed that greater levels of
outsider representation on the board (i.e., a more independent board) provide access to
valuable resources. More importantly, outsider representation on the board has
received social validation and legitimacy because greater levels of independence are
believed to positively impact the functioning of the firm and subsequent firm
performance. In other words, there is an institutionalized belief among ownership
groups, governance reform activists, the popular press, and for the most part,
academicians that a move toward greater levels of outsider representation is a move
towards greater accountability and subsequent levels of firm performance. It is
important to note that greater levels of independence (i.e., more outsiders on the board)
might be instituted in the post-restructuring period due to pressures from ownership
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groups or as a result of impression management and signaling behavior on behalf of the
board and CEO. As such, the following proposition is offered.
Proposition 1a: Restructuring firms experiencing poor performance in the prerestructuring period will have greater levels of board independence in the postrestructuring period
3.B.2. Board Leadership Structure
Dalton et al. noted that “As with board composition, there is strong sentiment
among board reform advocates, most notably public pension funds and shareholder
activist groups, that the CEO should not serve simultaneously as chairperson of the
board” (1998: 271). Young et al. echoed these comments by stating that “this
arrangement has been widely criticized as potentially undermining the board’s
responsibility to oversee top management” (2000: 279). Lorsch & MacIver strongly
advocated the independent board leadership structure, suggesting that “providing a
leader separate from the CEO could significantly help directors prevent crises, as well
as to act swiftly and effectively when one occurs” (1989: 185). Besides these authors,
many in the academic community (e.g., Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Black, 1992; Daily et al.,
2003a, 2003b; Daily & Johnson, 1997; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Finkelstein & D’Aveni,
1994; Kesner & Johnson, 1990; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mallette & Fowler, 1992;
Mizruchi, 1983; Monks & Minnow, 1991; Rechner & Dalton, 1989, 1991; Rock, 1991;
Singh & Harianto, 1989; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) and popular press (e.g., Brown, 2003;
Dobrzynski, 1991; Geneen, 1984; Langley, 2003; Levy, 1993a, 1993b; Ozanian &
Decarlo, 2003; Patton & Baker, 1987; Pozen, 1994; Rock, 1991; Simison &
Blumenstein, 1995) have also embraced the idea that separation of these positions is
favorable for the firm’s welfare.
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Institutional investors and advocates of board reform have pressured firms to
separate the CEO and board chair positions as a means of improving board monitoring
and control of management decisions. Reforms for separation of these duties are
especially notable when firms are experiencing performance difficulties (Dalton et al.,
1998; Dobrzynski, 1995). Levy noted that “most separate chairmen are named during
times of stress for the corporation” (1993a: 10).
In summary, based on the above arguments, it is believed that for those firms
experiencing poor performance in the pre-restructuring period will face significant
pressures to not possess CEO duality status. It is important to note that like board
independence, independent board leadership structure has received social validation
and legitimacy because greater levels of independence are believed to positively impact
the functioning of the firm and its subsequent performance. There is an institutionalized
belief among ownership groups, governance reform activists, the popular press, and for
the most part, academicians that a move toward an independent board leadership
structure is a move towards greater accountability and subsequent levels of firm
performance. As before, it is important to note that pressures for independent board
leadership structures might be instituted in the post-restructuring period due to
pressures from ownership groups or as a result of impression management and
signaling behavior on behalf of the board. As such, the following proposition is offered.
Proposition 1b: Restructuring firms experiencing poor performance in the prerestructuring period will have independent leadership structures in the postrestructuring period
3.B.3. Board Linkages
In response to institutional pressures, an organization may choose to co-opt the
source of the pressure (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Gulati & Westphal, 1999;
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Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Hillman et al., 2000; Oliver, 1991; Pennings, 1980;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967; Scott, 1995). Selznick defined co-opting as
“the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining
structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence”
(1949:13). For example, an organization may attempt to persuade an institutional
constituent, such as a representative of a financial institution, to join the board of
directors. Pfeffer’s (1974) research on electrical utility boards showed how political
support and legitimacy were obtained by co-opting important economic sectors in which
the utility was under regulation. Selznick’s (1949) study of the Tennessee Valley
Authority also described how outside interests were co-opted by the organization and
persuaded to support its projects. The intended effect of co-optation tactics is “to
neutralize institutional opposition and enhance legitimacy…[and] to demonstrate the
organization’s worthiness and acceptability to other external constituencies from whom
it hopes to obtain resources and approval” (Oliver, 1991: 157).
The predominant way that firms co-opt sources of environmental uncertainty is
via board interlocks, which is when a person affiliated with one organization sits on the
board of directors of another organization (Mizruchi, 1996). Research has suggested
that interlocking directorates can play an important role in disseminating information
across firms (Burt, 1980; Mizruchi, 1996; Palmer, 1983; Useem, 1984), serve as a
mechanism for the diffusion of innovation (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998), facilitate the
adoption of organizational initiatives (Haunschild, 1993, 1994; Palmer et al., 1993),
facilitate access to strategic information and opportunities (Pfeffer, 1991), expose firms
to the best practices of other organizations (Haunschild, 1993; Mizruchi, 1996), and
enhance environmental scanning (Useem, 1984). Additionally, empirical evidence has
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shown that executives’ external ties play a critical role in future strategy formulation and
subsequent firm performance (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Geletkanycz &
Hambrick, 1997; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).
An interesting finding in the literature about interlocking directorates is that
unprofitable firms are more likely to interlock (Allen, 1974; Boeker & Goodstein, 1991;
Dooley, 1969; Kaplan & Minton, 1994; Lang & Lockhart, 1990; Mizruchi & Stearns,
1988; Richardson, 1987; Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993; Weisbach, 1988). For example,
Richardson (1987) confirmed that bankers often join a board when a firm is in financial
difficulty. Such results suggest that when profits are lowest that interlocking may occur.
Additionally, these results imply that interlocks may serve as means of monitoring the
activities of the firm and its executives, thus serving as a means for corporate control
(Aldrich, 1979; Mizruchi, 1996).
Whether interlocks serve as a means of corporate control or co-optation, they
serve as a provision of resources to the organization (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
Interlocks also assist in acquiring resources from important elements outside the firm,
such as capital influence and influence with political bodies or other important
stakeholder groups (such as customers, suppliers, and communities). Directorate ties
allow firms to secure critical resources, often on more favorable terms (Boeker &
Goodstein, 1991; D’Aveni, 1990; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Zald, 1969). Pfeffer (1972)
demonstrated that organizations with directorate ties to sectors in the environment
posing the most critical constraints outperformed their industry counterparts who lacked
such ties. Additionally, Provan (1980) suggested that attracting powerful board
members has the potential to reduce uncertainty in its environment and is likely to
enhance its potential to attract scarce resources, such as funding.
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In addition to serving as a co-opting mechanism that provides control and
resources, board linkages also provide the firm with legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; Gulati & Westphal, 1999; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Selznick, 1949). It is a
way of signaling to the environment that the board possesses knowledge, experience,
and the ability to manage interorganizational dependencies (Fama & Jensen, 1983).
Mizruchi suggested, “when investors decide whether to invest in a company, they
consider the firm’s strengths and the quality of its management. By appointing
individuals with ties to other important organizations, the firm signals to potential
investors that it is a legitimate enterprise worthy of support” (1996: 276). Bazerman and
Schoorman stated, “An organization’s reputation can be affected by who serves on the
board of directors and to whom the organization is seen to be linked” (1983: 211). It is
important to note that such legitimacy is a prerequisite for securing resources. For
example, a bank may be more willing to lend money to a firm if it believes that the firm is
directed by reputable individuals (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
Based on the above research that suggests firms with poor performance will be
more likely to form linkages via the board of directors, it is reasonable to assume that
restructuring firms experiencing poor performance will create greater linkages via
existing and new board members with the intent of providing more control, resources,
and legitimacy to the firm. As such, the following proposition is offered.
Proposition 1c: Restructuring firms experiencing poor performance in the prerestructuring period will have an increased number of linkages with other
organizations in the post-restructuring period
3.B.4. CEO, Top Management Team, and Director Stock Ownership
It is an institutionalized belief in the academic literature and popular press that
managers who hold ownership positions in the firms they serve are more likely to act in
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the shareholders’ interests given their shared financial interests (Bryan, Hwang & Lilien,
2000; Coles et al., 2001; Dalton et al., 2003; Perry & Zenner, 2000). Thus, ownership
positions cause executives’ wealth to vary directly with firm performance. The taken for
granted argument is that absent an ownership position in their firms, managers are
more likely to behave opportunistically by supporting projects that further their own
interests and, thus, decreasing their employment risk (Himmelberg, Hubbard & Palia,
1999; Zahra & Neubaum & Huse, 2000).
Researchers have also applied this alignment rationale to corporate board
members. The norm is to view board members’ stock ownership as closely aligning the
interests of the board members with the interests of shareholders, and, thus, creating an
incentive for the board to exercise greater control over the CEO and his/her top
management team (Dalton et al., 2003; Jensen, 1993). Moreover, voting rights afford
additional power to owner-directors and this power increases with the portion of total
shares held (Zald, 1969). Thus, higher stock ownership may give directors greater
relative power in relation to the CEO.
This way of thinking has become habitualized and objectified and has led to
shared social understandings by environmental actors as to what constitutes good
governance (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996; Zucker, 1977, 1987).
For example, Business Week’s annual review of “The Best and Worst Boards” reflects
these understandings about proper versus improper governance. In their effort to
define sound governance the publication’s researchers survey the “nation's largest
pension funds and money managers, as well as authorities on directors and boards,” in
order to identify the least and most effective boards (Byrne, 2000). One of the main
attributes of an effective board is that “directors ought to hold serious stakes in the
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company.” The survey gave a particularly positive assessment of the board of General
Electric by noting that outside directors each own an average of $6.6 million of General
Electric stock, which they argued clearly aligns the interests of outside directors with
shareholders.
Despite such evidence, a culmination of equity ownership-firm performance
research has failed to establish a consistent, direct relationship between equity
ownership and firm performance (Dalton et al., 2003). Yet, I still predict that in times of
poor performance, which is frequently accompanied by uncertainty within the
organization, external constituencies will press for executives’ and directors’ to hold
greater equity in their organizations because of the institutionalized belief that equity
ownership is an effective alignment mechanism. It is believed that such pressures for
corrections to the governance structure of the firm to make executives and boards of
directors more responsive to the shareholders.
As such, there is an institutionalized belief among ownership groups, governance
reform activists, the popular press, and for the most part, academicians that a move
toward establishing a link between the CEO’s wealth and firm performance is a move
towards greater accountability and subsequent levels of firm performance. It is
important to note that these changes take place whether forced to by powerful actors
(i.e., acquiescence to pressures – Oliver, 1991), done for substantive reasons (i.e., to
become more accountable to the shareholders), or as a symbolic gesture on behalf of
executives and board members (i.e., as a mollification device – Sanders & Carpenter,
2003). This basic belief is rooted in institutional theory, which suggests that structures
and procedures might become part of the formal structure not for efficiency reasons, but
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because such practices and procedures have social validation and legitimacy (DiMaggio
& Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
Additionally, it is important to note that executives, in a symbolic gesture to the
firm’s shareholders, might institute such equity ownership programs. The
implementation of an equity ownership program may signal commitment to the interests
of the shareholders, which is most important in times when shareholders’ interests are
viewed as having been neglected (e.g., poor performance) (Westphal & Zajac, 1994).
From an impression management standpoint, poor performance threatens the credibility
of board members and the firm’s executives as protectors of shareholders’ interests.
Thus, in order to ease these tensions and attenuate such concerns, board members
and executives must at least appear to pursuing the best interests of the shareholders
(Pfeffer, 1981; Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Westphal & Zajac, 1994). As such, the
following propositions are offered.
Proposition 1d: Restructuring firms experiencing poor performance in the prerestructuring period will have stronger links between the CEO’s personal wealth
and firm performance in the post restructuring period
Proposition 1e: Restructuring firms experiencing poor performance in the prerestructuring period will have stronger links between the top management
team’s personal wealth and firm performance in the post restructuring period
Proposition 1f: Restructuring firms experiencing poor performance in the prerestructuring period will have stronger links between the board of directors’
personal wealth and firm performance in the post restructuring period
3.C.

The Moderating Impact of Governance
In this section, I draw on the aforementioned propositions with the intent of

discussing the impact that governance structures have on the restructuring-performance
relationship. Specifically, I argue that these governance structures improve market
performance by influencing the perceptions of investors and analysts, due to the fact
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that the positive value of these governance structures have been socially constructed
and possess social validity. I contend that the aforementioned governance structures
are clearly what governance activists, institutional investors, the popular press, and, to a
great extent, academicians view as sound and appropriate governance.
Recent research suggests the importance of financial information (e.g., earnings,
cash flows, and book values) in determining equity values has decreased steadily over
the past two decades (Lev & Zarowin, 1999). The decreasing relevance of financial
information has motivated a stream of research that indicates the increasing importance
of nonfinancial information in determining equity valuations (e.g., Amir & Lev, 1996;
Certo, 2003; Trueman, Wong & Zhang, 2000). Despite the fact that the research
concerning the influence of board of director and managerial characteristics is limited,
the propositions to follow are in-line with existing research (e.g., Certo, 2003; Mavrinac
& Siesfeld, 1998), which suggests that the credibility of boards of directors and
management is an important factor for shareholders, boards, and, ultimately, the
evaluation by the stock markets.
I argue that certain governance configurations (i.e., those with greater legitimacy)
will elicit positive stock market reactions that reflect not only the perceived economic
benefits of reduced agency costs, but also social benefits resulting from symbolic
actions that reduce uncertainty about managerial motives. Such symbolic actions are
most effective under conditions of uncertainty, such as managerial accountability to the
welfare of the firm (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer, 1981; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;
Scott, 2001). It is suggested that market reactions can be viewed in “terms of soft
numbers that reflect the subjective perceptions of a heterogeneous audience, neatly
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quantified and aggregated, reacting to changes in formal policy that may be
independent of substantive practices” (Westphal & Zajac, 1998: 131).
This dissertation contends that the presence of certain governance structures
and configurations can play a role in the social construction of market value. In line with
prior research (e.g., Westphal & Zajac, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1995), it is assumed
that investors are boundedly rational information processors who are interested in
reducing uncertainty and value socially legitimate indications that agency problems are
being addressed. This thought is congruent with evidence from surveys of large
institutional investors, who were willing to pay 11% more on average for companies
considered well governed – that is, companies in which outsiders constitute a majority
of the board, own significant amounts of stock, are subject to formal evaluation, and are
not personally tied to management (Bianco & Byrne, 1997). As such, firms with sound
governance structures might be extremely effective in enhancing organizational
legitimacy by attenuating concerns about managerial and board loyalties (Oliver, 1991;
Westphal & Zajac, 1998).
3.C.1. Evidence of Governance’s Impact on Market Valuations
Within the financial economics and strategic management literature, the adoption
of governance reforms have been linked with positive stock market reactions as
evidenced by the prior discussion concerning Zajac and Westphal’s (1995) and
Westphal and Zajac’s (1998) investigation of market reactions to long-term incentive
plans (LTIP) adoptions. A series (e.g., Brickley, Coles & Terry, 1994; Byrd & Hickman,
1992; Gaver, Gaver & Battistel, 1992; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1994; Tehranian, Travlos &
Waegelein, 1987) of work relying on financial theory has examined the relationship
between board composition and stockholder wealth. This stream of research has
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demonstrated that stockholders may interpret independent boards as a signal that the
firm is being managed in their interest (Johnson et al., 1996).
For example, Rosenstein & Wyatt (1994) found that the appointment of outside
directors was positively and significantly associated with firms’ stock price. In a study of
the effect of a takeover bid announcement on the stock price of the bidding firms, Byrd
and Hickman (1992) found that organizations with high proportions of unaffiliated
outside directors (i.e., those individuals with no current or former relationship with the
organization, whether via employment, family, or business or other professional
relationship) realized higher abnormal returns following the announcement of the tender
offers than did firms with fewer independent directors. Lastly, Brickley et al. (1994)
reported that the stock price of firms with predominantly unaffiliated outside directors
rose after the announcement of the adoption of a poison pill anti-takeover provision, in
contrast to firms with a majority of inside and affiliated boards. The results of Brickley et
al. (1994) suggest that the markets treat the presence of an independent board as a
signal that poison pills will be used in stockholders’ interests.
Recent research is supportive of the importance of reputation as a signal of the
quality and performance potential of the firm. D’Aveni (1990), for example, found that
prestigious managers are important to the survival of bankrupt firms in their ability to
receive greater concessions with debtors. Additionally, he noted that prestigious top
managers leave the failing firm prior to bankruptcy filing and that this bailout may signal
to creditors that the firm is no longer deserving of their continued financial support.
Drawing on these arguments, I suggest that governance characteristics such as
board independence, board leadership structure, board interlocks, and equity ownership
will positively impact the restructuring-market performance relationship. It is believed
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that restructuring creates uncertainty for organizations and those organizations
exhibiting favorable governance structures are able to reduce this uncertainty by
signaling that board of directors and managers have greater alignment with
shareholders’ interests. Based on the fact that investors are interested in reducing
uncertainty and therefore value socially legitimate indications that agency problems are
being addressed, it is believed that the socially valid governance structures previously
discussed serve as an mechanism for reducing uncertainty about managerial motives.
Thus, the presence of socially valid governance variable might engender a favorable
stock market reaction because they appear to address the specific goals of key
constituents while also exploiting more general social beliefs. As such, the following
propositions are offered.
Proposition 2a: Restructuring’s impact on the subsequent market performance of
the firm will be positively moderated by board independence
Proposition 2b: Restructuring’s impact on the subsequent market performance of
the firm will be positively moderated by an independent board leadership structure
Proposition 2c: Restructuring’s impact on the subsequent market performance of
the firm will be positively moderated by board linkages with other organizations
Proposition 2d: Restructuring’s impact on the subsequent market performance of
the firm will be positively moderated by firm ownership by the CEO
Proposition 2e: Restructuring’s impact on the subsequent market performance of
the firm will be positively moderated by firm ownership by the top management
team
Proposition 2f: Restructuring’s impact on the subsequent market performance of the
firm will be positively moderated by firm ownership by the board of directors
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CHAPTER 4: HYPOTHESES AND METHODS
Within this chapter a variety of issues will be discussed. Initially, there is a
discussion about the sample of firms for the first part of my study. Following this
discussion, I provide an overview of the specific variables (i.e., dependent, independent,
and control variables) and their measurements as they correspond to the first part of my
study. Based on these operationalizations, I present six hypotheses that address
governance characteristics in the post-restructuring period. This is followed by a review
of the analytical techniques used to test the first set of hypotheses.
Following this discussion, I provide an overview of the sample of firms for the
second part of my study. Next, I lay out the specific variables and their measurements
as they correspond to the second part of my study. Based on these operationalizations,
I formally present six hypotheses that address the moderating impact of governance on
the restructuring-performance relationship. Next, I review the analytical techniques
used to test the second set of hypotheses. Lastly, I incorporate a discussion of the
desired statistical power of my entire set of analyses. Such a discussion is crucial since
low statistical power is a primary threat to statistical conclusion validity (Cook &
Campbell, 1979) in this research domain.
4.A.

Governance in the Post-Restructuring Period – The First Study

4.A.1. The Sample
Essentially, the first part of this dissertation argues that governance changes are
most prevalent in firms that restructured their portfolio of assets and experienced suboptimal performance in the pre-restructuring period. In other words, low performance
that leads to changes in governance, and the magnitude or probability of these changes
is amplified for those firms that have restructured their portfolio of assets. As such, it is
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important to assess this impact by sampling two types of firms – ones that did and ones
that did not restructure their portfolios of assets. Randomization of sample selection for
both sets of firms allowed me to increase the potential validity of my inferences (Cook &
Campbell, 1979).
The propositions developed so far suggest that there will be significantly different
governance outcomes for those firms that did restructure versus those firms that did not
restructure. It is important to note that my sampling and subsequent method of testing
reflect the hypothesized relationships presented in Chapter 3. I feel that my sampling is
appropriate since I am contrasting firms who did or did not engage in a certain activity
(i.e., restructuring) over time, which is different than investigating changes in firms over
a number of time periods where one measures both dependent and independent
variables over time to trace how changes in one variable are followed by changes in the
other (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2002). The latter would be investigated using
time-series regression, which can present inferential problems caused by common
causes and causal effects in the opposite direction. As noted by Cohen et al. “we may
find that the presumed effect of Xt on Y(t+1) was really due to the effect of Yt or Y(t-1) on
both, or to other common causes (serially correlated errors and omitted variables). Of
course with time series data this is a potential problem with regard to every variable at
every time point” (2002: 601). To correct for this, one would have to partial out from
each variable that proportion of its variance that is attributable to its value in the
previous time period. In addition to this issue, when employing time series analysis,
one needs to account for company specific effects, which dictates adding a series of
firm-specific control variables.
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The sample of restructuring firms was collected from the SDC Platinum Database
published by Thomson Financial. The data contained in this database is drawn from
SEC filings. I limited my search to U.S. firms that had $1 billion or more in annual
revenues. This cutoff was chosen to ensure full access and availability of data
contained in other data sources, such as Lexis-Nexis and CompuStat. Due to data
availability constraints, I accessed data from 1986 through 2000. Incorporating firms
that have and have not restructured their portfolio of assets and sampling across 15
years allows for greater confidence in any causal relationships since it increases the
external validity of my conclusions and inferences (Cook and Campbell, 1979). External
validity is also enhanced since my sample of firms will be a cross-industry sample.
In order to qualify as having restructured, a firm must have divested at least 10%
of its assets, which represents significant strategic change by an organization. This
criterion has been used in previous restructuring research (e.g., Hoskisson & Johnson,
1992; Johnson, Hoskisson & Hitt, 1993; Markides, 1992; Simmonds, 1990) and is
accepted as a construct valid indicator of restructuring activity.
The SDC Platinum Database allowed me to search based on asset restructuring,
however, it did not permit for searches based on the percentage of assets divested.
Approximately 18,000 restructuring events were uncovered in my initial search. After
factoring out non-U.S. organizations and those organizations with less than $1 billion in
annual revenue, I was left with approximately 10,000 companies. Using a random
number generator, I began selecting companies to determine if they met the 10% rule.
To do this, I compared the restructuring event in the database against the actual SEC
filings for each firm for that particular year in order to obtain the specific percentage of
assets divested. Specifically, the asset data was located in the firm’s ‘notes to the
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consolidated financial statements’ contained within the annual report to shareholders.
Although an extremely time-intensive process, validating each restructuring allowed me
to be confident in my sample and collect additional data, such as the actual percentage
of assets divested.
A total of 100 restructuring firms were included in the sample, which was added
to an equal-sized sample of non-restructuring firms (specifics concerning the selection
of a sample of non-restructuring firms are offered in the following paragraph). This
sample size was sufficiently large to ensure adequate statistical power. The average
firm in my sample of restructuring firms divested 19.84% of its assets for an average
dollar value of $1.63 billion. The minimum and maximum divested percentages for my
sample were 10% and 46.7%, respectively. The minimum and maximum divested
dollar amounts were $508 million and $4.57 billion, respectively.
The restructuring sample needed to be matched with a non-restructuring firm
sample. From the same database, I randomly selected a sample of non-restructuring
firms and matched them up with randomly selected years within the same time frame as
the restructuring firms – 1986 through 2000. I used the same criteria for my searches –
U.S. firms and firms with $1 billion or more in annual revenues – and, additionally,
chose firms that did not engage in asset restructuring. Once again, I cross-referenced
the firms from the database with the actual SEC filings. A firm qualified as a nonrestructuring firm if it had not engaged in any restructuring activity within a six-year
period (i.e., three years before and three years after). A total of 110 non-restructuring
firms were selected, however one firm was acquired in the following year, thus reducing
the non-restructuring sample to 109 firms. The non-restructuring sample was
statistically not different from the restructuring sample based on assets, revenues, and
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capital structures. Adding the 100 restructuring firms to the 109 non-restructuring firms
gave me a total sample size of 209 firms.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, several studies that investigated the governancestrategic change relationship suffer methodologically by gathering data exclusively on
those organizations that have survived a strategic change. In other words, the validity
of the findings might be called into question as a result of this survivor bias. I have
guarded against this bias in that all firms in my sample survived during the periods in
which they were investigated. In other words, none of the restructuring or nonrestructuring firms initially chosen for the sample were removed from this study.
4.A.2. The Variables and Hypotheses
Dependent Variables. The governance constructs in propositions 1a – 1f were
operationalized using well-accepted variables and measurements offered in the
literature – the proportion of outsiders on the board (proxy for board independence),
CEO duality (proxy for board leadership structure), number of board interlocks (proxy for
board linkages), and the percent of total equity held by the CEO, the top management
team, and the board of directors (three proxies for CEO, top management team, and
director wealth tied to performance) (Baliga et al., 1996; Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994; Certo
et al., 2001; Chatterjee et al., 2003; Daily, 1995; Gales & Kesner, 1994; Gibbs, 1993;
Goodstein et al., 1994; Kaplan & Minton, 1994; Kesner, Pfeffer, 1972; Wade et al.,
1990; Zajac & Westphal, 1995). The formulas for calculating each of these governance
structures are as follows:
Proportion of Outsiders on the Board =

Number of outside board members
total number of board members

CEO Duality = 1 if the CEO is also the chairperson of the board; 0 if not
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Number of Board Interlocks =

(∑ number of board seats to external companies
or organizations held by each director)

Percentage of Equity Held by the CEO =

number shares held by the CEO
total number of shares outstanding

Percentage of Equity Held by the
number of shares held by the TMT
=
Top Management Team
total number of shares outstanding
Percentage of Equity Held by the
=
Board of Directors

number of shares held by the BOD
total number of shares outstanding

I opted for multiple operationalizations of governance in order to increase the
validity of my conclusions. Data sources for these governance characteristics were
drawn from SEC filings (annual reports and proxy statements). Data for all other
variables in this dissertation, including the second study, were drawn from CompuStat,
Moody’s Manuals, and SEC filings. A summary of all variables used in this dissertation
is offered in Table 3.
Independent and Moderating Variables. An assessment of my first set of
propositions could lead to the conclusion that it is low performance that leads to
changes in governance. Additionally, the magnitude or amount of changes in
governance structures should be greater for those firms that have restructured their
portfolio of assets. This implies that there is an interaction effect between these two
constructs, which will be addressed in the testing section of this chapter. I
operationalized performance as change in return on assets (ROA).
This measure is appropriate for this study since I am identifying restructuring
firms as those who alter their assets, and increases and decreases in this measure is
indicative of the quality of investment decisions. ROA is considered a fairly robust
measure of performance, as compared to return on equity, because ROA is a measure
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Definition/Measurement
Advertising expenditures divided
by sales
The sum of all non-duplicated
ties the firm’s board has to all
other boards, that is, the total
number of other boards each
director sat on, summed across
all directors, minus any
duplicated ties (i.e., cases in
which two or more directors sit on
the same two boards
Debt-to-equity – long-term debt
divided by shareholders’ equity
Separate CEO and board chair –
a binary variable coded 1 if a
CEO is not also chairperson of
the board, and 0 otherwise
Number of months as the CEO

Variable

Advertising intensity

Board interlock

Capital structure

CEO duality

CEO tenure

long-term debt
shareholders equity

1 if the CEO is also the chairperson of the board; 0 if not

=

(∑ number of board seats to external companies or
organizations held by each director)

advertising expenditures
total sales

Formula
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= number of months the CEO has been in the CEO position

=

=

=

Table 3
Definition of Variable Measurement

=

=

Total dollar amount of dividends
paid to shareholders during the
year
Number of shares outstanding
divided by the total number of
shareholders
Sum of the equity holdings by the
CEO divided by the total common
shares outstanding
Sum of the equity holdings by the
top management team divided by
the total common shares
outstanding
Sum of the equity holdings by the
board of director divided by the
total common shares outstanding

Dividends

Ownership
concentration

Percentage of equity
held by the CEO

Percentage of equity
held by the top
management team

Percentage of equity
held by the board of
directors

= ROA in year t-2 – ROA in year t-1
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=

=

number of shares held by the BOD
total number of shares outstanding

number of shares held by the TMT
total number of shares outstanding

number shares held by the CEO
total number of shares outstanding

number of common shares outstanding
total number of shareholders

= total dollar amount of dividends paid to shareholders in one
year

Calculated as calculated as the
difference in ROA (net income
divided by total assets) from year
t-2 to year t-1

Change in return on
assets

(Table 3 continued)

R&D expenditures divided by
sales
The entropy measure for total
diversification (DT)

Proportion of outside
directors on the
board

R&D intensity

Total diversification
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The number of outside board
members divided by the total
number of directors. Outside
board members are those
directors not currently or formerly
employed by the firm. All others
were considered inside board
members

Portfolio restructuring

=

= ∑Pj ln(1/Pj)

R&D expenditures
total sales

number of outside board members
total number of board members

= 1 if restructure; 0 if not restructure

Measured as 1 for those firms that
did restructure. If no restructuring
took place – measured as 0

Period effect

=

= 1 if restructuring was from 1986-1992; 0 if from 1993-2000

Measured as 1 if the restructuring
took place during 1986 – 1992.
Measured as 0 if the restructuring
took place during 1993 – 2000

(Table 3 continued)

Total shareholder
returns

(Table 3 continued)

Capital gain (i.e., price change) in
the share over a year plus the
value of dividends paid during the
year, divided by the value of the
share at the beginning of the year

share price at end of year – share price at beginning of year
+ dividend paid during year
share price at the beginning of year
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=

of return on total (debt and equity) investment. Specifically, I incorporated a change
score for ROA, which was calculated as the difference in ROA for the year prior to
restructuring and the year of restructuring. The specific formula is as follows.
Change in ROA = ROA in year t-2 – ROA in year t-1
It is important to discuss the issue of time (i.e., the temporal dimension) in the
measurement of each of the variables. The performance variable (i.e., ROA) will be
measured on a one-year time lag. In other words, if restructuring is in year t, the
change in ROA will be measured from year t-2 to year t-1. I am using a one year time lag
since research has clearly demonstrated that firms engaged in restructuring often are
performing poorly just prior to the initiation of restructuring activities (Bergh, 2001;
Bowman et al., 1999; Duhaime & Baird, 1987; Duhaime & Grant, 1984; Hoskisson &
Hitt, 1994; Hoskisson & Johnson, 1992; Hoskisson et al., 1994; Johnson, 1996; Lang,
Poulson & Stulz, 1995; Markides, 1992, 1995; Markides & Singh, 1997; Montgomery &
Thomas, 1988; Montgomery et al., 1984; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987; Sicherman &
Pettway, 1987; Smart & Hitt, 1994). For example, Jain (1985) found that firm
performance began to suffer approximately a year prior to divestiture and resulted in
negative excess stock return of 10.8% within the one year prior to the actual
restructuring event.
When it came to operationalizing restructuring firms, I chose to measure
restructuring as a dichotomous variable. I opted for this because I am interested in
assessing if differences exist between restructuring and non-restructuring firms in the
post-restructuring period. This is the first study that addresses this issue, thus a more
broad-based approach is warranted. As such, restructuring firms were coded as 1, and
non-restructuring firms were coded as 0. More fine-grained analyses that involve
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operationalizing restructuring as a continuous variable would be a natural follow up to
this investigation, thus allowing me to study and understand any differences that might
exist at different percentages of assets divested versus using a dichotomous
operationalization.
To come closer to inferring causality, I measured the dependent variables (i.e.,
governance) in years t1 and t2. It is not appropriate to measure governance and
restructuring cross-sectionally for two reasons. First, I am predicting that portfolio
restructuring will lead to subsequent changes in governance. Second, governance
mechanisms, like compensation and employment contracts, limit the ability of the firm to
immediately institute governance changes (Westphal & Zajac, 1998). Thus, if a
restructuring took place in 1992, I measured the governance variables in 1993 and
1994. It is important to note that ascertaining the direction of causality is a key issue for
internal validity, necessitating the longitudinal measurement of independent and
dependent variables.
Based on the operationalizations of the independent and dependent variables,
the formal hypotheses tested in the first part of this study are as follows:
Hypothesis 1a: A more negative change in ROA for a portfolio restructuring firm
in the year prior to a restructuring will result in an increased proportion of
outsiders on the board in the post-restructuring period
Hypothesis 1b: A more negative change in ROA for a portfolio restructuring firm
in the year prior to a restructuring will result in a non-CEO duality structure in
the post-restructuring period
Hypothesis 1c: A more negative change in ROA for a portfolio restructuring firm
in the year prior to a restructuring will result in an increased number of board
interlocks in the post-restructuring period
Hypothesis 1d: A more negative change in ROA for a portfolio restructuring firm
in the year prior to a restructuring will result in CEOs holding greater equity
ownership positions in the post-restructuring period
100

Hypothesis 1e: A more negative change in ROA for a portfolio restructuring firm
in the year prior to a restructuring will result in the top management team
holding greater equity ownership positions in the post-restructuring period
Hypothesis 1f: A more negative change in ROA for a portfolio restructuring firm
in the year prior to a restructuring will result in the board of directors holding
greater equity ownership positions in the post-restructuring period
Control Variables. Cook and Campbell (1979) noted that to increase internal
validity of a study’s conclusions, one must account for third-variable alternative
interpretations of the relationships between the independent and dependent variables.
As such, I have included the following control variables.
Other governance variables. One must control for the other governance
variables contained in this study to counter any substitution effects that take place
between these governance mechanisms. The concept of substitution effects is
discussed in the next chapter, clarifying why these controls are needed (section 6.B.2.).
Because the CEO is always part of the top management team, and these two variables
are highly correlated (approximately .80 - .85), I did not control for TMT equity
ownership when CEO equity ownership was the dependent variable (hypothesis 1d).
Doing so otherwise would lead to inflated R2 values. Likewise, when TMT equity
ownership was the dependent variable (hypothesis 1e), I did not control for CEO equity
ownership.
CEO tenure. Controlling for CEO tenure is imperative since a number of studies
have hypothesized a link between tenure and CEO influence over the board (Finkelstein
& Hambrick, 1989, 1996; Hill & Phan, 1991; Ocasio, 1994; Singh & Harianto, 1989). It
is typically argued that as tenure increases, CEOs acquire personal power by
populating boards with supporters (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Fredrickson et al.,
1988) while gaining expert power through an increased familiarity with the firm’s
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resources (Singh & Harianto, 1989; Young et al., 2000; Zald, 1969). CEO tenure was
measured in months using the following formula.
CEO tenure = number of months the CEO has been in the CEO position
Ownership concentration. I controlled for ownership concentration because
concentrated ownership increases the ability and incentive to monitor investments and
their subsequent ability to institute changes in the organization (Bethel & Liebeskind,
1993; Brickley, Lease & Smith, 1988, 1994; Tihanyi et al., 2003). As such, I want to
partial out the impact of ownership concentration to accurately assess the impact of
performance (and the moderating impact of restructuring) on changes in governance.
Ownership concentration was operationalized using the following formula.
Ownership Concentration

=

number of common shares outstanding
total number of shareholders

Period effects. Pressures for greater accountability in governance have not been
uniform throughout time. As such, I incorporated dummy variables to control for period
effects. First, I must discuss the rationale for my period effects. The rise of shareholder
activism has forced a weakening of control over the corporation by top management
(Davis & Thompson, 1994; Ryan & Schneider, 2002). It was not until the mid 1980s
that a social movement of corporate control manifested itself. This came about during
the Reagan administration, which fostered and encouraged a pro-shareholder stance in
the United States and encouraged the formation of shareholder rights groups. In
particular, the shareholder-rights movement began around 1985 with the formation of
the Council of Institutional Investors and the Institutional Shareholders Services.
Shortly thereafter in 1986, the United Shareholders Association was formed (Davis &
Thompson, 1994).
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It was not until late 1992 when groups of significant shareholders were no longer
required to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) their
communications when seeking to influence the management of an organization.
Specifically, the SEC had to examine and approve communications aimed at influencing
the votes of more than ten other shareholders, provided that they collectively owned
more than five percent of the firm’s shares. Additionally, if the group owned ten percent
or more of the firm’s shares, the members would be subject to insider-trading rules
requiring monthly disclosures of their purchases and sales of company stock and
liabilities for short-term manipulations of stock price. Since 1993 shareholder passivity
decreased as a result of fewer legal rules that made it difficult, expensive, and legally
risky to own large percentage stakes or undertake joint efforts (Black, 1990; Davis &
Thompson, 1994).
Based on these circumstances, I controlled for these issues by incorporating a
period effect into my analyses. As my data collection starts at 1986 and continues
through 2000, I am coded the 1986-1992 period as 1 to account for the stricter
regulations placed upon shareholders, and coded the 1993-2000 period as 0 to account
for the less strict regulations and resulting increases in activism by shareholders. In
other words,
Period Effect = 1 if restructuring was from 1986-1992; 0 if from 1993-2000
4.A.3. Testing the Hypotheses
In my theory development chapter I suggested that it is low performance that
leads to changes in governance. Additionally, the magnitude or probability of these
changes is amplified for those firms that have restructured their portfolio of assets. This
basically implies that there is an interaction effect between these two constructs. To
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test for hypotheses 1a – 1f interaction effects, I used moderated multiple regression. A
moderator effect suggests that the relationship between two variables changes as a
function of a moderator variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986).
Separate regression analyses were run for each of the hypotheses. I entered the
control variables in stage one. The next step was to enter the main effect (i.e.,
performance and restructuring), which was followed by entering the independent
variable interaction in the third stage. A significant interaction effect is present if the
interaction term is significant. If statistical significance was found, I plotted each
interaction to determine the slope and relationship with the dependent variable. In order
to truly be confident that my results imply an interaction effect, I needed to test for a
curvilinear effect, which was done by entering a square term of the change in ROA
variable in the regression equation in the last model.
I deviated from using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression when testing
hypothesis 1b since the dependent variable – CEO duality – is dichotomous. I utilized
logistic regression to assess CEO duality in the post-restructuring period. Much like
OLS regression, logistic regression allows for testing of effects in a multiple model
format, as well as testing of moderator and quadratic effects. Unlike OLS regression,
which assesses model significance by the change in R2, I assessed the change in loglikelihood and by the significance of the change in chi-square for each model.
To ensure the soundness of my analyses, I wanted to address two key issues.
First, the potential threat of collinearity needed to be assessed. To do this, I estimated
the variance inflation factors and found none above the recommended ceiling of 10
(Kleinbaum, Kupper & Muller, 1988). Variance inflation factor measures the impact of
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collinearity among the independent variables in a regression model. It expresses the
degree to which collinearity among the predictors degrades the precision of an estimate.
Second, I wanted to abide by one of the primary requirements of OLS regression,
which is that the residuals of the regression analyses be normally distributed
(approximate mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1). All of the residuals were plotted
against a normal curve and evaluated against normality statistics to ensure that this
criterion was not violated.
4.B.

The Moderating Impact of Governance – The Second Study

4.B.1. The Sample
The sample for the second study was the same as for Study 1.
4.B.2. The Variables and Hypotheses
The governance characteristics that were incorporated into the hypotheses
below were the same as those incorporated into hypotheses 1a through 1f –
proportion of outsiders on the board, CEO duality, board interlocks, and equity
ownership by the CEO, top management team, and the board of directors.
Dependent Variable. Total shareholder returns, was measured in the year
following the restructuring. In other words, if a restructuring was undertaken in 1993,
performance is to be measured in 1994. This measure has been employed in the
literature (e.g., Davis, 1991; Westphal & Zajac, 1994; Zajac & Westphal, 1995) to
represent a fair evaluation of the market performance of the firm and has the ability to
capture both information concerning financial information, such as earnings and cash
flows, as well as non financial information, such as socially valid indicators of sound
governance. Thus, I believe that the total shareholder returns are positively impacted
for those firms exhibiting sound governance because such initiatives symbolically affirm
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and tighten control over management. Displays of good governance signal that the
board of directors and top managers are credible and legitimate guardians of
shareholder interests. The specific operationalization of this variable is as follows.
Total Shareholder
Return

=

share price at end of year – share price at beginning
of year + dividend paid during year
share price at the beginning of year

Independent/Moderating Variables. The independent variable for each
hypothesis is portfolio restructuring. The moderator variable differs depending on the
governance characteristic of interest. As previously mentioned, the six governance
characteristics are proportion of outsiders on the board, CEO duality, board interlocks,
and equity ownership by the CEO, top management team, and the board of directors.
Section 4.A.2. above and Table 3 provide specific operationalizations of these variables.
Based on the aforementioned independent and dependent variables, the formal
hypotheses tested in the second part of this study are as follows:
Hypothesis 2a: Shareholder returns in the post-restructuring year will be higher
for those organizations with greater proportions of outsiders on the board of
directors
Hypothesis 2b: Shareholder returns in the post-restructuring year will be higher
for those organizations with non-CEO duality structures
Hypothesis 2c: Shareholder returns in the post-restructuring year will be higher
for those organizations with greater numbers of board interlocks
Hypothesis 2d: Shareholder returns in the post-restructuring year will be higher
for those organizations with greater percentages of equity shares owned by the
CEO
Hypothesis 2e: Shareholder returns in the post-restructuring year will be higher
for those organizations with greater percentages of equity shares owned by the
top management team
Hypothesis 2f: Shareholder returns in the post-restructuring year will be higher
for those organizations with greater percentages of equity shares owned by the
board of directors
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Control Variables. As previously mentioned, it is crucial for researchers to
account/control for variables that impact the relationship between the independent and
dependent variables so as to increase internal validity. As such, there are a variety of
factors that might possibly impact the restructuring-performance relationship for which I
controlled. Table 3 provides specific operationalizations of these variables.
Dividends. I controlled for dividend payout due to its general positive impact on
performance (Sanders & Carpenter, 2003) and other research that suggests portfolio
restructurings accompanied by payouts to shareholders have a positive impact on
performance in the post-restructuring period (Lang et al., 1995). The exact calculation
of dividends is as follows.
Dividends =

total dollar amount of dividends paid
to shareholders in one year

R&D Intensity. Controlling for R&D intensity is crucial because it captures the
extent of innovation opportunities within firms (Hansen & Hill, 1991; Henderson &
Fredrickson, 1996; Hitt, et al., 1996; Hitt, Hoskisson & Kim, 1997; Hoskisson & Johnson,
1992), and has directly been linked with performance improvements in the postrestructuring period (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994). Spending on research and development
efforts can lead to positive returns for organizations as a result of new product or
service creations. Additionally, research suggests that R&D activity is an important
contributor to competitiveness. Franko (1989) provided evidence that one important
contributor to the decline of U.S. competitiveness in the global markets of the 1980s is
the “R&D factor.” The exact calculation of R&D intensity is as follows.
R&D Intensity =

R&D expenditures
total sales
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Advertising Intensity. It is not uncommon for firms to spend significant amounts
of money in advertising to differentiate their product from those of their competitors
(Sharma & Kesner, 1996). The literature suggests that advertising provides useful
information about the availability of products and their attributes, enabling consumers to
make informed purchase decisions. As such, expenditures on advertising have the
ability to create images and convey information about products and services, which may
help develop brand awareness and loyalty (Anand, 2001; Comanor & Wilson, 1974;
Gatewood, Gowan & Lautenschlager, 1993; Kessides, 1986; Sharma & Kesner, 1996;
Tesler, 1964). Like investments in R&D, investments in advertising can positively
impact firm performance by boosting the visibility of a firm and, subsequently, sales
revenue (Comanor & Wilson, 1974; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). As such, it is
important to control for advertising intensity. The exact calculation of advertising
intensity is as follows.
Advertising Intensity =

advertising expenditures
total sales

Total Diversification. I controlled for total diversification because research
suggests that positive performance accrues to those firms who experience an increase
in focus/relatedness (Berger & Ofek, 1995; Bhagat, Shleifer, Vishny, Jarrell & Summers,
1990; Bowman et al., 1999; Chatterjee et al., 2003; Comment & Jarrell, 1995; Kose,
1995; Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992; Lang & Stulz, 1994). I utilized the entropy measure of
total diversification. The specific formula is as follows,
Entropy measure = ∑Pj ln(1/Pj)
where Pj is defined as the share of sales in segment j and ln(1/P) is the weight for each
segment j (the logarithm of the inverse of its sales). This number takes into account the
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number of segments in which a firm operates and the relative importance of each
segment in sales (Palepu, 1985).
Capital Structure. I controlled for the firm’s capital structure, since a firm’s
leverage may affect its propensity to engage in activities such as innovation and
acquisitions, in addition to impacting the firm’s performance via its debt obligations
(Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Sanders & Carpenter, 2003). The specific operationalization
of capital structure is as follows.
Capital Structure =

long-term debt
shareholders equity

4.B.3. Testing the Hypotheses
I used moderated regression to test the interaction effects that are noted in
hypotheses 2a – 2f. As with testing the first set of hypotheses, I ran separate
regression analyses for each of the hypotheses. If statistical significance of the
interaction term was found, I plotted each interaction to determine the slope and
relationship with the dependent variable. As previously mentioned, in order to truly be
confident that my results imply an interaction effect, I tested for a curvilinear effect.
4.C.

Statistical Power Considerations
Cook and Campbell (1979) noted that a threat to statistical conclusion validity is

low statistical power. Statistical power is the probability that the test will reject a false
null hypothesis - that it will not make a Type II error (Cohen, 1977). I assessed the
statistical power for my analyses to avoid this problem. There are three components
that determine the level of statistical power of an inference test: (1) the significance level
(α - Type I error - the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is actually true),
(2) the sample size, and (3) effect size (the magnitude or strength of the relationship
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among the variables in the population). The relationship between power and its three
determinants is such that if one of the four elements (i.e., power, significance level,
sample size, or effect size) is unknown, it can be calculated using the known values of
the other three elements. Hence, researchers are able to a priori determine statistical
power levels of their tests. Following standard conventions, I opted for a power level of
.95, a level of significance equal to .05, and medium effect sizes (i.e., the size of a
statistically significant difference) (Cohen, 1977, 1992; Mone, Mueller & Mauland, 1996;
Nickerson, 2000; Sauley & Bedeian, 1989; Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1989).
Based on these three components and Cohen’s (1977) power analysis tables
and formulae, I calculated the levels of statistical power for each model in each of the
regression analyses. The power levels for the regression analyses in the first study
(hypotheses 1a – 1f) ranged from .95 to .99. The power levels for the regression
analyses in the second study (hypotheses 2a – 2f) ranged from .95 to .98.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
This chapter presents and discusses the findings, which are structured in three
main sections. First, I discuss the findings associated with study one, which attempts to
assess governance structures in the post-restructuring period. Each governance
structure tested is presented with accompanying tables and figures (if applicable). Two
sets of results exist for each governance structure because each one was measured in
the first and second year after a restructuring. As it will become clear, distinct
differences exist in the behavior of governance in the post-restructuring period.
Second, I discuss the findings associated with study two, which attempts to
assess the moderating impact of governance on market valuations in the postrestructuring period. As before, each governance structure is presented with
accompanying tables. Unlike the findings in the first study, the results of the second
study were remarkably consistent across the entire set of governance structures, and,
as such, the findings are collectively discussed.
Lastly, a series of post-hoc studies were conducted to test the generalizability
and robustness of study two results. A discussion of the strategy utilized for conducting
the post-hoc studies is presented, which primarily involved variations to the
measurement of the dependent variable (i.e., shareholder return) and changes to the
time period in which the independent variables were measured. Following this
discussion, the results of these analyses and all accompanying tables and figures are
presented.
5.A.

Study 1 Results: Governance in Post-Restructuring Periods
Table 4 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations for the first

study, which assesses governance structures in the post-asset restructuring period.
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The findings in the table reveal that restructuring activity is correlated with governance
structures in the post-restructuring period. For instance, asset restructuring is positively
correlated with CEO equity ownership one year (r = .20, p < .01) and two years (r = .18,
p < .05) after a firm restructures its assets. The same relationship holds true for TMT
equity ownership one and two years after restructuring (r = .22, p < .01, for both years).
Additionally, restructuring activity is positively correlated with the proportion of outsiders
on the board of directors in one year and two years following a restructuring (r = .24, p <
.05 and r = .27, p < .05, respectively).
It is important to note that the means reported in Table 4 are for the combined
sample of restructuring and non-restructuring firms. As such, it is difficult to draw
conclusions based on the combined sample. Thus, I broke out the means for the two
groups in my sample (i.e., restructuring and non-restructuring firms) and conducted ttests to investigate the differences in means of the governance and performance
variables for firms that did and did not engage in restructuring. The means and results
of the t-tests are shown in Table 5.
It is not surprising to find that the two groups of firms differ significantly on a large
number of governance characteristics. With regard to performance, restructuring firms
had an average ROA in the year preceding a restructuring that was 53% less than nonrestructuring firms in the same period. However, ROA for restructuring firms greatly
improved -- approximately 273% -- in the year following a restructuring, yet ROA for the
non-restructuring sample improved by a little more than 3%.
Significant differences in governance characteristics were also uncovered when
assessing the means of the two groups. For instance, restructuring firms have greater
proportions of outsiders on their boards (around .78 - .80) in the year of restructuring, as
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Mean

S.D.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
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1. CEO equity t
1.76
5.69
2. CEO equity t1
1.95
5.80
.96**
3. CEO equity t2
1.67
4.26
.81**
.88**
4. TMT equity t
3.11
10.02
.96**
.93**
.79**
5. TMT equity t1
2.62
4.98
.89**
.87**
.78**
.95**
6. TMT equity t2
2.96
5.88
.90**
.86**
.82**
.93**
.96**
7. BOD equity t
3.88
13.45
.19**
.17*
.20**
.17*
.31**
.32**
8. BOD equity t1
6.82
38.90
.10
.10
.07
.10
.12
.15*
.96**
9. BOD equity t2
5.26
24.28
.39**
.36**
.33**
.49**
.44**
.40**
.56**
.41**
10. CEO duality t
.84
.37
-.16*
-.16*
-.04
-.18*
-.09
-.12
.06
.04
11. CEO duality t1
.88
.33
-.27** -.26**
-.08
-.28** -.22** -.21**
.01
.02
12. CEO duality t2
.87
.34
-.28** -.26**
-.11
-.26** -.24** -.21**
.01
.03
13. Outside proportion t
.76
.12
-.12
-.09
-.08
-.14
-.28** -.25**
-.12
-.04
.76
.12
-.13
-.11
-.07
-.13
-.25** -.23**
-.09
-.02
14. Outside proportion t1
15. Outside proportion t2
.77
.12
-.08
-.07
-.09
-.08
-.20** -.20**
-.01
.04
16. Board ties t
40.89
24.83
-.03
-.02
-.03
-.01
-.12
-.09
.03
.05
17. Board ties t1
41.24
24.83
-.03
-.01
.04
-.02
-.08
-.05
.04
.06
18. Board ties t2
41.62
24.77
-.01
-.02
.05
.01
-.06
-.03
.09
.10
19. CEO tenure t1
84.91
81.07
.01
-.03
.02
.01
.02
.01
.03
.01
20. CEO tenure t2
97.12
163.37
-.01
-.02
.01
.01
.02
.01
.02
.01
21. Restructuring
.48
.50
.18*
.20**
.18*
.19**
.22**
.22**
.13
.13
22. Period effect
.41
.49
-.11
-.13
-.11
-.12
-.15*
-.15*
.01
.01
23. ROA change – t-2 to t-1
-.22
7.68
-.01
-.01
.12
-.02
.14
.17*
.00
-.01
24. Owner concentration t
12.1
23.91
.29**
.31**
.17*
.27**
.35**
.33**
.15*
.06
25. Owner concentration t1
12.72
24.68
.30**
.33**
.21**
.30**
.34**
.33**
.15*
.07
26. Owner concentration t2
13.26
25.73
.29**
.32**
.22**
.31**
.33**
.35**
.14*
.07
N = 209 for V7 and V10 – V26. N = 205 for V26 – V28. N = 198 for V2 and V8. N = 196 for V1, V3, and V9. N = 187, 185, and
183 for V5, V6, and V4, respectively. ** p < .01; * p < .05. Means and standard deviations for V1 – V9 are in millions.

Variable

Table 4
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Variables – Study 1

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

CEO equity t
CEO equity t1
CEO equity t2
TMT equity t
TMT equity t1
TMT equity t2
BOD equity t
BOD equity t1
BOD equity t2
CEO duality t
CEO duality t1
CEO duality t2
Outside proportion t
Outside proportion t1
Outside proportion t2
Board ties t
Board ties t1
Board ties t2
CEO tenure t1
CEO tenure t2
Restructuring
Time effect
ROA change – t-2 to t-1
Owner concentration t
Owner concentration t1
Owner concentration t2

Variable

(Table 4 continued)

.06
.02
.03
-.15*
-.12
-.13
.02
.00
.08
.09
.05
.01
-.05
.01
.06
.06
.07

9

.63**
.49**
.22**
.13
.13
.10
.10
.06
.25**
.13
-.08
.04
-.09
-.02
-.03
-.03

10

.75**
.20**
.27**
.26**
.17*
.19**
.17*
.21**
.11
-.10
-.01
-.12
-.11
-.09
-.10

11
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.22**
.21**
.23**
.13
.16*
.12
.17*
.13
-.05
.04
-.06
-.09
-.06
-.07

12

.86**
.75**
.23**
.25**
.24**
-.09
-.16*
.19**
-.21**
-.12
-.21**
-.22**
-.22**

13

.84**
.20**
.24**
.23**
-.16*
-.21**
.24**
-.23**
-.15*
-.24**
-.24**
-.23**

14

.17*
.21**
.20**
-.24**
-.25**
.27**
-.28**
-.22**
-.11
-.13
-.12

15

.94**
.91**
-.14*
-.14*
.06
-.04
.03
-.20**
-.20**
-.20**

16

.96**
-.16*
-.14*
.09
-.01
.02
-.18*
-.17*
-.16

17

-.18**
-.14*
.07
-.02
.01
-.15*
-.14*
-.14*

18

.56**
-.26**
.13
.01
.01
.06
.06

19

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

(Table 4 continued)

CEO equity t
CEO equity t1
CEO equity t2
TMT equity t
TMT equity t1
TMT equity t2
BOD equity t
BOD equity t1
BOD equity t2
CEO duality t
CEO duality t1
CEO duality t2
Outside proportion t
Outside proportion t1
Outside proportion t2
Board ties t
Board ties t1
Board ties t2
CEO tenure t1
CEO tenure t2
Restructuring
Time effect
ROA change – t-2 to t-1
Owner concentration t
Owner concentration t1
Owner concentration t2

Variable

-.16*
.02
.05
.02
.03
.02

20
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-.26**
-.05
-.04
-.03
-.03

21

-.08
-.22**
-.21**
-.21**

22

-.01
-.03
-.04

23

.95**
.96**

24

1.00**

25

-

26

well as the one and two years after, versus the non-restructuring group (around .735 .745). Major differences were also seen with equity ownership by CEOs, TMTs, and
BODs. As noted in Table 5, equity ownership among these three groups was
substantially higher in restructuring firms across all three years, except for equity
ownership by BOD members in the second year following a restructuring. Specifically,
the average number of shares held by the CEO of a restructuring firm across the three
years reported (i.e., the year of restructuring and one and two years following the
restructuring) was 2.89 million versus 0.9 million held by the CEO of a non-restructuring
firm. The average number of shares held by the TMTs and BODs of restructuring firms
were 4.61 million versus 1.68 million and 9.1 million versus 2.24 million held by the
TMTs and BODs of non-restructuring firms, respectively.
Lastly, differences between the two groups were observed in CEO turnover and
tenure. Restructuring firms reported significantly more turnover by the CEO in the year
following a restructuring, yet less turnover in the second year following a restructuring.
CEOs of restructuring firms were significantly less tenured that their counterparts in
non-restructuring firms. The average CEO of the restructuring group had been the CEO
for approximately 69 months as opposed to 101 months for the CEO of a nonrestructuring firm, which supports the idea that CEOs with shorter tenure bring about
more change within their organizations than CEOs with longer tenures.
Regression analyses were employed to assess governance structures in the
post-restructuring periods. As previously discussed, these analyses sought to evaluate
six specific governance structures – board independence, CEO duality, board ties, and
equity ownership by the CEO, TMT, and BOD. Each regression analysis for the first
study tested four models. Model 1 contained the control variables. Model 2 added the
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Table 5
Comparisons of Means – Study 1
Variable

Total
Sample

NonRestructured
Restructured
Firms
Firms

T-Statistic
for Equality
of Means (2tailed)

PERFORMANCE
# ROA (t-1)
# ROA (t)
# ROA (t+1)

4.230
7.804
5.528

2.654
9.921
5.129

5.676
5.861
5.894

3.068**
-2.217*
0.886

# Change in ROA (t-2 to t-1)

-0.216

-0.647

0.179

0.770

GOVERNANCE
# CEO Duality (t)
# CEO Duality (t+1)
# CEO Duality (t+2)

0.842
0.876
0.866

0.810
0.840
0.850

0.872
0.908
0.881

1.209
1.479
0.646

# Outsider Proportion (t)
# Outsider Proportion (t+1)
# Outsider Proportion (t+2)

0.757
0.761
0.775

0.781
0.792
0.808

0.735
0.733
0.745

-3.541**
-3.574**
-4.069**

# CEO Equity (t)
# CEO Equity (t+1)
# CEO Equity (t+2)

1.758
1.946
1.680

2.890
3.218
2.547

0.836
0.886
0.990

-2.334*
-2.652**
-2.337*

# TMT Equity (t)
# TMT Equity (t+1)
# TMT Equity (t+2)

3.109
2.617
2.963

5.416
3.890
4.510

1.507
1.686
1.861

-2.247*
-2.829**
-2.776**

# BOD Equity (t)
# BOD Equity (t+1)
# BOD Equity (t+2)

3.880
6.821
5.265

5.870
12.332
5.280

2.258
2.229
5.252

-1.721†
-1.672†
-.009

# Board Ties (t)
# Board Ties (t+1)
# Board Ties (t+2)

40.885
41.244
41.622

42.380
43.470
43.44

39.514
39.202
39.954

-.833
-1.243
-1.016

# CEO Turnover (t to t+1)
# CEO Turnover (t+1 to t+2)

0.081
0.096

0.120
0.060

0.046
0.128

-1.932†
1.708†

# CEO Tenure (t)
# CEO Tenure (t+1)
# CEO Tenure (t+2)

85.722
84.914
97.120

69.160
63.280
69.880

100.917
104.761
122.110

2.897**
3.889**
2.422*

** < .01, * < .05, and † < .10. Equity means are reported in millions. Tenure is reported
in months.
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independent variables – a change in performance variable and the dichotomous
restructuring variable. Model 3 tested the interaction between the two aforementioned
variables – performance and restructuring. Lastly, Model 4 assessed a curvilinear
effect.
5.A.1. Proportion of Outsiders on the Board
Tables 6 and 7 show the results of the regression analyses that attempted to
understand board independence (operationalized as the proportion of outsiders on the
board of directors) in the post-restructuring period. Specifically, Table 6 assesses the
proportion of outsiders in the year following restructuring (i.e., t1) and Table 7 assesses
the proportion of outsiders in the second year following a restructuring (i.e., t2). Both
Models 1 in Tables 6 and 7 reveal that the period effect variable and CEO tenure are
negatively related to the proportion of outsiders on the board for t1 and t2. This first
finding suggests that organizations studied in years marked by greater shareholder
activism (i.e., after 1993) were likely to have greater proportions of outsiders on the
board. This second finding suggests that as CEO tenure increases proportion of
outsiders on the board decreases. This finding might be attributable to increased tenure
leading to increased CEO power and control, which allows CEOs to have boards more
beholden to them (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1994). Additionally, the results suggest that
CEO duality and the number of board ties are positively related to the proportion of
outsiders at year t1 and t2. Lastly, ownership concentration was negatively related to the
proportion of outsiders on the board only for t1.
Models 2 in Tables 6 and 7 clearly demonstrate that performance and
restructuring are predictors of the proportion of outsiders on the board in the first (R2 =
.283, p = .005) and second year (R2 = .346, p = .000) after a restructuring. More
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specifically, the change in ROA is negatively related to the proportion of outsiders at t1
(p < .05) and t2 (p < .01). Thus, firms experiencing poor performance are coerced to
adopt (either voluntarily or involuntarily) greater proportions of outsiders on their boards.
Such a move might be viewed as an attempt to institute socially legitimated
characteristics of better or good governance since poor or inadequate governance is
often times believed to be the driver of organizational performance. In addition to the
significance of the performance change, restructuring proved to be significant and
positive predictor of the proportion of outsiders on the board in years t1 and t2 (p < .05
for both). Models 3 (the interaction of performance and restructuring) and Models 4
(curvilinear effect) did not produce any significant effects for either years t1 or t2.
Overall, the findings that relate to the proportion of outsiders in the postrestructuring period allow me to find partial support for hypothesis 1a. Although the
hypothesis predicted that restructuring firms with low ROA in the pre-restructuring
period would have greater proportions of outsiders on their boards in post-restructuring
periods, support was found for the direct effects of performance and restructuring.
Restructuring firms had greater proportions of outsiders on their boards in postrestructuring years (t1 and t2) and firms experiencing low performance had greater
proportions of outsiders on their boards in years t1 and t2, but an interaction effect did
not exist.
5.A.2. CEO Duality
Tables 8 and 9 show the results of the regression analyses that attempt to
understand board leadership structure (operationalized as CEO duality) in the postrestructuring period. Specifically, Table 8 assesses CEO duality in the year following
restructuring (i.e., t1) and Table 9 assesses CEO duality in the second year following a
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- 0.259
- 0.242
- 0.001
- 0.008
0.254
- 0.152
0.121

β

t

.239
.211

- 3.874**
- 3.427**
- 0.020
- 0.131
3.608**
- 2.229*
1.786†

Model 1

R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2
Significance of R2 Change
N = 192. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

Period Effect
Ownership Concentration t1
CEO Equity t1
BOD Equity t1
CEO Duality t1
CEO Tenure t1
BOD Ties t1
Performance
Restructure
Performance x Restructure
(Performance)2
(Performance)2 x Restructure

Variables
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- 0.235
- 0.227
- 0.037
- 0.029
0.237
- 0.109
0.124
- 0.139
0.161

β

t

.283
.248
.044
.005

- 3.475**
- 3.254**
- 0.519
- 0.454
3.412**
- 1.611
1.859†
- 2.179*
2.322*

Model 2
- 0.232
- 0.219
- 0.035
- 0.031
0.240
- 0.115
0.126
- 0.070
0.160
- 0.091

β

t

.287
.247
.004
.348

- 3.410**
- 3.124**
- 0.497
- 0.481
3.454**
- 1.685†
1.898†
- 0.716
2.299*
- 0.941

Model 3

- 0.228
- 0.234
- 0.012
- 0.036
0.240
- 0.114
0.120
- 0.160
0.186
0.006
0.090
- 0.160

β

t

.299
.252
.012
.219

- 3.370**
- 3.322**
- 0.170
- 0.557
3.410**
- 1.679†
1.799†
- 1.012
2.622**
0.046
0.708
- 1.619

Model 4

Dependent Variable: PROPORTION OF OUTSIDERS ON THE BOD (t1)

Table 6
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting the Proportion of Outsiders on the Board of Directors in Year t1

- 0.331
- 0.115
- 0.111
- 0.094
0.229
- 0.249
0.114

β

t

.278
.248

- 4.946**
- 1.621
- 1.439
- 1.309
3.361**
- 3.746**
1.694†

Model 1

R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2
Significance of R2 Change
N = 194. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

Period Effect
Ownership Concentration t2
CEO Equity t2
BOD Equity t2
CEO Duality t2
CEO Tenure t2
BOD Ties t2
Performance
Restructure
Performance x Restructure
(Performance)2
(Performance)2 x Restructure

Variables

121

- 0.302
- 0.109
- 0.121
- 0.088
0.217
- 0.211
0.111
- 0.192
0.173

β

t

.346
.311
.068
.000

- 4.538**
- 1.570
- 1.543
- 1.267
3.325**
- 3.265**
1.723†
- 2.979**
2.524*

Model 2
- 0.302
- 0.107
- 0.120
- 0.089
0.218
- 0.212
0.112
- 0.177
0.172
- 0.019

β

t

.346
.307
.000
.843

- 4.510**
- 1.541
- 1.522
- 1.268
3.319**
- 3.260**
1.727†
- 1.828†
2.506*
- 0.199

Model 3

- 0.229
- 0.118
- 0.109
- 0.095
0.217
- 0.207
0.108
- 0.272
0.200
0.079
0.092
- 0.159

β

t

.358
.311
.012
.215

- 4.481**
- 1.696†
- 1.374
- 1.369
3.222**
- 3.167**
1.675†
- 1.693†
2.842**
0.576
0.716
- 1.623

Model 4

Dependent Variable: PROPORTION OF OUTSIDERS ON THE BOD (t2)

Table 7
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting the Proportion of Outsiders on the Board of Directors in Year t2

restructuring (i.e., t2). Due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable (1 =
duality; 0 = non-duality), logistic regression was utilized.
The baseline model (i.e., control variables) predicting duality structure in postrestructuring periods is reflected in Model 1 in Tables 8 and 9. Both baseline models
show significantly positive relationships between the proportion of outsiders on the
board (p < .01) and BOD ties (p < .05), which might be explained by the presence of
substitution effects between CEO duality and the proportion of outsiders on the board,
as well as between CEO duality and the number of BOD ties. In other words, the
adoption of institutionally legitimated form of good governance (e.g., a greater
proportion of outsiders on the board and a greater number of board ties) might forestall
a push for non-duality structures within organizations (Dalton et al., 2003; Rediker &
Seth, 1995; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Westphal & Zajac, 1998; Young et al., 2000; Zajac
& Westphal, 1994). (Substitution effects in corporate governance are discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 6.) Additionally, both baseline models concluded that CEO
tenure in years t1 and t2 was positively related (p < .01) to CEO duality in the same year,
which supports the long-standing argument that CEO tenure builds power and control,
thus leaving the CEO in a better position to be elected as the chairperson of the board
of directors. Separately, only the baseline model for year t1 revealed a statistically
negative relationship (p < .10) between CEO equity and CEO duality. The overall hit
ratios for Model 1 for years t1 and t2 were 91.7% and 88.4%, respectively. Unlike
moderated multiple regression, logistic regression attempts to correctly classify each
occurrence of the dependent variable (e.g., duality versus non-duality) based on the
independent variables in the model. A correct classification is considered a ‘hit’. Thus,
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the addition of independent variables that properly explain/predict CEO duality will
increase the model’s hit ratio.
The independent variables – change in ROA and restructuring – were added in
Model 2. The results revealed that only a change in performance was significantly
related to CEO duality – negative relationship (p < .10) in year t1. Although the loglikelihood values for Model 2 in year t1 decreased, thus suggesting a better model fit,
the change did not lead to model significance. Additionally, the change in χ2 was not
significant (∆χ2 = 4.22, sig = .12). The overall hit ratio for Model 2 for year t1 was
90.6%, which was 1.1% less than that for Model 1. Model 2 results for CEO duality in
year t2 were less impressive since neither of the two independent variables significantly
improved overall model fit (∆χ2 = 1.32, sig = .52) versus the baseline model. The
overall hit ratio for Model 2 for year t2 was 88.4%, which was unchanged from Model 1.
The addition of the interaction between change in performance and restructuring
did not improve the goodness-of-fit of the model. As evidenced in the results of Model 3
in Tables 8 and 9, the interaction terms were not significant for either year t1 (∆χ2 =
1.94, sig = .16) or t2 (∆χ2 = .88, sig = .35). The overall hit ratios for Model 3 for years t1
and t2 were 91.1% and 87.8%, respectively, which suggests that overall model fit has
not improved from the previous model.
Significant improvements in model fit for were made when a quadratic equation
was entered into the logistic regression model for year t2. As evidenced in Table 9, a
curvilinear relationship was uncovered when the (performance)2 X restructuring variable
was entered into the model for year t2 (p < .10). The negative coefficient suggests that
the relationship is an inverted U relationship, which means that CEO duality in the
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92.721
48.019 **

χ
Change in χ2
.221
Cox & Snell R2
†
*
**
N = 203. p < .10, p < .05, and p < .01

2

-2 Log Likelihood

2.080**
0.637
0.020
0.126†
0.108
2.509**
0.008**
0.015*

Model 1
B
SE

Constant
- 5.856
Period Effect
0.008
Ownership Concentration t1
0.015
CEO Equity t1
- 0.225
0.135
BOD Equity t1
Outsider Proportion t1
7.276
CEO Tenure t1
0.022
BOD Ties t1
0.032
Performance
Restructure
Performance x Restructure
(Performance)2
(Performance)2 x Restructure

Variables
2.360**
0.688
0.019
0.128†
0.116
2.910**
0.008**
0.015*
0.031†
0.703
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88.500
52.239 **
4.220 (n.s.)
.238

- 6.743
- 0.289
0.009
- 0.242
0.174
8.531
0.023
0.033
- 0.052
0.967

Model 2
B
SE
2.361**
0.720
0.018
0.141†
0.122
2.951**
0.009**
0.015*
0.033
0.725
0.070

86.564
54.176 **
1.937 (n.s.)
.246

- 6.760
- 0.543
0.002
- 0.253
0.193
8.834
0.026
0.030
- 0.033
1.095
- 0.097

Model 3
B
SE

Dependent Variable: CEO DUALITY (t1)

Table 8
Results of Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting CEO Duality in Year t1

2.362**
0.699
0.024
0.163†
0.137†
2.975**
0.010**
0.015†
0.053
0.823†
0.105
0.002
0.004
81.954
58.786 **
4.610 (n.s.)
.264

- 6.824
- 0.649
0.013
- 0.305
0.236
9.102
0.026
0.029
0.052
1.458
0.075
- 0.002
- 0.004

Model 4
B
SE

114.690
40.334 **

-2 Log Likelihood

χ
Change in χ2
.192
Cox & Snell R2
†
*
**
N = 193. p < .10, p < .05, and p < .01

2

- 7.478
0.867
- 0.002
- 0.104
0.061
8.912
0.021
0.026

B

SE
2.172**
0.612
0.010
0.069
0.062
2.474**
0.007**
0.012*

Model 1

Constant
Period Effect
Ownership Concentration t2
CEO Equity t2
BOD Equity t2
Outsider Proportion t2
CEO Tenure t2
BOD Ties t2
Performance
Restructure
Performance x Restructure
(Performance)2
(Performance)2xRestructure

Variables
2.273**
0.646
0.010
0.072
0.068
2.638**
0.007**
0.012*
0.032
0.563
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113.368
41.656 **
1.323 (n.s.)
.198

- 7.979
0.708
- 0.003
- 0.098
0.071
9.626
0.022
0.025
0.001
0.637

Model 2
B
SE
2.248**
0.654
0.011
0.069
0.065
2.638**
0.007**
0.012†
0.029
0.572
0.058

112.484
42.540 **
.884 (n.s.)
.202

- 7.930
0.614
- 0.005
- 0.097
0.069
9.699
0.023
0.023
0.009
0.670
- 0.056

Model 3
B
SE

Dependent Variable: CEO DUALITY (t2)

Table 9
Results of Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting CEO Duality in Year t2

103.687
51.337 **
8.796 *
.238

- 8.735
0.578
- 0.003
- 0.106
0.086
10.979
0.024
0.022
0.099
1.275
0.125
- 0.002
- 0.005

2.442**
0.668
0.011
0.073
0.071
2.859**
0.008**
0.013†
0.044*
0.682†
0.084
0.001
0.003†

Model 4
B
SE

second year following a restructuring is contingent upon the change in ROA in the prerestructuring period. Specifically, restructuring firms who experienced either significant
declines or significant gains in ROA the year before a restructuring tended to have lower
occurrences of duality, whereas firms whose change in ROA could have been
characterized as moderate, tended to have increased likelihoods of CEO duality
structures. For year t2, Model 4 was significant (∆χ2 = 8.80, sig = .012). The overall hit
ratio for Model 4 for year t2 improved from 87.8% to 88.9%. Overall, this finding
provides partial support for hypothesis 1b. The relationship between performance,
restructuring, and CEO duality in year t2 seemed to be more intricate than was predicted
by the hypothesis since the hypothesis found support only at the extremes of
performance (low and high). Model 4 results for CEO duality in year t1 were less
impressive since neither of the quadratic terms achieved significance, thus leading to
overall non-significance of the Model (∆χ2 = 4.61, sig = .10). The overall hit ratio for
Model 4 for year t1 improved from 90.6% to 91.1%.
5.A.3. Board of Director Ties
Tables 10 and 11 show the results of the regression analyses that attempt to
understand BOD ties in the post-restructuring period. Specifically, Table 10 assesses
BOD ties in the year following restructuring (i.e., t1) and Table 11 assesses BOD ties in
the second year following a restructuring (i.e., t2). Both Models 1 in Tables 10 and 11
reveal that ownership concentration is negatively related (p < .10) and the proportion of
outsiders on the board is positively related (p < .10) to the number of BOD ties in years
t1 and t2. Separately, Model 1 in Table 10 revealed that CEO duality is positively related
(p < .05) and CEO tenure is negatively related (p < .05) to the number of BOD ties in
year t1. It would seem reasonable that a positive relationship exists between CEO
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duality and the number of BOD ties due to the fact that CEO duality is, and has been,
viewed as a bad form of governance that adversely impacts organizational performance
and increases opportunistic behavior on behalf of the CEO. As such, a push for greater
number of ties may serve as means of monitoring the activities of the firm and its
executives and/or serve as a means of co-opting resources from important elements
outside the firm, as a result of the uncertainty created by a restructuring (Aldrich, 1979;
Mizruchi, 1996; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
The addition of the independent variables – restructuring and performance – did
not yield any greater explanation of BOD ties in either year t1 (Model 2 R2 = .13, p = .64)
or t2 (Model 2 R2 = .09, p = .85), which suggests that changes in a firm’s performance in
the pre-restructuring period or the restructuring event itself does not appear to directly
impact the size of the networks BOD members create with the external environment.
Much like the Models 2, Model 3 (the interaction between performance and
restructuring) and Model 4 (curvilinear effects) did not produce any significantly better
results for predicting BOD ties in years t1 and t2. Model 3 for year t1 yielded an R2 = .13,
R2 change = .002, and p = .47, whereas Model 3 for year t2 yielded an R2 = .09, R2
change = .003, and p = .43. Model 4 for year t1 yielded an R2 = .13, R2 change = .005,
and p = .63, whereas Model 4 for year t2 yielded an R2 = .10, R2 change = .003, and p =
.71. Based on these results for BOD ties in the post-restructuring periods t1 and t2,
hypothesis 1c was not supported.
5.A.4. CEO Equity Ownership
Tables 12 and 13 show the results of the regression analyses that attempted to
understand CEO equity ownership in the post-restructuring period. Specifically, Table
12 assesses the proportion of outsiders in the year following restructuring (i.e., t1) and
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0.025
- 0.136
0.193
- 0.169
0.140
0.092
0.057

.120
.087

0.334
- 1.753†
2.513*
- 2.316*
1.786†
1.217
0.814

Model 1
β
t

R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2
Significance of R2 Change
N = 192. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

Period Effect
Ownership Concentration t1
CEO Duality t1
CEO Tenure t1
Outsider Proportion t1
CEO Equity t1
BOD Equity t1
Performance
Restructure
Performance x Restructure
(Performance)2
(Performance)2 x Restructure

Variables
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0.038
- 0.128
0.201
- 0.169
0.151
0.092
0.055
0.068
0.011

β

t

.125
.082
.005
.636

0.486
- 1.626
2.581*
- 2.269*
1.859†
1.189
0.786
0.949
0.142

Model 2
0.035
- 0.133
0.196
- 0.163
0.155
0.091
0.057
0.009
0.012
0.078

β

t

.127
.079
.002
.469

0.453
- 1.682†
2.514*
- 2.179*
1.898†
1.168
0.805
0.082
0.149
0.725

Model 3

Dependent Variable: BOD TIES (t1)

Table 10
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting Board of Director Ties in Year t1

0.033
- 0.137
0.185
- 0.168
0.148
0.100
0.055
0.083
0.016
0.036
- 0.077
- 0.017

β

t

.132
.074
.005
.628

0.429
- 1.708†
2.329*
- 2.226*
1.799†
1.265
0.774
0.471
0.205
0.235
- 0.544
- 0.157

Model 4

- 0.003
- 0.137
0.104
- 0.118
0.144
0.076
0.079

.088
.053

- 0.035
- 1.817†
1.376
- 1.579
1.753†
0.984
1.036

Model 1
β
t

R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2
Significance of R2 Change
N = 189. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

Period Effect
Ownership Concentration t2
CEO Duality t2
CEO Tenure t2
Outsider Proportion t2
CEO Equity t2
BOD Equity t2
Performance
Restructure
Performance x Restructure
(Performance)2
(Performance)2 x Restructure

Variables
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0.005
- 0.131
0.103
- 0.118
0.156
0.071
0.082
0.043
0.001

β

t

.090
.044
.002
.851

0.064
- 1.717†
1.357
- 1.556
1.803†
0.884
1.066
0.569
0.015

Model 2
0.003
- 0.136
0.101
- 0.112
0.157
0.061
0.084
- 0.022
0.004
0.087

β

t

.093
.042
.003
.434

0.033
- 1.770†
1.327
- 1.469
1.809†
0.751
1.098
- 0.201
0.053
0.785

Model 3

Dependent Variable: BOD TIES (t2)

Table 11
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting Board of Director Ties in Year t2

0.001
- 0.137
0.087
- 0.118
0.153
0.070
0.081
0.062
0.006
0.034
- 0.085
0.000

β

t

.096
.035
.003
.706

0.016
- 1.760†
1.101
- 1.534
1.730†
0.850
1.039
0.330
0.077
0.211
- 0.575
- 0.001

Model 4

Table 13 assesses the proportion of outsiders in the second year following a
restructuring (i.e., t2). Both Models 1 in Tables 12 and 13 reveal that the ownership
concentration is positively related to CEO equity ownership in years t1 and t2. As
ownership becomes more concentrated (i.e., fewer owners own more shares), CEOs
hold greater number of shares in the firms they lead. This finding is supports the
general consensus that powerful owners have the ability to force CEOs to somewhat
align their personal wealth with the success of their organizations. As with other
governance mechanisms, greater CEO equity ownership is seen as good governance.
Furthermore, the results on Modes 1 suggest that CEO duality is negatively related to
CEO equity ownership in t1 and BOD equity ownership is positively related to CEO
equity ownership in t2.
Models 2 of Tables 12 and 13 indicate that restructuring is positively related to
CEO equity ownership in years t1 (p < .05) and t2 (p < .01), which suggests that
restructuring drives CEOs to adopt greater equity positions in their firms. A
restructuring incidence and its significant impact on governance in post-restructuring
periods is a fairly common occurrence throughout this study. Unlike restructuring, the
change in performance was positively related to CEO equity ownership in year t2 (p <
.10), which runs counter to the philosophy that poor performance creates pressures to
institute tighter and better governance. In other words, I would have expected to see
increases in CEO equity ownership in times of negative changes in performance
because the slide in performance would create pressures for organizations to make
socially legitimated changes to their governance structures. Models 2 for CEO equity
ownership in years t1 and t2 were both significant (R2 = .21, p = .04, and R2 = .21, p =
.01, respectively).
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Models 3 and 4 did not produce any significantly better results for CEO equity
ownership in year t1. The addition of the interaction between restructuring and
performance (Model 3) and the addition of curvilinear terms (Model 4) did not produce
any significant results. Models 3 and 4 results were R2 = .21, p = .75 and R2 = .21, p =
.64, respectively. Model 3 for CEO equity ownership in year t2 did produce an
interesting finding when the interaction between restructuring and performance was
entered into the model. The addition of this term eliminated the positive relationship
between performance and CEO equity ownership in year t2 significant. However, as
revealed in Model 3 of Table 13, the interaction between restructuring and performance
is significant and positive (p < .05), in addition to significance of the entire model (R2 =
.22, p = .04).
The plotting of the interaction effect is shown in Figure 3. The methodology for
plotting the regression equations (one for restructuring firms and one for nonrestructuring firms; Z = 0 and 1) was taken from Aiken and West (1991). The anchoring
values used to plot the slopes of the lines needed to be meaningful; as such, I chose
two standard deviations below the mean and two standard deviations above the mean.
This strategy was utilized for all interaction plotted in this dissertation. As evidenced in
Figure 3, restructuring firms experiencing poor performance in the pre-restructuring
period had CEOs who held less equity in organizations they managed versus those
restructuring firms experiencing above average performance in the pre-restructuring
period. This finding contradicts the arguments set forth in this dissertation. However,
there is a substantial difference in equity holdings when comparing restructuring firms
versus non-restructuring firms. The overall conclusion drawn from Figure 3 is that
compared to the CEOs of non-restructuring firms, the CEOs of restructuring firms hold
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- 0.071
0.293
0.078
- 0.262
0.028
- 0.002
0.086

β

t

.179
.153

- 1.033
4.201**
1.166
- 3.732**
.0401
- 0.020
1.228

Model 1

R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2
Significance of R2 Change
N = 192. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

Period Effect
Ownership Concentration t1
BOD Equity t1
CEO Duality t1
CEO Tenure t1
Outsider Proportion t1
BOD Tiest1
Performance
Restructure
Performance x Restructure
(Performance)2
(Performance)2 x Restructure

Variables
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- 0.028
0.307
0.053
- 0.249
0.064
- 0.040
0.079
- 0.014
0.180

β

t

.208
.173
.029
.041

- 0.391
4.428**
0.793
- 3.537**
0.908
- 0.519
1.132
- 0.211
2.508*

Model 2
- 0.029
0.304
0.054
- 0.250
0.066
- 0.039
0.078
- 0.039
0.180
0.032

β

t

.208
.169
.000
.751

- 0.409
4.340**
0.799
- 3.540**
0.929
- 0.497
1.113
- 0.378
2.508*
0.317

Model 3
β

t

.210
.164
.002
.641

- 0.454
4.528**
0.885
- 3.290**
0.938
- 0.170
1.257
0.172
1.879†
- 0.456
- 0.483
0.481

Model 4
- 0.032
0.315
0.059
- 0.234
0.066
- 0.013
0.087
0.028
0.138
- 0.065
- 0.064
0.062

Dependent Variable: CEO EQUITY OWNERSHIP (t1)

Table 12
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting CEO Equity Ownership in Year t1

- 0.062
0.174
0.308
- 0.108
0.001
- 0.032
0.070

β

t

.161
.129

- 0.827
2.429*
4.435**
- 1.499
0.011
- 0.405
0.984

Model 1

R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2
Significance of R2 Change
N = 189. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

Period Effect
Ownership Concentration t2
BOD Equity t2
CEO Duality t2
CEO Tenure t2
Outsider Proportion t2
BOD Tiest2
Performance
Restructure
Performance x Restructure
(Performance)2
(Performance)2 x Restructure

Variables
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0.000
0.195
0.307
- 0.094
0.020
- 0.036
0.062
0.117
0.195

β

t

.206
.166
.045
.008

0.002
2.768**
4.511**
- 1.327
0.283
- 0.438
0.884
1.674†
2.736**

Model 2
- 0.006
0.179
0.307
- 0.096
0.033
- 0.032
0.052
- 0.040
0.198
0.207

β

t

.224
.180
.018
.044

- 0.076
2.541*
4.550**
- 1.367
0.462
- 0.395
0.751
- 0.386
2.797**
2.030*

Model 3
β

t

.225
.179
.001
.658

- 0.005
2.736**
4.709**
- 1.123
0.548
- 0.039
0.850
- 0.159
2.096*
1.050
- 0.035
0.592

Model 4
0.000
0.191
0.313
- 0.080
0.039
- 0.003
0.058
- 0.027
0.152
0.151
- 0.005
0.092

Dependent Variable: CEO EQUITY OWNERSHIP (t2)

Table 13
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting CEO Equity Ownership in Year t2

greater amounts of equity in their organizations. Moreover, this difference becomes
more noticeable with better (not worse) performance in the pre-restructuring period.
Based on these results, hypothesis 1d was not supported.
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Figure 3
Interactive Effect of Change in Performance and Restructuring
on CEO Equity (Year t2)
5.A.5. Top Management Team Equity Ownership
Tables 14 and 15 show the results of the regression analyses that attempt to
understand TMT equity ownership in the post-restructuring period. Specifically, Table
14 assesses TMT equity ownership in the year following restructuring (i.e., t1) and Table
15 assesses TMT equity ownership in the second year following a restructuring (i.e., t2).
Both Models 1 in Tables 14 and 15 reveal that ownership concentration is positively
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related (p < .01) and CEO duality is negatively related (p < .05) to TMT equity
ownership in years t1 and t2. Separately, Model 1 in Table 14 reveals that both the
proportion of outsiders on the board and the time effect variable is negatively related (p
< .05 and p < .10, respectively) to TMT equity ownership in year t1. It would seem
reasonable to find that an inverse relationship exists between the proportion of outsiders
on the board and TMT equity ownership as a result of a substitution effect between
these two governance issues. A greater proportion of outsiders on the board might
forestall a push for greater equity ownership by top managers. The negative
relationship between the period effect and TMT equity ownership suggests that
organizations studied in years marked by greater shareholder activism (i.e., starting in
1993) were more likely to have TMTs with greater equity holdings in their organizations
than organizations studied in years marked by less shareholder activism (i.e., before
1993). Lastly, Model 1 in Table 15 reveals that BOD equity ownership in positively
related to TMT equity ownership in year t2 (p < .01).
Models 2 in Tables 14 and 15 clearly demonstrate that performance and
restructuring are predictors of TMT equity ownership in years t1 (R2 = .26, p = .001) and
t2 (R2 = .38, p = .00). Specifically, a change in performance during the pre-restructuring
period is positively related to TMT equity ownership in years t1 (p < .10) and t2 (p < .05),
which runs counter to the hypothesized relationship between these two variables. The
same positive relationship holds true between restructuring and TMT equity ownership
for years t1 and t2 (p < .01), which, as predicted, suggests that restructuring firms have
TMTs that hold greater amounts of equity in the firms they manage. Models 3 (the
interaction of performance and restructuring) and Models 4 (curvilinear effect) did not
yield any significant effects for either years t1 or t2.
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- 0.138
0.251
- 0.170
0.039
0.028
0.106
- 0.169

β

t
†

.197
.164

- 1.875
3.400**
- 2.282*
0.528
0.393
1.548
- 2.168*

Model 1

R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2
Significance of R2 Change
N = 192. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

Period Effect
Ownership Concentration t1
CEO Duality t1
CEO Tenure t1
Board Ties t1
BOD Equity t1
Outsider Proportion t1
Performance
Restructure
Performance x Restructure
(Performance)2
(Performance)2 x Restructure

Variables
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- 0.068
0.273
- 0.124
0.078
0.015
0.070
- 0.196
0.115
0.260

β

t

.262
.223
.065
.001

- 0.923
3.810**
- 1.706†
1.089
0.210
1.054
- 2.530*
1.691†
3.591**

Model 2
- 0.069
0.269
- 0.127
0.082
0.012
0.072
- 0.193
0.071
0.261
0.058

β

t

.263
.220
.001
.567

- 0.944
3.720**
- 1.736†
1.135
0.177
1.068
- 2.478*
0.688
3.588**
0.574

Model 3
β

t

.266
.213
.003
.722

- 0.922
3.647**
- 1.556
1.186
0.221
1.056
- 2.458*
- 0.186
3.515**
0.910
0.773
- 0.399

Model 4
- 0.068
0.266
- 0.116
0.086
0.016
0.071
- 0.194
- 0.031
0.266
0.131
0.104
- 0.041

Dependent Variable: TMT EQUITY OWNERSHIP (t1)

Table 14
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting Top Management Team Equity Ownership in Year t1

- 0.100
0.261
- 0.177
- 0.013
0.015
0.371
- 0.107

β

t

.305
.277

- 1.435
3.894**
- 2.615*
- 0.191
0.219
5.702**
- 1.439

Model 1

R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2
Significance of R2 Change
N = 189. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

Period Effect
Ownership Concentration t2
CEO Duality t2
CEO Tenure t2
Board Ties t2
BOD Equity t2
Outsider Proportion t2
Performance
Restructure
Performance x Restructure
(Performance)2
(Performance)2 x Restructure

Variables
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- 0.019
0.289
- 0.158
0.013
0.004
0.369
- 0.115
0.147
0.260

β

t

.382
.349
.077
.000

- 0.283
4.507**
- 2.453*
0.197
0.060
5.974**
- 1.543
2.322*
4.010**

Model 2
- 0.022
0.282
- 0.159
0.018
0.000
0.369
- 0.113
0.085
0.261
0.081

β

t

.384
.348
.002
.385

- 0.317
4.374**
- 2.463*
0.273
0.001
5.970**
- 1.522
0.898
4.023**
0.872

Model 3
β

t

.388
.344
.004
.634

- 0.290
4.399**
- 2.298*
0.300
0.033
5.979**
- 1.374
0.560
3.626**
0.473
- 0.005
0.657

Model 4
- 0.020
0.286
- 0.154
0.020
0.002
0.371
- 0.104
0.089
0.246
0.064
- 0.001
0.063

Dependent Variable: TMT EQUITY OWNERSHIP (t2)

Table 15
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting Top Management Team Equity Ownership in Year t2

Based on the aforementioned results, hypothesis 1e is, at best, partially
supported by the finding that restructuring firms do institute greater TMT equity
ownership in the first and second years after a restructuring. However, support for
hypothesis 1e fails to be granted due the fact that greater performance leads to greater
adoption of equity by the TMT. This finding runs counter to my argument, which
suggested that TMTs will adopt greater equity ownership positions when prerestructuring performance decreases, not increases.
5.A.6. Board of Director Equity Ownership
Tables 16 and 17 show the results of the regression analyses that attempt to
understand BOD equity ownership in the post-restructuring period. Specifically, Table
16 assesses BOD equity ownership in the year following a restructuring (i.e., t1) and
Table 17 assesses BOD equity ownership in the second year following a restructuring
(i.e., t2). Model 1 in Table 16 contains the control variables for BOD equity ownership in
year t1 and the results for this model were quite different than the preceding control
variable models in that all of the control variables, in addition to the model itself, failed to
achieve significance (R2 = .02, p = .84). The control variables continued to achieve
non-significance in all of the models that were tested in the attempt to explain BOD
equity ownership in year t1. Model 1 in Table 17 assesses the control variables for BOD
equity ownership for t2 revealed that CEO equity ownership is positively related (p <
.01), and the proportion of outsiders on the board is negatively related (p < .10), to BOD
equity ownership two years after a firm undertakes a restructuring (i.e., year t2). Unlike
Model 1 for BOD equity ownership in year t1, Model 1 for BOD equity ownership in year
t2 did achieve significance (R2 = .13, p = .00).
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0.034
0.059
0.044
0.002
0.063
0.093
- 0.011

.018
.017

0.425
0.714
0.534
0.021
0.814
1.162
- 0.131

Model 1
β
t

R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2
Significance of R2 Change
N = 192. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

Period Effect
Ownership Concentration t1
CEO Duality t1
CEO Tenure t1
Board Ties t1
CEO Equity t1
Outsider Proportion t1
Performance
Restructure
Performance x Restructure
(Performance)2
(Performance)2 x Restructure

Variables
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0.062
0.072
0.056
0.028
0.061
0.063
- 0.039
0.003
0.152

β

t

.037
.024
.019
.173

0.765
0.870
0.675
0.352
0.786
0.772
- 0.454
0.034
1.882†

Model 2
0.063
0.075
0.058
0.025
0.063
0.064
- 0.041
0.038
0.152
- 0.048

β

t

.038
.019
.001
.673

0.780
0.904
0.700
0.310
0.805
0.778
- 0.481
0.339
1.871†
- 0.422

Model 3
β

t

.040
.015
.002
.813

0.771
0.791
0.709
0.301
0.774
0.875
- 0.557
- 0.024
1.958†
- 0.023
0.284
- 0.605

Model 4
0.063
0.067
0.060
0.024
0.061
0.073
- 0.049
- 0.004
0.164
- 0.004
0.042
- 0.070

Dependent Variable: BOD EQUITY OWNERSHIP (t1)

Table 16
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting Board of Director Equity Ownership in Year t1

- 0.061
- 0.022
0.094
0.007
0.075
0.318
- 0.152

β

t

.134
.100

- 0.804
- 0.298
1.277
0.091
1.036
4.435**
- 1.900†

Model 1

R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2
Significance of R2 Change
N = 189. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

Period Effect
Ownership Concentration t2
CEO Duality t2
CEO Tenure t2
Board Ties t2
CEO Equity t2
Outsider Proportion t2
Performance
Restructure
Performance x Restructure
(Performance)2
(Performance)2 x Restructure

Variables
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- 0.081
- 0.033
0.092
0.002
0.077
0.333
- 0.163
- 0.068
- 0.041

β

t

.139
.096
.005
.575

- 1.028
- 0.446
1.248
0.030
1.066
4.511**
- 1.933†
- 0.929
- 0.546

Model 2
- 0.078
- 0.029
0.093
- 0.002
0.080
0.340
- 0.164
- 0.015
- 0.044
- 0.070

β

t

.141
.093
.002
.517

- 0.997
- 0.388
1.261
- 0.029
1.098
4.550**
- 1.938†
- 0.139
- 0.575
- 0.650

Model 3
β

t

.150
.092
.009
.385

- 1.020
- 0.542
1.210
- 0.042
1.039
4.709**
-2.096*
- 0.405
- 0.234
- 0.033
0.378
- 0.235

Model 4
- 0.080
- 0.041
0.092
- 0.003
0.076
0.357
- 0.178
- 0.073
- 0.018
- 0.005
0.054
- 0.132

Dependent Variable: BOD EQUITY OWNERSHIP (t2)

Table 17
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting Board of Director Equity Ownership in Year t2

The addition of the independent variables – restructuring and performance –
yielded greater explanation of BOD equity ownership in year t1, but not year t2.
Specifically, restructuring was positively related (p < .10) to BOD equity ownership in
year t1, which suggests that incidences of restructuring lead to BODs adopting more
equity ownership in the firms they govern. It is important to note that, in spite of this
finding, Model 2 was not significant (R2 = .04, change in R2 = .02, p = .17). Even though
the model was not significant, the aforementioned positive finding does allow for greater
insight into BOD equity ownership in the post-restructuring period. Beyond the
significance of the control variables in Model 1, Model 2 predicting BOD equity
ownership in year t2 did not produce any significant findings (R2 = .14, p = .58).
Additionally, Models 3 (the interaction of performance and restructuring) and Models 4
(curvilinear effect) did not produce any significant effects for either years t1 or t2. Even
though restructuring was positively related to BOD equity in year t2, this finding did not
allow for full support of hypothesis 1f.
5.B.

Study 2 Results: Governance’s Impact on Market Valuation
Table18 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations for Study 2,

which assesses the impact of governance structures on post-asset market valuations of
the firm. The basic contention of this study is that organizations exhibiting more socially
legitimated forms of governance (i.e., good or sound governance) shall be rewarded
with greater shareholder returns in the year following a restructuring. Specifically and
drawing on the governance structures used in the first study, firms with non-duality
structures, greater proportions of outsiders on the board of directors, CEOs, TMTs, and
BODs who hold have their personal wealth tied to the market performance of the firm
via equity ownership, and BODs with greater ties to their external environments shall
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have shareholder returns in the post-restructuring year than those firms not exhibiting
these governance characteristics.
Table 18 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations for the
second study. None of the governance structures are significantly correlated to
shareholder returns in year t1. Additionally, the correlation between restructuring and
shareholder returns was not significant. Shareholder returns in year t1, which averaged
6.04%, were significant and positively correlated to dividends paid in year t1 (r = .14, p <
.05), R&D intensity in year t1 (r = .27, p < .01), and negatively correlated to capital
structure in year t1 (r = -.10, p < .10).
Regression analyses were employed to assess the moderating impact of
governance structures on shareholder returns in the post-restructuring year (i.e., t1).
The governance structures evaluated were the same as those utilized in the first study –
board independence, CEO duality, equity ownership by the CEO, TMT, and BOD, and
board ties. Every hypothesis was tested using four models. Model 1 contains the
control variables. Model 2 adds the independent variables – the dichotomous
restructuring variable and the governance variable of interest. Model 3 tests the
interaction between the two aforementioned variables – restructuring and governance.
Lastly, Model 4 utilizes a quadratic equation to test for a curvilinear effect.
5.B.1. Collective Findings
The results for the second study of this dissertation were disappointing in that
none of the hypothesized relationships were supported for any of the six governance
structures. Before discussing these results, I begin with a discussion of the models
containing the control variables. The moderating impact of the six governance
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0.64
0.48
16767
0.94
6.04
0.85
0.02
0.03
0.88
1.95
2.62
6.82
0.76
41.24

Mean
0.58
0.50
37404
0.78
13.84
1.20
0.03
0.05
0.33
5.80
4.98
38.90
0.12
24.83

S.D.
.17*
.18*
.22**
-.07
-.09
-.10
-.03
.05
.08
.06
.18*
.11
.23*

1
.08
-.06
-.06
.01
-.05
.01
-.10
.20**
.22**
.13
.24**
.09

2

.28**
-.08
.27**
-.07
-.04
-.01
-.01
-.01
.01
.10
.35**

3

.14*
.05
-.06
-.05
.16*
-.13
-.20**
.04
.19**
.53**

4

-.10†
-.06
.27**
-.04
-.06
-.13
-.05
.08
.01

5

.11
-.16*
.13
-.02
-.03
-.03
-.01
.11

6

.01
.08
.02
.07
.01
-.02
.08

7
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Notes: N = 187 for TMT equity. N = 198 for CEO and BOD equity. N = 203 for Total Diversification. N= 209 for
all remaining variables. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01. Means and standard deviations for assets, CEO,
TMT, and BOD equity ownership (i.e., variables 3, 10 – 12) are reported in millions.

1. Total Diversification t1
2. Restructuring
3. Assets t1
4. Dividends t1
5. Shareholder Return t1
6. Capital Structure t1
7. Advertising Intensity t1
8. R&D Intensity t1
9. Duality t1
10. CEO Equity t1
11. TMT Equity t1
12. BOD Equity t1
13. Outside Proportion t1
14. Board Ties t1

Variable

Table 18
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Variables – Study 2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Variable

Total Diversification t1
Restructuring
Assets t1
Dividends t1
Shareholder Return t1
Capital Structure t1
Advertising Intensity t1
R&D Intensity t1
Duality t1
CEO Equity t1
TMT Equity t1
BOD Equity t1
Outside Proportion t1
Board Ties t1

(Table 18 continued)

-.10
-.09
-.08
.08
.01
.09

8
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-.26**
-.22**
.02
.27**
.19**

9

.87**
.10
-.11
-.01

10

.12
-.25**
-.08

11

-.02
.06

12

.24**

13

-

14

structures was tested utilizing six separate regression analyses, yet Model 1 (i.e., the
control variables model) for each analysis was the same. The results for each Model 1
are offered in Tables 19 through 24. The results suggest that the control variables
collectively account for 14.8% of the variance (i.e., R2 = .15, p = .00) in shareholder
return in the year following a restructuring. Specifically, R&D Intensity (p < .01),
dividends (p < .05), and shareholder returns in the restructuring year (p< .05) were
significant and positively related predictors of shareholder returns in year t1.
In Model 2 the independent variables – restructuring and one of the six
governance structures – were added to the control variables. This was repeated six
times – one for each governance structure. Each Model 2 did not provide any better
explanatory power of returns in the post-restructuring period. In every instance, the
addition of the restructuring variable and governance structure variables did not yield
any significant results. Although R2 values did increase in three of the six models, the
increase was attributable to the addition of the two independent variables, which is
corroborated by the substantial decreases in the adjusted R2 values for each analysis.
Results for the interaction between restructuring and governance (Model 3) and
for a curvilinear effect (Model 4) were equally disappointing. None of the interactions
between restructuring and governance structures were significant predictors of
shareholder returns in the post-restructuring period. As noted in Tables 19 through 24,
the addition of the interaction term in the regression equations lead to sizeable
decreases in the adjusted R2 values for each analysis. Overall significance values for
the interaction models (Model 3) ranged from .353 to .899. These findings were
comparable to those models that incorporated a curvilinear effect (Model 4). None of
the curvilinear effect variables, or the models themselves, was significant. In all but
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- 0.111
- 0.077
0.228
- 0.030
0.173
0.173
- 0.084

β

t

.148
.118

- 1.523
- 1.145
3.302**
- 0.423
2.438*
2.510*
- 1.219

Model 1

R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2
Significance of R2 Change
N = 203. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

Assets t1
Advertising Intensity t1
R&D Intensity t1
Capital Structure t1
Dividends t1
Shareholder Return t
Total Diversification t1
Restructure
Outsider Prop t1
Outsider Prop t1 x Restructure
(Outsider Prop t1)2
(Outsider Prop t1)2 x Restructure

Variables

146

- 0.113
- 0.078
0.226
- 0.028
0.157
0.174
- 0.085
- 0.027
0.079

β

t

.154
.114
.006
.529

- 1.539
- 1.165
3.271**
- 0.399
2.149*
2.490*
- 1.202
- 0.375
1.125

Model 2
- 0.114
- 0.078
0.226
- 0.027
0.159
0.173
- 0.085
- 0.107
0.069
0.084

β

t

.154
.110
.000
.858

- 1.545
- 1.155
3.261**
- 0.380
2.148*
2.473*
- 1.204
- 0.236
0.771
0.180

Model 3
β

t

.164
.111
.010
.325

- 1.692†
- 0.967
3.432**
- 0.410
2.328*
2.446*
- 1.038
- 0.106
- 1.154
0.114
1.243
- .0131

Model 4
- 0.127
- 0.066
0.240
- 0.029
0.173
0.171
- 0.074
- 0.200
- 0.957
0.491
1.049
- 0.332

Dependent Variable: SHAREHOLDER RETURN (t1)

Table 19
Results of Regression Analysis Using Outsider Proportion to Predict Shareholder Returns in Year t1

- 0.111
- 0.077
0.228
- 0.030
0.173
0.173
- 0.084

β

t

.148
.118

- 1.523
- 1.145
3.302**
- 0.423
2.438*
2.510*
- 1.219

Model 1

R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2
Significance of R2 Change
N = 202. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

Assets t1
Advertising Intensity t1
R&D Intensity t1
Capital Structure t1
Dividends t1
Shareholder Return t
Total Diversification t1
Restructure
CEO Duality t1
CEO Duality t1 x Restructure
(Duality t1)2
(Duality t1)2 x Restructure

Variables

147

- 0.118
- 0.071
0.223
- 0.018
0.188
0.166
- 0.078
- 0.017
- 0.088

β

t

.155
.116
.007
.443

- 1.609
- 1.057
3.220**
- 0.255
2.590**
2.379*
- 1.104
- 0.240
- 1.274

Model 2
- 0.116
- 0.070
0.209
- 0.019
0.193
0.172
- 0.079
- 0.189
- 0.167
0.193

β

t

.159
.115
.004
.353

- 1.573
- 1.040
2.955**
- 0.263
2.648**
2.450*
- 1.118
- 0.956
- .1524
0.930

Model 3
β

t

.160
.111
.001
.487

- 1.584
- 1.036
3.007**
- 0.266
2.625**
2.394*
- 1.124
- 0.109
- 1.259
0.894
1.145
0.815

Model 4
- 0.117
- 0.069
0.214
- 0.020
0.191
0.168
- 0.080
- 0.007
- 0.086
0.189
0.077
0.054

Dependent Variable: SHAREHOLDER RETURN (t1)

Table 20
Results of Regression Analysis Using CEO Duality to Predict Shareholder Returns in Year t1

- 0.111
- 0.077
0.228
- 0.030
0.173
0.173
- 0.084

β

t

.148
.118

- 1.523
- 1.145
3.302**
- 0.423
2.438*
2.510*
- 1.219

Model 1

R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2
Significance of R2 Change
N = 202. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

Assets t1
Advertising Intensity t1
R&D Intensity t1
Capital Structure t1
Dividends t1
Shareholder Return t
Total Diversification t1
Restructure
BOD Ties t1
BOD Ties t1 x Restructure
(BOD Ties t1)2
(BOD Ties t1)2 x Restructure

Variables

148

- 0.095
- 0.067
0.238
- 0.026
0.212
0.176
- 0.075
0.001
- 0.085

β

t

.153
.113
.005
.595

- 1.272
- 0.989
3.404**
- 0.360
2.602**
2.512*
- 1.055
0.012
- 1.014

Model 2
- 0.099
- 0.067
0.239
- 0.023
0.216
0.175
- 0.073
- 0.027
- 0.103
0.038

β

t

.153
.109
.000
.809

- 1.291
- 0.980
3.404**
- 0.324
2.594**
2.493*
- 1.026
- 0.201
- 0.908
0.242

Model 3
β

t

.157
.104
.004
.607

- 1.332
- 0.852
3.425**
- 0.426
2.562*
2.525*
- 1.013
0.460
0.565
- 0.661
- 0.987
0.793

Model 4
- 0.105
- 0.059
0.242
- 0.031
0.215
0.178
- 0.072
0.099
0.170
- 0.336
- 0.300
0.314

Dependent Variable: SHAREHOLDER RETURN (t1)

Table 21
Results of Regression Analysis Using Board of Director Ties to Predict Shareholder Returns in Year t 1

- 0.111
- 0.077
0.228
- 0.030
0.173
0.173
- 0.084

β

t

.148
.116

- 1.479
- 1.113
3.208**
- 0.411
2.368*
2.438*
- 1.184

Model 1

R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2
Significance of R2 Change
N = 192. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

Assets t1
Advertising Intensity t1
R&D Intensity t1
Capital Structure t1
Dividends t1
Shareholder Return t
Total Diversification t1
Restructure
CEO Equity t1
CEO Equity t1 x Restructure
(CEO Equity t1)2
(CEO Equity t1)2 x Restructure

Variables

149

- 0.111
- 0.077
0.228
- 0.030
0.172
0.171
- 0.083
- 0.007
- 0.001

β

t

.148
.106
.000
.994

- 1.460
- 1.108
3.175*
- 0.408
2.311*
2.379*
- 1.137
- 0.100
- 0.021

Model 2
- 0.111
- 0.078
0.228
- 0.029
0.173
0.172
- 0.082
- 0.003
0.042
- 0.046

β

t

.148
.101
.000
.856

- 1.463
- 1.116
3.170**
- 0.394
2.309*
2.379*
- 1.129
- 0.036
0.168
- 0.182

Model 3
β

t

.153
.097
.005
.601

- 1.408
- 1.072
3.190**
- 0.459
2.285*
2.373*
- 1.087
- 0.344
- 0.876
0.880
0.997
- 1.005

Model 4
- 0.108
- 0.075
0.230
- 0.034
0.172
0.172
- 0.080
- 0.029
- 0.624
0.631
2.985
- 3.009

Dependent Variable: SHAREHOLDER RETURN (t1)

Table 22
Results of Regression Analysis Using CEO Equity Ownership to Predict Shareholder Returns in Year t1

- 0.111
- 0.077
0.228
- 0.030
0.173
0.173
- 0.084

β

t

.148
.114

- 1.435
- 1.079
3.110**
- 0.399
2.297*
2.364*
- 1.148

Model 1

R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2
Significance of R2 Change
N = 181. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

Assets t1
Advertising Intensity t1
R&D Intensity t1
Capital Structure t1
Dividends t1
Shareholder Return t
Total Diversification t1
Restructure
TMT Equity t1
TMT Equity t1 x Restructure
(TMT Equity t1)2
(TMT Equity t1)2 x Restructure

Variables

150

- 0.109
- 0.074
0.224
- 0.032
0.164
0.168
- 0.080
0.000
- 0.043

β

t

.150
.105
.002
.845

- 1.390
- 1.022
3.038**
- 0.425
2.107*
2.260*
- 1.069
0.006
- 0.572

Model 2
- 0.107
- 0.074
0.225
- 0.033
0.164
0.167
- 0.081
- 0.005
- 0.057
0.018

β

t

.150
.100
.000
.899

- 1.363
- 1.020
3.032**
- 0.433
2.100*
2.216*
- 1.071
- 0.054
- 0.427
0.127

Model 3
β

t

.157
.097
.007
.494

- 1.292
- 0.859
3.074**
- 0.501
1.999*
2.193*
- 0.984
- 0.559
- 1.154
1.140
1.069
- 1.190

Model 4
- 0.102
- 0.063
0.229
- 0.038
0.157
0.165
- 0.075
- 0.054
- 0.406
0.436
0.469
- 0.534

Dependent Variable: SHAREHOLDER RETURN (t1)

Table 23
Results of Regression Analysis Using Top Management Team Equity Ownership to
Predict Shareholder Returns in Year t1

- .0111
- 0.077
0.228
- 0.030
0.173
0.173
- 0.084

β

t

.148
.116

- 1.479
- 1.113
3.208**
- 0.411
2.368*
2.438*
- 1.184

Model 1

R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2
Significance of R2 Change
N = 192. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

Assets t1
Advertising Intensity t1
R&D Intensity t1
Capital Structure t1
Dividends t1
Shareholder Return t
Total Diversification t1
Restructure
BOD Equity t1
BOD Equity t1 x Restructure
(BOD Equity t1)2
(BOD Equity t1)2 x Restructure

Variables

151

- 0.111
- 0.077
0.230
- 0.030
0.173
0.168
- 0.081
- 0.007
- 0.011

β

t

.148
.106
.000
.983

- 1.464
- 1.100
3.178**
- 0.408
2.339*
2.228*
- 1.100
- 0.096
- 0.153

Model 2
- 0.110
- 0.074
0.229
- 0.031
0.171
0.168
- 0.080
- 0.011
- 0.143
0.132

β

t

.149
.101
.001
.871

- 1.443
- 1.042
3.160**
- 0.417
2.276*
2.215*
- 1.083
- 0.145
- 0.176
0.163

Model 3
β

t

.150
.098
.001
.534

- 1.433
- 0.976
3.118**
- 0.371
2.102*
2.168*
- 0.923
0.020
- 0.239
- 0.176
0.623
- 1.211

Model 4
- 0.109
- 0.070
0.227
- 0.027
0.162
0.165
- 0.070
0.002
- 0.195
- 0.166
0.350
- 0.524

Dependent Variable: SHAREHOLDER RETURN (t1)

Table 24
Results of Regression Analysis Using Board of Director Equity Ownership to
Predict Shareholder Returns in Year t1

one analysis – proportion of outsiders on the board – did the addition of a curvilinear
term lead to a drop in the adjusted R2 value for each analysis. Overall significance
values for the curvilinear term models (Model 4) ranged from .325 to .607. Based on
the results for each model across all six governance characteristics, hypotheses 2a
through 2f were not supported.
5.B.2. Post Hoc Analyses and Results
Although my results revealed that there appeared to be no financial reward for
firms exhibiting socially constructed and legitimated forms of good governance despite
the fact that the governance structures tested are clearly what governance activists,
institutional investors, the popular press, and, to a great extent, academicians view as
sound and appropriate governance. As mentioned in Chapter 3, there is evidence that
the presence of certain governance structures and configurations can play a role in the
social construction of market value (Bianco & Byrne, 1997; Brickley et al., 1994; Byrd &
Hickman, 1992; Gaver, Gaver & Battistel, 1992; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1994; Tehranian,
Travlos & Waegelein, 1987; Westphal & Zajac, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1995). As
such, I conducted a series of post hoc analyses to truly determine if governance
surrounding a restructuring event does not play a role in the social construction of
market value.
In order to test the aforementioned assertion, my post hoc analyses were driven
by a two-pronged approach. First, I utilized an additional measure of market valuation
that is commonly accepted in strategic management research – return on equity.
Second, instead of measuring governance structures and shareholder returns in the
same year (i.e., t1), I measured the governance structures in the restructuring year (i.e.,
t) in order to assess the presence of a causal effect. Thus, the additional analyses: (1)
152

evaluated the original dependent variable – shareholder returns – in relation to the
governance structures, which were measured during the year of the restructuring; (2)
evaluated the alternative dependent variable – return on equity (ROE) – in relation to
the governance structures, which were measured both during the year of restructuring
and the year after. Only significant findings from these additional analyses will be
presented and discussed. The specific formula for ROE is as follows.
Return on Equity (ROE) =

net income
shareholders’ equity

Regressing shareholder returns against the six governance variables measured
the year of the restructuring, returned one significant finding. As shown in Model 2 of
Table 25, CEO duality during the restructuring year is significantly and negatively
related to shareholder returns (p < .01). In other words, shareholders in firms adopting
non-duality structures during the year of a restructuring, will be positively rewarded in
the post-restructuring year. This finding is supportive of the prior assertion that the
presence of certain governance structures and configurations can play a role in the
social construction of market value; that is, sound or good governance leads to greater
market valuations. Overall, R2, change in R2, and significance of Model 2 are .19, .04,
and .01, respectively. Models 3 (the interaction between restructuring and CEO duality)
and 4 (curvilinear effect) did not yield any significant findings.
Additional significant findings were uncovered when using ROE as the
dependent variable. For instance, significant results were obtained when assessing the
impact of proportion of outsiders on the board during the year of restructuring (i.e., year
t). Table 26 shows the results from this analysis. As shown in Model 2 of the table, the
addition of the independent variables – proportion of outsiders on the board in year t
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- 0.111
- 0.077
0.228
- 0.030
0.173
0.173
- 0.084

β

t

.148
.118

- 1.523
- 1.145
3.302**
- 0.423
2.438*
2.510*
- 1.219

Model 1

R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2
Significance of R2 Change
N = 203. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

Assets t1
Advertising Intensity t1
R&D Intensity t1
Capital Structure t1
Dividends t1
Shareholder Return t
Total Diversification t1
Restructure
CEO Duality t
CEO Duality t x Restructure
(Duality t)2
(Duality t)2 x Restructure

Variables

154

- 0.105
- 0.054
0.184
- 0.020
0.202
0.140
- 0.081
- 0.028
- 0.214

β

t

.189
.151
.041
.009

- 1.459
- 0.822
2.666**
- 0.292
2.852**
2.025*
- 1.183
- 0.420
- 3.105**

Model 2
- 0.105
- 0.055
0.190
- 0.021
0.203
0.143
- 0.083
0.082
- 0.160
- 0.126

β

t

.191
.149
.002
.477

- 1.462
- 0.833
2.725**
- 0.300
2.866**
2.061*
- 1.209
0.486
- 1.546
- 0.713

Model 3
β

t

.191
.143
.000
.599

- 1.466
- 0.829
2.799**
- 0.307
2.860**
2.055*
- 1.201
0.488
- 1.727
- 0.711
- 1.002
- 0.717

Model 4
- 1.06
- 0.053
0.192
- 0.022
0.202
0.141
- 0.083
0.089
- 0.178
- 0.125
- 0.116
- .126

Dependent Variable: SHAREHOLDER RETURN (t1)

Table 25
Results of Post-Hoc Analysis Using CEO Duality to Predict Shareholder Returns in Year t1

and restructuring – into the regression equation did not yield any significant results (R2 =
.23, change in R2 = .02, and p = .15). However, when the interaction term was entered,
significant results were obtained (positive relationship; p < .05). Overall, the R2 for
Model 3 improved by .016, for an overall R2 = .25, p = .04. Thus, these results suggest
that variance in ROE in year t1 can be explained by the interaction between the
proportion of outsiders on the board during the year of restructuring.
The interaction effect is depicted in Figure 4 and provides support for the idea
that shareholder returns are influenced by socially legitimated forms of good
governance. Specifically, Figure 4 suggests that the combination of restructuring and
greater proportions of outsiders on the board during the year of a restructuring has a
positive impact on ROE in the post-restructuring year. This result did not hold for nonrestructuring firms. As such, support is found for the assertion that board independence
is a desirable governance structure and is positively valued by the markets.
Additional variance in ROE in year t1 was explained by BOD ties in both the year
of, and year after, a restructuring. Regression results in Tables 27 and 28 reveal that
the direct effects of BOD ties (in either year) and the restructuring event itself did not
have any direct effects on ROE in year t1 (R2 = .22, p = .28 for year t and R2 = .22, p =
.32 for year t1). However, the addition of the interaction term in the regression models
resulted in model significance. As evidenced in Models 3 in Tables 27 and 28, the
addition of the interaction terms resulted in their significance (p < .10 for BOD ties in
year t, and p < .05 for BOD ties in year t1), as well as overall Model 3 significance (R2 =
.24, change in R2 = .01, and p = .08 for BOD ties in year t, and R2 = .24, change in R2 =
.02, and p = .03). The addition of a quadratic term in the regression equation to assess
a curvilinear effect did not produce any significant findings for either year.
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.214
.186

R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2
Significance of R2 Change
N = 203. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

t
- 1.557
1.563
1.547
5.329**
3.004**
3.120**
0.273

β

Model 1

Assets t1
- 0.109
Advertising Intensity t1
0.101
R&D Intensity t1
0.100
Capital Structure t1
0.363
0.204
Dividends t1
ROE t
0.200
Total Diversification t1
0.018
Restructure
Outsider Prop t
Outsider Prop t x Restructure
(Outsider Prop t)2
(Outsider Prop t)2 x Restructure

Variables
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- 0.099
0.099
0.104
0.364
0.217
0.222
0.036
- 0.061
- 0.104

β

t

.230
.194
.016
.147

- 1.411
1.545
1.620
5.361**
3.133**
3.397**
0.535
- 0.909
- 1.557

Model 2
- 0.120
0.105
0.106
0.378
0.241
0.218
0.035
- 0.904
- 0.215
0.884

β

t
†

.246
.207
.016
.041

- 1.707
1.650
1.656†
5.590**
3.460**
3.358**
0.526
- 2.178*
- 2.518*
2.057*

Model 3

Dependent Variable: RETURN ON EQUITY (t1)

- 0.122
0.103
0.104
0.380
0.239
0.221
0.039
- 1.525
- 0.294
2.318
0.082
- 0.835

β

t

.247
.199
.001
.919

- 1.692†
1.587
1.603
5.573**
3.372**
3.358**
0.572
- 0.891
- 0.365
0.595
0.101
- 0.367

Model 4

Table 26
Results of Post-Hoc Analysis Using Outsider Proportion to Predict Shareholder Returns in Year t1

10
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ROE t1

0

Restructuring Firms
-5

-10

-15

Non-Restructuring Firms

-20
Low

Outsider Proportion - Year t

High

Figure 4
Interactive Effect of Outsider Proportion (Year t) and Restructuring on
Shareholder Returns
A visual assessment of the interaction plots in Figures 5 and 6 shows that
restructuring firms possessing governance structures, which allow organizations to coopt sources of uncertainty in their external environments or serve as a means for
corporate control for executives (Aldrich, 1979; Mizruchi, 1996), can be see as
responsible governance. As such, this form of good governance is rewarded by the
markets. Assessing the interaction plots, it is important to note that the rewards for
restructuring firms only start to accrue at fairly high amounts of linkages with their
environments. Below this level, non-restructuring firms performed better.
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- 0.109
0.101
0.100
0.363
0.204
0.200
0.018

β

t
- 1.557
1.563
1.547
5.329**
3.004**
3.112**
0.273

Model 1

R2
.214
2
Adjusted R
.186
2
Change in R
Significance of R2 Change
N = 203. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

Assets t1
Advertising Intensity t1
R&D Intensity t1
Capital Structure t1
Dividends t1
ROE t
Total Diversification t1
Restructure
BOD Ties t
BOD Ties t x Restructure
(BOD Ties t)2
(BOD Ties t)2 x Restructure

Variables
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- 0.121
0.091
0.089
0.358
0.155
0.215
0.155
- 0.084
0.085

β

t
†

.224
.188
.010
.278

- 1.663
1.400
1.367
5.234**
2.011*
3.285**
2.011*
- 1.269
1.067

Model 2
- 0.152
0.089
0.096
0.378
0.182
0.219
0.034
- 0.275
- 0.044
0.260

β

t

.237
.197
.013
.082

- 2.043*
1.385
1.478
5.483**
2.318*
3.358**
0.502
- 2.156*
- 0.403
1.748†

Model 3

Dependent Variable: RETURN ON EQUITY(t1)

- 0.140
0.090
0.096
0.374
0.178
0.220
0.029
- 0.262
0.157
0.197
- 0.228
0.075

β

t

.239
.191
.002
.712

- 1.776†
1.394
1.476
5.365**
2.234*
3.351**
0.419
- 1.275
0.499
0.398
- 0.671
0.182

Model 4

Table 27
Results of Post-Hoc Analysis Using Board of Director Ties(t) to Predict Shareholder Returns in Year t1

- 0.109
0.101
0.100
0.363
0.204
0.200

β

t

.214
.186

- 1.557
1.563
1.547
5.329**
3.004**
3.112**

Model 1

R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2
Significance of R2 Change
N = 203. † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01

Assets t1
Advertising Intensity t1
R&D Intensity t1
Capital Structure t1
Dividends t1
ROE t
Total Diversification t1
Restructure
BOD Ties t1
BOD Ties t1 x Restructure
(BOD Ties t1)2
(BOD Ties t1)2 x Restructure

Variables
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- 0.116
0.088
0.091
0.360
0.160
0.214
0.024
- 0.086
0.073

β

t

.223
.187
.009
.322

- 1.609
1.357
1.387
5.281**
2.059*
3.252**
0.351
- 1.284
0.917

Model 2
t

.242
.202
.019
.032

- 0.149
- 2.038*
0.092
1.420
0.102
1.574
0.380
5.570**
0.192
2.449*
0.215** 3.302**
0.037
0.548
- 0.320
- 2.520*
- 0.085
- 0.787
0.322
2.161*

β

Model 3

Dependent Variable: RETURN ON EQUITY(t1)

- 0.138
0.091
0.100
0.374
0.186
0.214
0.034
- 0.376
0.002
0.470
- 0.090
- 0.113

β

t

.244
.196
.002
.743

- 1.840†
1.393
1.527
5.420**
2.340*
3.275**
0.507
- 1.842†
0.006
0.976
- 0.314
- 0.302

Model 4

Table 28
Results of Post-Hoc Analysis Using Board of Director Ties(t1) to Predict Shareholder Returns in Year t1
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Figure 5
Interactive Effect of Board of Director Ties (Year t) and
Restructuring on Shareholder Returns
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Figure 6
Interactive Effect of Board of Director Ties (Year t1) and
Restructuring on Shareholder Returns
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION, CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS,
AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The intent of this chapter is four-fold. First, the chapter offers a discussion of
the findings presented in the previous chapter. Two discussions are presented –
one for each study. Second, this chapter attempts to shed light as to why not all my
hypotheses were supported. Third, the contributions and implications of this
dissertation are discussed. Lastly, this chapter addresses the limitations of my
studies and offers directions for future research.
6.A.

Discussion

6.A.1. Discussion – Study 1
This first study in this dissertation was concerned with the relationship
between performance and restructuring, and their impact on governance in the
post-restructuring period. Drawing on the basic tenets of institutional and resource
dependence theories, this dissertation argues that modifications to governance
structures in the post-restructuring period will be the greatest for those firms
experiencing poor performance in the pre-restructuring period because poor
governance is believed to drive poor performance.
It is believed that a restructuring creates a fundamental shift in the domain of
the organization and alters the resource allocation process, thus ultimately leading
to a period of instability within the organization. Furthermore, it is believed that this
instability is magnified in periods of poor performance. As a result of these events,
the organization is more vulnerable to challenges from outside forces (e.g., powerful
owners), which might press for changes to the status quo (Davis & Thompson,
1994). Additionally, it is argued that, although each organization has its own
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sources of pressures (e.g., different/various powerful owners), the intent or purpose
of these pressures are the same – to improve the governance of the firm and
realign management’s interests to be congruent with those of shareholders. It was
hypothesized that these firms will adjust their governance structures to reflect
socially valid indicators of sound governance as set forth by large shareholders and
the markets. By changing governance structures that adhere to the prescriptions of
rationalizing myths in the institutional environment, an organization might enhance
its legitimacy and demonstrate that it is behaving on collectively valued purposes in
a proper and adequate manner.
The general findings of Study 1 are presented in Table 29. Overall, the
results generally support the notion that restructuring firms do institute governance
changes in the post-restructuring period. This overarching finding leads me to
believe that there is a general consensus in corporate America that governance
modifications, along with the restructuring itself, are necessary in order to improve
organizational performance. Why would powerful owners or institutional investors
push for modifications to governance structures and/or firms volunteer to institute
governance changes if there were not socially constructed beliefs that governance
truly does matter and that these particular changes are means of improving
organizational performance?
Table 29 reveals that the restructuring event itself, irrespective of
performance in the pre-restructuring period, is causally related to changes in
governance structures in the post-restructuring period. These positive relationships
reflect a push towards governance structures that are believed to be for the
betterment of the organization and its functioning. Specifically, restructuring was
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Table 29
Summary of Findings – Study 1
Governance
Structures

DIRECT, LINEAR RELATIONSHIPS
Restructuring
(+)

Performance
(-)

Prop Outsiders t1

X

X

Prop Outsiders t2

X

X

Restructuring
(-)

Performance
(+)

CEO Duality t1
CEO Duality t2
BOD Ties t1
BOD Ties t2
CEO Equity t1

X

CEO Equity t2

X

TMT Equity t1

X

X

TMT Equity t2

X

X

BOD Equity t1

X

BOD Equity t2
INTERACTION EFFECTS AND NON-LINEAR RELATIONSHIPS
CEO Duality t2

Duality was more prevalent for restructures with low or high
performance. It was less prevalent for firms with moderate
performance. Relationship does not hold for non-restructurers.

CEO Equity t2

Ownership was greater for restructurers with moderately low to high
performance. Contrary to arguments, for restructurers, the greater
the positive change in performance, the greater the equity
ownership.
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positively related to the proportion of outsiders on the board of directors, CEO
equity ownership, and TMT equity ownership in the first and second years following
a restructuring. Additionally, restructuring was found to be positively related to BOD
equity ownership in the first year following a restructuring. It is not surprising that
these structures were modified because they are the most frequently targeted for
change by institutional investors, as well as being easily changed compared to the
other governance structures assessed in this study (Daily et al., 1999, 2003a;
Dalton et al., 1998, 2003; Johnson et al., 1996). It is important to note that all of
these relationships reflect a move towards sound or better governance. In other
words, none of these relationships contradicted the theoretical arguments set forth
in this dissertation.
In all, four of the six governance structures studied were modified in the postrestructuring period, which is supportive of the fact that restructuring is all-to-often
associated with substandard governance. As previously mentioned, poor
governance is posited to negatively impact performance, even though the academic
literature, popular press, and institutional activists have never soundly defined poor
governance. The result of this situation has resulted in the consensus that if firms
experiencing poor performance must have reached that point as a result of poor
governance. As such, modifications are made to governance structures in such a
way that these structures will reflect current socially constructed norms.
Even though these modifications to governance structures are instituted,
what remains uncertain relates to how these changes came about. In other words,
do organizations make changes as a result of powerful actors forcing these
changes upon them, or are these changes instituted as a proactive measure in
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order to appease powerful actors in the external environment (Oliver, 1991)? In
fact, these changes might constitute a compromise between the organization and
multiple constituent demands (Oliver, 1991), since powerful actors might have the
different agendas (Hoskisson et al., 2002). Although beyond the scope of this
dissertation, these issues are important to address in order to attain a greater
understanding of governance in the post-restructuring period.
The two governance structures that did not have a direct relationship with
restructuring were CEO duality and board of director ties. It would seem reasonable
to assume that CEO duality would not be impacted for two main reasons. First,
CEO duality gives a CEO greater power and control over its board of directors and
top management team (Baliga et al., 1996; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1991; Finkelstein
& Hambrick, 1994), which makes these two groups more beholden to the CEO and,
thus, less likely to negatively impact the duality status. Second, CEOs might not be
forced to step down from their duality roles since other governance reforms might
be put into place to minimize the control that CEO duality offers (Rediker & Seth,
1995; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). For instance, as depicted in Table 29, powerful
owners may push for governance changes such as greater proportions of outsiders
on the board and greater equity ownership by CEOs in the firms they manage.
These two moves can be seen as ways to attenuate the increasingly negative
perception of CEO duality.
As previously mentioned, BOD ties in the post-restructuring period did not
seem to be impacted by the restructuring event. In hindsight, I would explain the
non-significance of this finding more as a matter of ability than desire. As my
theoretical arguments suggested, it would seem reasonable for power
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constituencies to desire greater number of BOD linkages in the post-restructuring
period because such linkages may serve as a means of co-opting the environment
for resources and also serve as a means of corporate control. However, in
hindsight, these external constituencies might not have the ability to significantly
increase their boards’ networks of linkages because of the simple fact that in order
to serve on the boards of other organizations, one must be invited to serve. As
such, this governance structure might not be directly controllable by powerful
owners, such as institutional investors.
An assessment of the results, as presented in Table 29, revealed confirming
and contradictory results concerning the relationship between performance and
governance structures. Congruent with theoretical arguments set forth in this
dissertation, a firm experiencing a negative change in performance in the prerestructuring period tends to have an increase in the proportion of outsiders on the
board in both the first and second years after a restructuring. It was once believed
that independent boards would have a positive impact on performance (Johnson et
al., 1996), yet another stream of research has suggested a reverse causal
relationship (e.g., Daily & Johnson, 1997; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Kaplan &
Minton, 1994; Pearce & Zahra, 1992). Various authors empirically demonstrated
that following periods of poor performance, firms tended to add outside directors to
the board, which provides some evidence that poor performance signals a need for
more vigilant monitoring of firm management and a need to realign the firm with its
external environment. This is accomplished via a more independent board, which is
believed to be a better governance mechanism than a dependent board (Daily et
al., 2003a, 2003b).
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Contradictory to my theoretical arguments, it was revealed that poor prior
performance was positively related to top management team equity ownership in
both years. Several explanations for this relationship are offered. First, it might be
that top managers opportunistically and voluntarily take on more shares in their
organizations as a signal to the public that they have faith in their organizations,
and, thus others should as well. A second explanation might be that as a result of
the increase in performance, top managers have exercised their stock options, thus
increasing their overall equity ownership in the organizations they govern. A last
explanation might be that this relationship is masking the true relationship between
performance and CEO equity ownership since CEOs are always member of the top
management team. In other words, as performance increases, CEOs adopt greater
equity positions in their firms for the same reasons offered for top managers – to
signal to the markets or as a result of exercising stock options.
The two sections above discussed governance in terms of their direct
relationships with performance and restructuring, however, some other interesting
findings are worthy of discussion. The first interesting finding related to CEO duality
in year t2. The results revealed that the behavior of duality was contingent on
whether or not a firm engaged in a restructuring. For non-restructuring firms, poor
performance was found to have no significant impact on duality. For restructuring
firms, however, the relationship was curvilinear (i.e., inverted U relationship) in
relation to performance.
At the extremes of performance (low and high), restructuring firms
subsequently exhibited non-duality structures. At the middle ground (moderate
performance), restructuring firms exhibited duality structures. As predicted, it is not
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surprising to find restructuring firms with low pre-restructuring performance to
subsequently possess non-duality structures. In other words, in instances when it is
believed that shareholder interests have been neglected and governance is weak,
corrective action must be taken and managerial interests must once again be
aligned with those interests of the shareholders. In fact, given the belief that
restructuring is frequently associated with failure of a firm’s prior governance
structure irrespective of performance, it would not be unreasonable to accept that
non-duality structures exist at high prior performance levels as well. As previously
mentioned, firms exhibiting moderate levels of performance in the pre-restructuring
period were best characterized as having duality structures in the second year after
a restructuring. Although no straightforward theoretical rationale exists to explain
this phenomenon, it might be attributable to the fact that this group of restructurers
was more inclined to have other changes made to their governance structures and
not to duality. It might be that CEOs and their respective top managers opted to
have their personal wealth more heavily invested in the firm, as discussed above.
The second interesting finding relates to CEO equity ownership in year t2. As
is evidenced in Figure 3, equity ownership was greater for restructurers with
moderately low to high performance. For low performing organizations, nonrestructuring firms subsequently had CEOs who held more equity in their
organizations than CEOs of restructuring firms. Specifically, the regression lines
intersected at 1.4 standard deviations below the mean of firm performance. Since
the mean change in ROA performance for the entire sample was -.22 and the
standard deviation was 7.68, the intersection of the two regression lines occurred at
a negative change in ROA performance which equaled 10.75. Thus, restructuring
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firms in my sample experiencing a change in ROA greater than -10.75 (which
amounted to 93% of the firms) had CEOs with greater equity ownership than their
non-restructuring counterparts.
The greater use of CEO equity ownership for restructuring firms versus nonrestructuring firms is a clear indication that socially legitimated governance
structures are used to institute perceived better governance within organizations. In
other words, restructuring firms, as a whole, when compared to non-restructuring
firms had CEOs who had greater equity positions in the firms they managed.
6.A.2. Discussion – Study 2
The second area of study within this dissertation involved the moderating
impact of governance on the restructuring-performance relationship. The idea here
is that due to institutionalization of what constitutes sound governance, the financial
markets will positively reward those firms whose governance structures possess
socially valid indicators of sound governance. Up until this point, this was an
untested area of research in the restructuring-market performance relationship that
required investigation because there is significant evidence that market evaluations
can be impacted by non-financial factors, such as alterations of governance
structures.
Drawing on the basic tenets and arguments of institutional, resource
dependence, and signaling theories it was argued that the financial markets’
reactions may reflect social benefits resulting from symbolic actions that reduce
uncertainty about managerial motives (Westphal & Zajac, 1998). Institutional
theorists have argued that symbolic actions are most effective under conditions of
uncertainty or ambiguity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott,
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1995; Westphal & Zajac, 1998). Thus, it was argued that potentially symbolic
actions such socially valid governance structures might play a role in the social
construction of market value when firms are engaging in portfolio restructuring
activities.
The initial relationships tested revealed no moderating impact of governance
on the restructuring-shareholder return relationship. The governance structures
tested were measured the same year as shareholder returns (i.e., year t1). For
each governance structure studied, its moderating impact on the restructuringshareholder return relationship was non-existent. Although there appears to be no
clear reasoning for the non-significant findings, one plausible explanation is worth
mentioning. I believe that measuring governance structures in the year following a
restructuring will be symbolically less powerful because, on average, firm
performance increases in the year after a restructuring and thus fewer concerns
over improper/weak governance exist in times of improving performance (Daily &
Schwenk, 1996; Johnson et al., 1996). Additionally, as organizational performance
increases, far less uncertainty exists surrounding the health of the organization and
its governance structures. As such, assessments of proper governance may only
be salient (or at least more salient) in times of uncertainty and questionable
performance. This is supported by evidence that institutional investors,
blockholders, and other large shareholders only start to focus on governance and
push for modifications in times of weakening or stagnant performance (Barnard,
1991; Davis & Thompson, 1994; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Stiles & Taylor, 2001). For
example, Disney’s CEO, Michael Eisner, had his duality status stripped in 2004
after lackluster/stagnant performance of Disney’s stock price. Additionally, in
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response to this performance, Disney’s top managers pay packages were revised in
December 2004 to include greater amounts of equity ownership.
As per the discussion in Chapter 5, several post-hoc studies were conducted
to assess the robustness of my non-significant findings. Measuring governance
structures in the restructuring year and/or using ROE as an alternate dependent
variable proved somewhat fruitful. CEO duality in the restructuring year proved to
be negatively related to shareholder returns in the following year. Although an
interesting finding and supportive of the arguments that CEO duality is viewed as a
mechanism by which CEOs can pursue their own personal agendas and silence
opposition from the board, this relationship was present in my entire sample –
restructuring and non-restructuring firms.
Moderating impacts were discovered when assessing the proportion of
outsiders on the board (measured in the year of the restructuring) and BOD ties
(measured in the year of, and year after, the restructuring). These relationships
were plotted in Figures 4 – 6. The results revealed that greater proportions of
outsiders on the board and greater BOD ties improved ROE in the following year.
These relationships did not hold for non-restructuring firms, which makes sense
considering that the absence of a restructuring event, by default, implies less
ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding the organization and the motives of the
individuals and/or groups who govern it. Thus, outsiders on the board can be a
valuable signal by enhancing the reputation and credibility of the organization,
helping it establish and maintain the firm’s legitimacy, and serving as a means of
controlling opportunistic behavior by the CEO and top managers. Additionally,
board members with substantial linkages with their environments can signal to
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potential investors that their firms are legitimate enterprises worthy of support
(Mizruchi, 1996). Furthermore, substantial linkages allow for cooptation of
potentially disruptive elements in the organization’s environment (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978) and serve as a source for corporate control (Mizruchi, 1996).
In conclusion, while conventional and institutionalized agency perspectives
assume that the positive moderating impact of these governance structures reflect
economic benefits from reduced agency costs, a perspective based on institutional,
resource dependence, signaling, and impression management theories offer a
different interpretation – market valuations may instead reflect social benefits
resulting from symbolic actions that reduce uncertainty about managerial motives.
Such symbolic actions are most effective under conditions of ambiguity and/or
uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer, 1981; Scott,
1995; Westphal & Zajac, 1998) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977;
Pfeffer, 1981; Scott, 1995; Westphal & Zajac, 1998), and, as such, serve as
explanations of the moderating impact of governance on the restructuringperformance relationship.
Although it was not broad-based, I did find support for the argument that
market valuations may reflect social benefits resulting from symbolic actions such
as good governance. This support was found with the positive moderating impact
of CEO duality in the restructuring year, the proportion of outsiders on the board in
the restructuring year, and board ties in the restructuring and following years.
6.B.

Reasons for Mixed Results
As the results revealed, not all of my hypotheses were supported. A variety

of explanations can be offered. In the following sections I offer five specific reasons
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as to why the results were mixed. In fact, I believe these explanations are important
to consider in any study that wishes to assess changes in governance structures.
6.B.1. Any Change is Good News
Research (e.g., Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1995)
suggests that investors have great interest in reducing uncertainty and therefore
value socially legitimate indications that appear to be beneficial to the shareholders.
The basic implication here is that external constituencies reduce their pressure for
change and/or markets positively reward firms for initiating socially legitimate moves
that are perceived as value-added to the shareholder. As such, it would seem
reasonable that not all pressures for change as hypothesized in this study would be
addressed, due to the fact that partial modifications are enough to elicit a positive
response from the markets or a reduction in pressure from external constituencies.
There is evidence that external constituencies and the financial market
positively value announcements of change to a firm’s governance structure or
control procedures, even if these changes are decoupled from actual practice (i.e.,
not implemented by the firm). The adoption of formal governance reforms may be
particularly effective in enhancing organizational legitimacy by helping to allay
concerns about managerial loyalties, irrespective of whether such reforms are
actually implemented in the organization. For example, research by Westphal and
Zajac (1994) Zajac and Westphal (1995) indicates that firms might actually adopt
long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) for their CEOs, never implement these programs,
and still receive a positive reaction from the markets. Essentially, the decoupling of
LTIPs adoption from implementation can relieve pressures that firms face from
shareholder groups to enact other governance reforms.
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6.B.2. Substitution Effects
Closely aligned with the aforementioned idea, it is believed that substitution
effects exist in relation to governance and changes in governance (Beatty & Zajac,
1994; Dalton et al., 2003; Rediker & Seth, 1995; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Westphal
& Zajac, 1998; Young et al., 2000; Zajac & Westphal, 1994). The idea behind
substitution effects of governance is that some substantive governance issues or
substantive changes in governance might serve as substitutes for each other. In
other words, substitution theory addresses the relationship among alternative
governance mechanisms.
For example, governance reform activists believe that a higher level of
monitoring by the board (i.e., greater outsider representation) would be required
when a CEO does not accept any compensation risk tied to firm performance
versus when a CEO’s incentives are tied to the performance of the firm (e.g., Fama
& Jensen, 1983a).

In essence, the substitution effect of governance states that

the desired level of one governance mechanism is to be contingent on the
magnitude of other governance mechanisms. Governance mechanisms
incorporated into this debate include pay for performance, outsider representation
on the board, CEO duality, equity held by directors, and equity held by the top
management team. By formally adopting institutionally legitimated procedures
indicative of CEO accountability, top managers may effectively preempt or forestall
alternative changes in board structure.
6.B.3. CEO Influence
CEOs possess varying degrees of power in their organizations and do not
favor any governance changes that might decrease their autonomy or increase their
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employment or compensation risks (Daily & Johnson, 1997; Oliver, 1991; Shen,
2003; Westphal & Zajac, 1998). The literature suggests that CEOs who have more
control over the governance of their organizations via CEO duality, board members
who were appointed by the CEO, and a longer tenured CEO have more influence
relative to the board. As such, powerful CEOs might be able to forestall initiatives
desired by constituencies that reduce the CEOs’ power or translate into greater risk
assumption by the CEOs in relation to their compensation packages. It is important
to note that I am not suggesting that CEOs will never give in to external pressure,
but I would be surprised to find changes in those governance characteristics least
desired by powerful CEOs.
6.B.4. Organizations Vary in Their Ability to Conform
Institutional theorists recognize that organizations may vary in the degree to
which they conform to changes in their external environments (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; Oliver, 1991; Young et al., 2000). It is suggested that an organization’s
strategic positioning (Davis et al., 1994; Fligstein, 1991; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992),
as well as its own traditions and history may also affect the extent of conformity to
isomorphic pressures (Eisenhardt, 1988; Young et al., 2000). Additionally, it is
suggested organizations must be responsive to external demands and expectations
in order to survive, yet it is posited that organizations vary in their resistance and
proactiveness to conforming to the institutional environment. As such, these issues
could manifest themselves in varying degrees of organizational responses (Meyer &
Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Oliver, 1991).
Furthermore, because my sample of firms was drawn from multiple
industries, I believe that the stability of organizational fields (i.e., the industry or
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competitive environment) would be a major determining factor in the likelihood of
change in any given organization. The actions of others in the organizational fields
can either legitimate current practices or else constitute reasons for change
(Fligstein, 1990, 1991).
6.B.5. The Impact of Board Interlocks
One of the most-studied forms of interorganizational influence is the director
interlock, which acts as a mechanism for interfirm cooperation, functions as a
source of legitimacy, and serves a source of information about business practices
(Haunschild, 1993, 1994; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Mizruchi, 1996; Palmer et
al., 1993). The literature has established that board interlocks function as important
conduits of information about business practices, which might result in firms doing
the same things their interlocked partners are doing. In other words, it is suggested
that organizations adopt legitimated practices, routines, and structures of other
organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
Evidence of interorganizational imitation via the board interlock is plentiful.
For example, Haunschild (1993) demonstrated that premiums paid by an acquiring
firm are related to those paid by other firms through which the organization was
linked. In a related study, Haunschild (1994) found support for her arguments that
firm managers are exposed to the acquisition activities of other firms when they sit
on those firms’ boards, which will serve as models to be imitated. Additional
evidence of the power of interlocks was offered by Palmer et al. (1993) in their
investigation of the multidivisional form among large U.S. industrial corporations in
the 1960s. Their results showed that firms whose directors had corporate board
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contacts with the directors of multidivisional firms adopted the multidivisional form
more frequently than other firms.
Based on this stream of research, I would expect that organizations also
imitate the governance practices and responses to pressures for governance reform
of those organizations with whom they are linked. Existing governance practices of
other firms may be viewed as legitimate, and thus the adoption of these governance
practices might function as a source of legitimacy for the firm and its own board of
directors and top managers. Since firms respond differently to pressures for greater
accountability in the governance structure of their own firm, and due to the fact that
governance structures are different across firms, it could be that organizational
imitation will result in different patterns of governance characteristics.
6.C.

Contributions and Implications
The purpose of this dissertation was to integrate the domains of governance

and portfolio restructuring in a post-restructuring setting. Addressing this issue
makes this study unique in a number of ways. Conceptually, it provides an analysis
of the relationship between portfolio restructuring and organizational governance
structures of the parent firm, as well as an examination of the moderating impact of
governance on the restructuring-performance relationship. This dissertation
examined these issues empirically using a multitude of variables, which have
received thorough scrutiny in the governance and restructuring literatures, yet have
never been examined in the post-restructuring period.
Such an examination was crucial because the literature suggests that
inadequate governance negatively impacts the performance of the organization and
thus precipitates a firm’s need to restructure its portfolio of businesses. The
178

literature contains studies that address the actions firms take to place them on a
path of renewed performance, yet, to date, no research has examined the alleged
driver of poor performance – inadequate governance – in the post-restructuring
period. As stated in the beginning of this dissertation, if governance is truly weak in
the pre-restructuring period, what do firms do to correct this issue in the postrestructuring period? As such, it would seem appropriate to assume that firms will
have a need to address this issue on either a voluntary or involuntary basis. The
empirical results revealed that restructuring firms do make significant changes to
governance structures in the post-restructuring period. Many of these changes are
instituted irrespective of performance in the pre-restructuring period.
The arguments set forth in this dissertation suggests that the literature
concerning organizational control and its relationship to managing the firm’s
portfolio of businesses are the result of years of institutionalized beliefs based in
agency theory. This dissertation makes another contribution by breaking free from
the ingrained way of viewing these topics and predominantly employs institutional
arguments, along with arguments from the signaling, impression management, and
resource dependence literatures, to suggest that the portfolio restructuring and
governance literatures have become locked into a way of thinking that basically
equates poor performance with poor governance. The existing literature has
clearly, although not convincingly, established what constitutes sound governance.
This dissertation makes a contribution by arguing that firms will alter their
governance structures in the post-restructuring period to address the governance
problem. It is believed that external constituencies will press for reforms –
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predominantly ones that are taken for granted and those that are believed to
positively impact the performance of the organization.
The second major focus of this study was to investigate the impact of
governance on the restructuring-performance relationship. It was argued that
sound governance (i.e., those characteristics that are socially valid and taken for
granted as those which appear to minimize managerial opportunism) positively
moderates the restructuring-performance relationship. Until now, the portfolio
restructuring literature has consistently incorporated governance variables and their
importance to the restructuring decision, yet has failed to consider these same
variables in the post-restructuring period. Additionally, the restructuringperformance literature has narrowly focused on the positive relationship between
these two variables and has made no attempt to investigate phenomena that might
positively or negatively impact this relationship. As such, it was important to
investigate variables that might moderate this relationship in order to test its
robustness. It was believed that the governance characteristics of the firm were a
good place to start since there was significant evidence that market evaluations can
be impacted by non-financial factors signals, such as alterations of governance
structures. This investigation attempted to define and examine governance
structures that were believed to impact the restructuring-performance relationship.
6.D.

Limitations and Future Research

6.D.1. Portfolio Restructuring as a Dichotomous Variable
Using a dichotomous variable to operationalize restructuring only allows
researchers to draw conclusions about firms based on their membership in one of these
two categories – restructuring versus not restructuring. By grouping firms into one of
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two categories the variance in this variable is greatly reduced. As such, there is an
implicit assumption that the relationships uncovered in this research are relevant to all
restructuring firms, which might not be the case at all.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the sample of restructuring firms ranged from 10% of
assets divested all the way up to 46.7%. It would not be unreasonable to assume that
the pressures for change in the latter group (i.e., divesting nearly half of the firm’s
assets) would be far greater than those in the former group, especially if substandard
performance preceded the restructuring event.
Future research in this area could investigate the same set of relationships
posited in this dissertation with restructuring operationalized as a continuous variable,
such as the percentage of assets divested. Doing so, will allow for greater variance in
the restructuring variable, and, as such, permit researchers to more accurately assess
restructuring’s impact on governance structures. Other operationalizations of
restructuring have been percentage of sales divested (Bethel & Liebeskind (1993);
Hoskisson et al. (1994); Johnson et al. (1993) and number of business units divested
(Hoskisson et al., 1994).
6.D.2. Only Considering Portfolio Restructuring
As discussed in Chapter 1, portfolio restructuring is not the only type of
restructuring firms may undertake. Firms may also engage in financial restructurings,
which involve significant changes in the capital structure of a firm, including leveraged
buyouts and debt for equity swaps, or organizational restructurings, which involve
significant changes in the organizational structure of the firm, including a realignment of
structure with strategy, flattening of hierarchic levels, and employment downsizing.
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Although this dissertation only considered portfolio restructurings, there are
instances where firms might engage in two or all three of these restructurings
simultaneously or sequentially (Gibbs, 1993; Hoskisson et al., 1994; Johnson, 1996).
As such, it is important for researchers to carefully examine the nature of the
restructurings before they can put any findings into context. For instance, if a firm
simultaneously engages in a portfolio restructuring and a financial restructuring,
researchers must address which changes in governance, the firm’s strategy, firm
performance, or any other variable(s) of interest, are attributable to each of the
restructurings.
Thus, future research could contrast the various types of restructurings and
assess their individual impacts on governance in the post-restructuring period. Some
preliminary results by Smart and Hitt (1996) suggest that the governance arguments
commonly used to explain asset restructurings might not be as strong for financial
restructurings. As such, these explanations and investigations would begin with broad
theoretical discussions of the links between the other types of restructurings and
governance, since these linkages are not as well developed as they are between
portfolio restructuring and governance.
6.D.3. Only Assessing Single Divestiture Moves
Studies examining firm performance as an antecedent to restructuring tend to be
classified into one of two categories: those examining programs of divestitures and
those examining single divestitures. Examining the latter allows a researcher to focus
on one event, thus allowing one to examine variables of interest before and after the
restructuring. In other words, it is easier to identify the pre- and post-restructuring
periods than it is when examining a program of divestitures. This dissertation, like most
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restructuring research, only examined firms that engaged in a single divestiture of
company assets. Research has consistently demonstrated that for these types of
restructurings, the divested units tended to be weak performers and that the parent firm
exhibited significantly lower levels of performance than matched control firms. In other
words, poor business unit or firm performance is positively associated with single
business unit divestiture activity (Duhaime & Grant, 1984; Johnson, 1996; Montgomery
& Thomas, 1988).
Unlike firms in single divestiture studies, firms engaging in programs of
divestiture may not do so as a result of substandard business unit performance
(Johnson, 1996). A company that undertakes a program of divestitures might do so as
a result of lower than expected growth in the unit or as a result of an exploratory move
into new markets that did not live up to expectations or did not fit the firm’s strategy.
Based on these issues the link between substandard performance and restructuring
activities might not be as strong for chronic restructuring firms as it would be for firms
engaging in a single divestiture with the intent of rectifying a drop in performance. As
such, it would be reasonable to assume that linkages between governance deficiencies,
firm performance, and restructuring would not be as strong for these firms as they are
for single divestiture firms. This is obviously and empirical question that needs to be
assessed in future research in order to determine the boundaries of the governanceperformance-restructuring paradigm.
6.D.4. Longevity of Governance Changes
As evidenced in Study 1, restructuring was related to a fair amount of
governance characteristics in the post-restructuring period. Although this dissertation is
one of the first studies to assess multiple governance structures in multiple years after a
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firm restructures its assets, the governance structures were not studied beyond the
second year in the post-restructuring period. Thus, I am uncertain as to how long these
changes will last. As the firm finalizes it’s restructuring and experiences increases in
performance, do these changes in governance slowly return to pre-restructuring levels?
Evidence does exist in the literature that during times of improved performance CEOs
are given more freedom and latitude in terms of governing their organizations. As such,
do CEOs try to gain more control over their organizations via such measures as
decreasing the proportion of outsiders on the board and/or pressing for duality
structures?
Future research would investigate how these governance structures might
change or evolve in the post-restructuring period beyond the two years that were
assessed in this dissertation. Based on the results that suggest performance has a
direct impact on performance, I would imagine that, as firm performance fluctuates in
the post-restructuring period, modifications to the firm’s governance structures would
manifest themselves. However, in the absence of a future restructuring event, these
changes might not be as great and/or affecting the same governance structures.
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